[0]http://www.investopedia.com/terms/c/capm.asp [1]http://www.investopedia.com/terms/e/efficientmarkethypothesi...
[0]http://www.investopedia.com/terms/c/capm.asp [1]http://www.investopedia.com/terms/e/efficientmarkethypothesi...
I invest in their S&P 500 ETF because it's the cheapest way to get diversified exposure to the 500 largest American companies, and I believe that the 500 largest American companies will be more valuable in the future as a combination of valuation, scale, and cash flows to owners, than they are right now.
I think it's plausible that these managers exist, but they're impossible to identify ex ante. Furthermore, a smart manager will charge fees that are equal to the alpha they generate. So even if the EMH is false in some broad sense, individual investors should act as if it were true and simply invest in low-cost diversified funds.
In the next breath you say that even if the EMH is false "individuals investors should act as if it were true".
This makes your post somewhat ambiguous; not so clear about which position you're advocating. How "plausible" is it that these managers are "impossible to identify ex ante."? Why is it plausible? "Impossible" seems like a pretty strict standard (akin to strong EMH), why not just say instead that identifying such managers before they outperform is "practically impossible" or just "really, really, damn hard and something that you're deluding yourself about if you think you can do it."
Also (assuming it is your position), it's important to clarify that you don't disagree with the assertion that many people do identify market-beating managers before they outperform. Probably millions of people have done it; it happens every day. What they don't do (in my opinion) is use skill or knowledge to identify the outperforming managers. If they do identify an outperforming manager (of which there are always many) it happens because of chance or luck. (Just as, IMO, the outperformance itself of almost all outperforming managers is due to luck or chance, not skill.)
Yet we know that hiring for programmers is utterly hopelessly broken beyond all belief, industry wide.
Therefore its very unlikely that people of a similar cognitive and training level that utterly failed at hiring programmers could possibly select outperforming investment managers given that being an even more difficult job. No one in HR or management is going to be selecting outperforming investment managers.
Its possible that someone outside HR and management is better at selecting the best programmers. Certainly plenty of advice from outsiders is given to hire more of coincidentally highly politically correct demographic group A or group B. Or perhaps ivy college admissions officers magically know how to pick future great programmers (LOL). Professors and college advisors might put forth a weak argument in their own favor. Still, money seems to talk and greed means management and HR, however awful they are at selecting programmers, none the less are the best skilled at it, regardless how low that skill level is.
(And yes, I understand that you agree with the conclusion there. But I'm saying what's the point of the verbal gymnastics in the first place?)
I think this is the kernel of what Bogle was saying and Vanguard is now reaping the benefits of.
Old system: active traders beat the market, therefore they charge fees slightly less than the alpha they're supposed to generate
New system: customers are more aware that their active trader(s) may not be the winners, so the acceptable fee to pay the traders decreases to the product of the alpha AND the risk of not picking the right traders
https://www.zacks.com/stock/news/250937/warren-buffett-on-ac...
This isn't how causation works.
> A disbeliever in EMH should look to identify these managers and pay them some fee, rather than simply investing in the index and trying to minimize fees.
It is as much work to identify good fund managers as it is to identify good company managers. You might as well save some money if you go this route and invest in a portfolio of companies directly.
> Furthermore, a smart manager will charge fees that are equal to the alpha they generate.
Warren Buffett seems quite smart, I mean he made it to rank #1 on the world's rich list and I think he's one of the few on the top #100 that did it by investing in other companies rather than just building his own. Judging from his 40 year performance data he's generated rather more alpha than any other manager. He charges fees that are very close to 0.00001% for being a partner with him.
That would seem to contradict your point.
Why would they? Unless they're so rare that there are only a few of them, one would expect the market to encourage "fair" pricing of active management--yet a key dogma of passive investing is that the market is generally efficient, but the market for actively managed mutual funds isn't!
It seems more plausible to me that (handwavy):
1. People can, in fact, beat the market, with lots of effort (e.g. very large college endowment funds, which outperform smaller ones, presumably by spending more on management and research)
2. The barriers to entry are typically high (because most investors won't trust their money with someone with an unproven track record)
3. Those high barriers to entry both allow the few established genuinely successful fund managers to charge higher fees than otherwise (to your point, eating up the alpha they generate) and ensure that "managing a fund" requires good sales skills and not just good management skills (see, lots of hedge funds)
Or, in short, lots of markets are inefficient--both the stock market and the market for managed funds. But because the stock market is much bigger than the fund market, it's probably _less_ efficient. Or so we hope.
Or maybe he just believes the market might stay irrational longer than he can stay solvent.
My concern is that if everyone is in the passive investing boat then we're no longer following the market, we're making the market, and it's a big departure from the philosophical under-pinnings behind the idea of passive investing.
(We started out letting active players make the market by placing good/bad bets and winning/losing. We got a market that was at least trying to find the right price and we did well due to the low expense ratios. Now that we're in the majority, I'm concerned that no-one is trying to find the right price anymore.)
tldr; I have mixed feelings about passive investing over the long term if we're no longer small fish in a big ocean.
EDIT - I highly recommend watching some of Robert Schiller's Financial Markets lectures on Yale Coursera about general investment theory. Bogle is saying good things, but he simplifies it in a way that I can see might sound disconcertingly incomplete. You're not wrong to ask these questions if you're conscientious and smart enough to want more in-depth answers.
Obviously, these are edge cases (we'll never be 100% passive), but there is some concern that there will be a lock-in effect for companies currently in the S&P... It will be harder to grow if you're not in it, and it'll be harder to fail if you are.
There's also no reason why passive indices have to reflect the total market weighted for market cap.
[0]https://corporate.morningstar.com/US/documents/MethodologyDo...
- http://www.investmentnews.com/article/20170224/FREE/17022994... - https://equityzen.com/blog/alternatives-part-of-investment-p... - http://video.cnbc.com/gallery/?video=3000598150
Disclaimer: Links #2-3 are affiliated with my own company, so you should decided whether or not to believe me.
I'm intrigued by your suspicion ... but I can't put my finger on the exact manner that this might play out ... it's really hazy.
It seems to me that the effect of everyones money going into index funds would be that firms large enough to be in the index would have less and less pressure to issue dividends ... if there is a ready market of buyers of your stock based solely on your size then why bother ?
If money flows, by autopilot, into an asset class wouldn't we expect that asset class to return less and less as time goes on ?
Yes, there are some IPOs, but overall new business starts are still in decline, and large portions of financial markets seem both too systematically risk averse, and yet willing to follow other risks blindly.