PATH_MAX Is Tricky
eklitzke.org
eklitzke.org
If you want to fix this you basically have to bypass it by using "\\?\" on the front of the full path. The situation gets messy when you're trying to write an installer with node packages especially.
https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/windows/desktop/aa3...
They had done such a step before with the switch from Win16 to Win32 and the help of Win32s. With Win32 they cleaned up the old API, fixed things yet kept it source compatible when possible. Microsoft could have fixed so many things with Win64 starting with Windows 2003 64-bit. But no, Microsoft invested little on native Windows API between 2002 and 2012 - Longhorn (later Vista) and dotNet were the latest hype.
Ha, they wouldn't even rename System32 when converting it to 64 bit. There was no chance of an API cleanup.
https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/aa365247(VS.85).asp...
Hanoi tower game built-in.
AFAIK, "paths" aren't a thing filesystems think about. As far as a filesystem driver is concerned, paths are either—for open/read/write/etc.—plain inodes (a uint64), or—for directory-manipulation calls—an inode plus a ptrdiff_t to index into the dirent list†. The only things that care about NAME_MAX are lookup(2) [get inode given {inode, dirent}], and link(2) [put inode in {inode, dirent}].
So it's really only the kernel, through its syscall interface, that cares about paths—and so PATH_MAX is just a representation of the maximum size of a path the kernel is willing to accept in those syscalls. As if they each had a statically-allocated path[PATH_MAX] buffer your path got copied into.
† Writing a FUSE filesystem is a great way to learn about what the kernel thinks a filesystem is. It's very different from the userland perspective. For example, from a filesystem driver's perspective, "file descriptors" don't exist! Instead, read(2) and write(2) calls are stateless, each call getting passed a kernel-side io-handle struct that must get re-evaluated for matching permissions on each IO operation. (You can do some up-front evaluation during the open(2) call, but, given that a file's permissions might change while you have a descriptor open to it, there's not much point.)
> Your hypothetical driver would need to keep a double-mapping: from inodes to paths, and then from paths to whatever else.
As I've noted in another comment, inodes (`struct inode` in linux) typically contain a lot of information. No additional mapping would be required.
Perhaps on a mainframe OS or something that doesn't have a VFS, but all VFS pretty much work the same way conceptually (BSD/nix, Linux, Windows).
This was mainly an example to show that "paths" in some sense are (or could be) handled by file systems, not an actual design I'd aspire to :)
That seems hard to believe. It would inefficient to look for a file for each e.g. write(). I guess a filesystem defines its own implementation-defined open-file handle and the kernel translates that into an (integer) FD.
> each call getting passed a kernel-side io-handle struct that must get re-evaluated for matching permissions on each IO operation. (You can do some up-front evaluation during the open(2) call, but, given that a file's permissions might change while you have a descriptor open to it, there's not much point.)
That's not how it works. File modes are checked when you open the file. Once you have an open file (a file handle), the file modes no longer matter.
File modes are more a "PATH" thing (there aren't per-filesystem variations and I assume permission checking is not done in file system code), although the file system must allocate the space to save the file mode bits and implement the VFS API.
"file descriptors" taken _literally_ don't exist (they are just the interface exposed to user space programs). Linux uses `struct file` internally as the generic file tracking, and multiple file descriptors can refer to a single `struct file`. `struct file` in turn refers to a `struct inode`, which represents an actual "something" on disk. Each file system driver stores a bunch of info in the `struct inode`.
In addition to that tracking, there is generally a bunch of fs-specific data structures to handle lookup of names (in the typical case, these are essentially cached versions of what is stored on disk).
At least in BSD, the syscall layer calls into the kernel virtual filesystem, which translates file descriptors into file objects. File objects have fo_read/fo_write methods implemented by different kinds of file object.
Files backed by filesystems have an associated "vnode" (virtual inode object). Then the fo_read/fo_write layer invokes the VOP_READ or VOP_WRITE (for example) method on the vnode. VOP ("vnode operation") methods are implemented by individual filesystems. Multiple user-level file descriptors can refer to a single vnode.
The filesystem's inode object hangs off a pointer from the generic vnode. Vnodes are unique (1:1) per real file (inode).
So:
read(fd, ...) ->
sys_read -> kern_readv ->
fget() (translate fd number into struct file object;
check that the descriptor was opened read/write as appropriate for the operation)
dofileread() ->
fo_read() ->
vn_io_fault() (fo_read method for vnodes) -> vn_read ->
VOP_READ(vnode, uio, ioflags, ucred)
(vnode for the file, an io descriptor ("uio"), io flags, and user credentials)
So yeah, at the filesystem layet (VOP_READ), you no longer have the fd (or even the file object) in the BSD model.Linux's model is similar, but not completely identical. They call "vnodes" "inodes" instead, and may not have the intermediary file layer.
There are! Keep in mind that "filesystems" includes things like NFS and SMB. The local kernel has no ultimate authority over security policy of a remotely-mounted filesystem, right? In open(2), the kernel has to ask the filesystem what's what, because the filesystem might know something the kernel doesn't.
Now, the interpretation of stat(2) values (UID/GID, ACLs, etc.) are up to the VFS—but the filesystem is the one that created that stat struct when the kernel called its stat(2) impl, and it expects to get that stat-struct passed back with no changes to open(2), and then make the decision for itself what those stat-struct members mean.
Which is to say, it's perfectly possible to write a filesystem that says you have 0000 permissions on a file, but which still lets you open(2), read(2), write(2), readdir(2), etc. that file! It's up to the filesystem to enforce file permissions or ACLs, and it can do that however it wishes; stat(2) is just an indication, in a common VFS language, of the policy the filesystem is (probably) going to enforce. It's not a baton passed to the kernel to do the enforcement for it. Linux has no equivalent to NT's kernel-object ACLs.
> File modes are more a "PATH" thing (there aren't per-filesystem variations and I assume permission checking is not done in file system code), although the file system must allocate the space to save the file mode bits and implement the VFS API.
Ah, sorry, I didn't mean file permissions; was a typo. I mean things like, the process on the other end of a pipe closing its write end, will cause your read(2) call to that pipe's FD to fail, because the IO permissions (not file permissions) on the FD have changed between the two successive read(2) calls.
When your open(2) impl gets called, you receive a stat(2) [that you previously created yourself when the kernel called your stat(2) implementation], and a set of open(2) flags, compare the two, and decide whether to grant each requested permission from open(2) given the stat-struct. Essentially, the open(2) impl is a pure mask-function on the requested flags, to determine what permissions actually end up put into the descriptor. (Conveniently, the kernel then returns a permissions error if it doesn't get returned the perms it asks for. But it could always end up with more perms than it asked for!)
Then, later, the kernel can modify that set of IO permissions without telling you, and your next read(2) or write(2) might get called with different IO permissions.
Another interesting fact: in the VFS struct file_operations (where you put your pointers to your filesystem's implementations of file operations), there is no member representing close(2). No FS-driver-level function gets called by the kernel in response to close(2)! Instead:
• There is a flush(2) that gets passed a file struct, to indicate to the FS that a given file's handle has been closed—but this is only there so that, if the file is part of a filesystem with synchronous-commit (e.g. NFS in sync mode), closing the file will trigger a flush of the entire device. This is stateless and idempotent; a given file-struct might get flush(2)ed any number of times. It's there to ask the the file's extents' backing store to checkpoint itself, not to do anything with the file itself.
• There is a release(2) that gets called when all handles to a file have been closed—i.e. when the kernel's "open(2) refcount" on the file-struct drops to zero. If the filesystem, say, caches some things about the file when you open(2), you can release that cache-entry on release(2).
Notice that neither of these operations has semantics that would let you clean up local state allocated in a table keyed off anything passed to open(2), because there's no call that happens 1:1 with open(2) calls. Thus, you really can't key local state to a struct-file in a way where you can later look it up again. And there's nowhere inside a struct-file to stash a key for your local state, either. So, like I said, read(2) and write(2) are "stateless."
Of course - I would call that "augmentations". But still each has to implement the dreaded POSIX modes to be compliant.
Thanks for the thing about there not being any state for open files in the filesystems themselves. I browsed a bit around the LXR and couldn't find any. That's insightful! (and I think it's a sensible design choice)
I don't think that's necessarily the best approach, but it matches reality more closely than typical Linux/BSD values (1024 or 4096).
As long as I'm already typing, the real problem here is that path lengths do not in fact fit into any practical statically-sized buffer. While statically-sized buffers have their utility and aren't going anywhere, they're an optimization, or a special case, in a world that is fundamentally dynamically-sized. In the 1970s it made sense for hardware reasons to treat "static buffer" as the default case and make dynamically-sized buffers the harder case, but that's not correct today on any level, code correctness, developer convenience, API cleanliness, ease of use, anything.
Yes, I understand that this is a kernel API and I am aware I'm making a deep structural criticism of UNIX kernels here, and that fixing it would be a significant challenge. It would take quite a bit of fundamental rethinking of how things work to do something like pass the kernel a function pointer to allocate a given bit of user-space RAM or something, or pass it a static buffer with a function to call on overflow, or something, and I am not claiming this would be easy.
(Note the distinction between "dynamically sized" and "arbitrarily large"; a 3GB path is 99.9999+% either some sort of bug or an attack, so having a total max path length has advantages too. But you can do something like make it 1MB, something very generous, without making everything that uses paths allocate 1MB per path.)
https://www.gnu.org/software/hurd/hurd/porting/guidelines.ht...
https://www.gnu.org/software/libc/manual/html_node/Limits-fo...
There's also an amusing todo question that looks like it might've been there for at least close to 20 years now:
#define OPEN_MAX 10240 /* max open files per process - todo, make a config option? */And that totally makes sense once you understand that files are basically "objects" (in the OO sense) identified by inodes instead of memory addresses. A file system implements the graph of these objects (linked by special file objects called directories). The fact that one can cross file system boundaries using file paths also indicates that file paths are none of a file system's business.
> The fact that one can cross file system boundaries using file paths also indicates that file paths are none of a file system's business.
The filesystem knows about file names, stores them, and puts limits on them (often 255 code units though some are lower — FAT16's 8.3, HFS's 31 — and some are higher — Reiser4's 3976 bytes).
A file path is nothing but a concatenation of a bunch of file names and separators ergo file paths are, in fact, an FS's business.
And while that's mostly fallen out of style there are still length-limited-path filesystems: ISO-9660 and UDF for instance.
This is a non sequitur.
Well, it’s allowed by POSIX. A POSIX compatible system doesn’t have to define it if it has no such inherent restriction on path lengths. Indeed, the GNU Hurd does not have such a restriction, and consequently does not define it. This leads to many porting adventures for those trying to compile a program on GNU Hurd, believing their source code to be correct for any POSIX-compliant system.
If there is a non-user-readable directory in the path then the fallback method fails but the getcwd syscall works if the path is short enough.
Bash also "cheats" by caching the working directory and updating it on 'cd' commands.
That's not what I would have expected. Did I miss something obvious?
For now I'll keep my limits.h. At least until I get a real-world bug-reports telling me this is causing real-world issues :)