Limits of computation
en.wikipedia.org
en.wikipedia.org
Well, technically, you just have to wait as the universe continues expanding if you want the temperature of the CMB to drop.
Is this an error? I thought busy beaver must halt?
IIRC, a Busy Beaver may halt or not. You only care about those that _do_ halt, though, and the _champion_ is the one with the most number of 1s on the tape. The whole problem is determining if a given machine will halt or not. Which we know, by the halting theorem, is possible to prove on a case-by-case basis, but not in the general case (i.e., you cannot create an algorithm to determine it).
So you resort to heuristics. E.g., if a machine never has a "go to the halt state" in its transition table, you know that it can't ever halt. But as the machines grow, you'll have to cover an infinite amount of such heuristics, hence the incomputable nature of them.
> We would like to emphasize that the output of our logic gate can be fed directly as an input to a second similar device (as shown below) and so on, to perform all the calculations desired. Clearly, our logic gate is a combinational device; thus, the removal of the inputs makes the system revert to the initial state S0 (regardless of whether the final state was S0 or S1). If we want to remember the final state, we need to couple this device to a sequential device where a Landauer reset might be required and a minimum dissipation of kBT log 2 is needed.
In other words, the Laundauer limit applies to state machines, but not to combinatorial logic blocks. I guess in retrospect this should not be surprising: the derivation of the principle considers a computing machine which is in thermal equilibrium with its environment, so implicitly we model the machine as having some memory unit which has time to thermalize after each operation.
>“How Smart Is a Rock? To appreciate the feasibility of computing with no energy and no heat, consider the computation that takes place in an ordinary rock. Although it may appear that nothing much is going on inside a rock, the approximately 1025 (ten trillion trillion) atoms in a kilogram of matter are actually extremely active. Despite the apparent solidity of the object, the atoms are all in motion, sharing electrons back and forth, changing particle spins, and generating rapidly moving electromagnetic fields. All of this activity represents computation, even if not very meaningfully organized. We’ve already shown that atoms can store information at a density of greater than one bit per atom, such as in computing systems built from nuclear magnetic-resonance devices. University of Oklahoma researchers stored 1,024 bits in the magnetic interactions of the protons of a single molecule containing nineteen hydrogen atoms.51 Thus, the state of the rock at any one moment represents at least 1027 bits of memory.”
[1] https://www.goodreads.com/quotes/1284270-how-smart-is-a-rock...
The very questions are faulty. A factory-stock rock is not a programable logic or memory device. If it computes at all, it only computes being-a-rock.
This rock analogy is the sort of sloppy thinking that takes someone from "it takes at least 38 petaflops to simulate a conscious human brain" (currently unknown, but not obviously incorrect) to "the human brain is a petaflop-class supercomputer" (WTF, no, category error).
This view of he universe seems to be fairly important and taken seriously since black hole thermodynamics, gravity as entropic force and similar concepts are derived from it.
The quote I was reacting to emphasizes feasibility:
"To appreciate the feasibility of computing with no energy and no heat, consider the computation that takes place in an ordinary rock."
There's precious little to suggest feasible computing with a rock. (Or to suggest other feasible ways to run computations of interest to humans with no input energy and no waste.) It's like reading "to appreciate the feasibility of supplying civilization's electricity sustainably, consider the energy released when two neutron stars collide." Both are strong contenders for "among the least feasible engineering programs not yet proven outright impossible."
A laptop only computes being-a-laptop. What makes it useful is that we have assigned meaning to the physical output. That is, there is a homomorphism mapping the atoms on a computer to a logical program.
So any physical system is only computationally useful to the extent that we can define homomorphisms from its physical state to a logical system of interest.
The OP is about the physical limitations of the information stored in the underlying system as measured by entropy. I wonder if entropy is the operating definition here because it implicitly defines what logical system we use to identify the physical system.
The cited link to this [1] is a fascinating email thread/essay which they call "Femtotech". I don't even understand most of the stuff, but it seems we're far, far from it.
[1] https://web.archive.org/web/20041025030505/http://www.cs.usu...
He and Ben Goertzel seem to look as pioneers but never produce something tangible.