> The number of people who religiously check PGP signatures/SHA256sums or whatever is miniscule.
• If you transfer things around using BitTorrent, it'll ensure you always end up with a file that hashes correctly to the sum it originally had when the .torrent file was constructed.
• Many archive formats (zip, rar, and 7z, at least) contain checksums, and archival utilities validate those checksums during extraction, refusing to extract broken files. "Self-extracting archive" executables that use these formats inherit this property.
• Some common disk-image formats (dmg, wim) embed a checksum that checks the whole disk-image during mount, and will refuse to mount a bad one. (I believe you can then try to "repair" the disk image with your OS's disk-repair utility, if you have no other copies.)
• Web pages increasingly use Sub-Resource Integrity attributes on things like .css and .js files, protecting them (though not the page itself) from errors.
• ISO files don't embed checks, but all the common package formats (Windows .cab and .msi; Linux .deb and .rpm; macOS .pkg) on installer ISOs embed their own checksums and often signatures.
• git repos are 'protected' insofar as you won't be able to sync mis-hashed objects from a remote, so they won't spread.
Really, looking over all that, it's only 1. plain binary executables, and 2. "media files" (images, audio, video)—and only when retrieved over a "dumb" protocol, rather than a pre-baked-manifest protocol like BitTorrent or zsync—that are "risky" and in need of explicit checksum comparison.