Leaked NSA Malware Threatens Windows Users Around the World | Hacker News Reader

Leaked NSA Malware Threatens Windows Users Around the World

theintercept.com

227 pointsFuturebot71 comments

I think jlgaddis' link[1] is more informative than the theintercept.com article : https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/shadow-broker...

I feel the HN submission should point to that instead.

The Outlook Exchange, RDP, Kerberos, ... exploits are scary, even though some only seem to affect older Windows versions.

[1] https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=14117336

I find it very irresponsible that NSA did not report these vulnerabilities to Microsoft after they had fallen into hands of shadow broker (no longer zeroday). Shadowbroker announced possession of these zerodays around 3 months ago. NSA had good 3 months to work with Microsoft to patch these. They chose not to.

It's possible the NSA isn't sure what the Shadow Brokers have.

...which doesn't make it any less irresponsible.

However, judging by https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/security/ms17-01... it's likely somebody had some advance knowledge, somehow.

Oh, and hey: https://blogs.technet.microsoft.com/msrc/2017/04/14/protecti...

In their original leak, Shadowbroker released a list of all file names in the encrypted part of the archive. They just did not release the password at that time.

See following tweet by shadowbrokers from Jan 7.

https://twitter.com/shadowbrokerss/status/817960380815306752

Why would they ? Have they ever done something similar ?

All of the vulnerabilities were patched by March. https://blogs.technet.microsoft.com/msrc/2017/04/14/protecti...

1) Some of these exploits work on many platforms (They are truyly 0day) [1]. Windows NT, 2000, 2003, XP, Vista, 7, 2008, 8 and 2012 are vulnerable.

2) Microsoft issued a statement that NSA did not tell them about any of the leaks [2]

3) NSA knew what was coming since Jan 7 [3]

[1] https://twitter.com/hackerfantastic/status/85303694234218905...

[2] https://twitter.com/samfbiddle/status/853025550096621568

[3] https://twitter.com/shadowbrokerss/status/817960380815306752

re: 1) Doesn't work on updated windows 7.

re: 2) You should reread that link and look at the correction. Microsoft was notified.

What I find sort of (a little) comforting is that the NSA seems to be relying on zero days. All these leaks have not really revealed any structural backdoor in any of the major operating systems.

For instance, the LastPass vulnerability was an architectural mistake.

That's my feeling too. Likewise for hardware backdoors. Yes: it's certainly possible that these things exist. But if they do they're exotic and closely held. They aren't part of the routine hacking toolkits in use in the intelligence community. Routine surveillance happens via routine means that we've already baked into threat models.

In this case, it seems (though I can't find confirmation) like standard firewalling of SMB (what you get if you click the "untrusted network" category on connecting to the cafe wifi or whatever) would be enough to protect a user.

It could be necessary for NSA to rely on zero days or implanted bugs. Any entry point must be possible to close quickly, as soon as the enemy discovers it. Creating what you call structural back doors would make it possible for the enemy to use the same structural back door.

Along these lines, I would expect the NSA to encourage the use of cryptography and encrypted software/Secure Boot/secure communications while they ensure the NSA have a set of extra keys and can sign software at will.

You can use public-private key cryptography that the enemy cannot compromise unless they compromise the NSA (the private keys).

Well, there are known stories of "accidental" key leaks: https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2016/08/microsoft_acc...

That would still stand out as a sore thumb.

Deliberate introduction of hard to exploit 0days would be precisely how they would do it. All you need is one plant with commit access.

Public key crypto can be broken if the certificate isn't securely pinned on the client. In other words, the adversary could insert their own cert and replicate the exploit.

Wait what? Cert pinning is not required for RSA pkcs.

So how do you get the NSA's public key to the client?

https://www.heise.de/tp/features/How-NSA-access-was-built-in...

Note the date - 04. September 1999.

Perhaps this "leak" was intentional and designed to obscure darker dealings by our friendly NSA.

Especially if it has the effect of driving more Windows 10 uptake.

Here's a twist: they're the same thing.

Most seasoned security folks know that the way to backdoor something is to leave an innocent bug in it. Plausible deniability, impossible to prove it was a backdoor because it looks just like any other exploitable bug.

Not that I'm suggesting that the NSA did leave these as backdoors. I don't believe that to be the case. But if you want one, that is how you do it.

If you ever find a blatant backdoor in some software, you're either dealing with an amateur, or someone who wanted to be found in order to send a message/misdirect you.

I was going to say basically the same thing. :+1:

If only there was a means by which you could vote his comment up so as to indicate your agreement.

Yeah man, if only upvoting something could be measured against something other than raw count.

The problems with bugs is that they can be exploited by the bad guys. A door with a public private key can only be exploited by you.

They did have a backdoor in the Dual_EC_DRBG PRNG algorithm that was widely used. It's not a major operating system, but it was used in a lot of products.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dual_EC_DRBG

There are diffeeent levels of ethics in hacking:

1) finding a bug and notifying the company

2) finding a bug and releasing/selling

3) finding a bug and using it

4) intentionally adding bugs to software without notifying anyone

5) intentionally adding bugs to software and claiming it's secure

This was level 5

You could potentially argue it's even worse. They paid RSA to intentionally add a bug so they can't be directly blamed for it.

finding a bug and releasing it, and finding a bug and selling it are hardly equivilent.

> NSA had worked during the standardization process to eventually become the sole editor of the Dual_EC_DRBG standard,

Yes that was a devilishly well executed backdoor, on so many levels.

Mostly on the political level; it was considered suspect by serious cryptographers essentially as soon as it was introduced.

> backdoor

A backdoor is far too obvious for widespread use, which is the needed anyway. The NSA (and FVEY in general) instead spends a lot of money on programs like BULLRUN (Edgehill at GCHQ) that try to bypass the need for backdoors and weaken encryption. PSYOPS for nerds[1] is much cheaper and easier than direct backdoors or other technical methods.

Instead of a backdoor we have IPSEC standards that is overly complicated, had to implement, and mandated "null" encryption support[2]. Most communication channels remain in plaintext or encrypted with keys that are recoverable, too short, or easily MitMed.

[1] https://archive.fosdem.org/2014/schedule/event/nsa_operation...

[2] http://www.mail-archive.com/cryptography@metzdowd.com/msg123...

1. I imagine they'd be more or less the same thing. Any mandated/deliberate backdoor is probably going to look very similar to an accidental bug - it lets you deny it exists, gives a valid explanation for if/when it is found, and potentially lets an NSA/software company "double-employee" add it without the company knowing.

2. It'd probably be a method of last resort, so the NSA et al. would gather and use zero days anyway. Any use of the backdoor risks it being noticed, so using other entry points make sense if possible.

A less comforting interpretation would be that relying on zero days suggests they are confident in their ongoing ability to find them and/or have a sizeable cache of unknown exploits already, so adding a deliberate backdoor wouldn't provide any additional access.

> lets an NSA/software company "double-employee" add it without the company knowing.

I always wondered how that works. I am a full time employee at software company. Cannot imagine having extra time to report to another employer (NSA) and deal with their red tape and crap as well.

Or does NSA show up at their doorstep with a bag full of cash - "Here you go, have this, and install a backdoor in your company's software. And we never met <wink>, <wink>"

That sounds good on paper so to speak, I just have a hard time imagining a realistic scenario.

Now finding 0-days and hoarding them, I can see that.

You assume the mole is an MS employee first and an NSA op second. Traditionally, the opposite is true: if you want to infiltrate a somewhat friendly entity, you do it by engineering the hire of trusted individuals. This is more secure, since there is no risk that one of the guys will get cold feet and blow the whistle.

So you monitor universities and you make contact with some of the brightest sparks. You promise them a good job in exchange for the possibility that, one day, they might have to act For The Good of The Country; and in the meantime they'll even be In The Know, which will place them above their peers - excitement! Ambition! Then you lobby a few higher-ups you're friend with, to hire these guys in this or that group. They are top-notch talent, immaculate credentials, so the hire is a slam dunk. They go about their business, being good kernel devs or whatnot, and every few months you give them a quick call to catch up - there is no need for extensive briefing, nobody really cares about the going-ons of Team Kernel A356. When "the favour" is required, the guy is comfortable in his position and doesn't want to leave it, so there is no chance he'll say no.

> Any use of the backdoor risks it being noticed, so using other entry points make sense if possible.

This applies to 0-days as well.

I've been following this closely over the last couple of hours on Twitter as the news broke. What does it mean in practice?

From what I have read one of the vulnerabilities seems to be a 0day targeting SMB on Windows. One commentator suggested it's enabled by default on the majority of Windows machines (of that I am sceptical). Presumably most people are behind a router which would stop this in its tracks?

A lot of people (who I would probably take seriously) suggest disconnecting Windows machines from the internet for the time-being. Is it really this bad? Are there millions of Windows (home-)users who are vulnerable (by default) today?

> Presumably most people are behind a router which would stop this in its tracks?

Trouble is there are millions of IoT devices with terrible security some of which are alway owned and inside the network. They could be used as a delivery tool to attack multiple machines inside of a network.

I'm not sure how many folks connect directly to the internet anymore. Hopefully not many.

"Connect directly". Could you please elaborate on that?

Connecting a computer directly to a modem, not a router.

Thanks.

> One commentator suggested it's enabled by default on the majority of Windows machines (of that I am sceptical).

It's been a while since I used windows but there used to be such a thing as the administrative share.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Administrative_share

So I don't find that hard to believe at all.

> one of the vulnerabilities seems to be a 0day targeting SMB on Windows.

If your computer's network profile is set to Public, it will be firewalled off. In other cases YMMV.

On corporate networks, AD Domain Controllers are (usually) the most highly privileged servers on the network and they will always have SMB enabled and accessible to the entire domain network because Group Policy relies on SMB shares. Compromise the Domain Controllers and you own the entire (Windows) network because they can administer everything.

All internet users are behind routers, their function is the opposite of blocking traffic.

Yes, but most NAT routers consumers use act as a firewall too (i.e. they block ingress traffic that is not related to a connection that was initiated from inside)

NAT is not really routing, routers are expressly forbidden from altering the address and port in IP packets.

Relevant tweets from/retweeted_by @snowden

I really regret reading some of the replies to those tweets. There's something I need to know: the people going on about Snowden being a traitor, helping 'the Russians' etc... On the 'average American' to 'village idiot' scale, which end are these people closer to?

This is not a rhetorical question btw. I just want to get some insight into what the 'average American' thinks about Snowden.

Average American.

http://www.newsmax.com/Newsfront/edward-snowden-rasmussen-po...

Thanks.

And now I feel ill.

> I just want to get some insight into what the 'average American' thinks about Snowden.

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=XEVlyP4_11M&t=26m50s

Is there a list of exact attack vectors for the lazy?

Both tools in the demo video are SMB-based. I wonder how exploitable is a machine if it has SMB properly disabled and blocked.

There's an incomplete "summary of leaked data" at https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/shadow-broker...

Looking at this list it seems to affect mostly older versions of windows servers and servers with SMB running. I'd say it would mostly be a problem on intranets than windows based web servers.

> and servers with SMB running.

Which is going to be Domain Controllers, the most highly privileged servers on most corporate networks. And accessible to the "entire" network too. Group Policy is distributed through SMB shares.

Disabling SMB is possible but it means you will not be accessing a Windows file share or providing one. Fine if you don't need it.

https://support.microsoft.com/en-gb/help/2696547/how-to-enab...

For my money, disable SMBv1 anyway and use a firewall and (V)LANs.

Samba, pop this under [global] to disable SMBv1 min protocol = SMB2

To disable it try "systemctl stop smbd" or "/etc/init.d/smbd stop" or ... 8)

Wouldn't it be nice if the NSA turned over all of its now compromised zero days to Microsoft so that Microsoft could patch them all?

So MSFT to take a pasting when the exchange reopens?

Direct link to the leak: https://steemit.com/shadowbrokers/@theshadowbrokers/lost-in-...

RIP Windows users.

Using Windows threatens Windows Users Around the World.

This entire article is a gross mischaracterisation of the facts and risks.

The only major zero days released for Windows in this bundle targeted SMB (SMBv1, SMBv2, & SMBv3). By default Windows firewalls SMB and has since Windows XP SP2. Many home and business users then typically have a NAT between the Windows Firewall and the internet, offering a second layer of protection.

Few companies intentionally expose SMB to the internet. Generally users are required to VPN in before then being able to contact an SMB endpoint.

The type of language in this article is designed to mislead non-technical readers into believing they're at risk e.g.:

> The software could give nearly anyone with sufficient technical knowledge the ability to wreak havoc on millions of Microsoft users.

So either the article author lacks the technical literacy to understand why this is untrue, or they know it to be untrue and are trying to implant fear into their readership. In either case, not a good look for The Intercept.

Isn't that the Intercepts whole M.O. though?

> Few companies intentionally expose SMB to the internet.

True, but in your average coffee shop setup if a user has SMB running you could reach them via a local IP if it isn't firewalled off on the machine itself.

And why would it not be firewalled off on the machine itself?

why would it be ?

Because it's a standard Windows policy for public, non-trusted networks?

1. This is actually a big deal. Look on Shodan and see how many systems have the CIFS port open, bannering on Win8 and older.

2. There are other risks: pivoting, RDP, etc.

3. Greenwald's entire point of founding The Intercept was to capitalize on bombastic Snowden leak stories without intermediaries such as The Guardian. It seems like it would be counterproductive for the editors to write something measured or that give NSA any benefit of the doubt. Readers should expect alarmist journalism from The Intercept as much as they should expect anti-conservative viewpoints from the NYT.

I did look on Shodan before I wrote the above, am not seeing "millions" of machines like this hyperbolic article claimed.

But never let fact get in the way of hyperbole and clickbait, it doesn't matter that Windows is secure against this out of the box since XP SP2, it doesn't matter that a simple NAT "firewall" will protect you, all that matters is that some article told you to be afraid and no amount of technical facts is going to get in the way of that.

Too many of these types of articles and threads appearing today completely void of rationality about the scope of this because they don't understand the attack vector and "journalists" like The Intercept are not helping. But naturally outside of a few Netsec discussion boards the fear-party is in full swing, and people will downvote those not fully committed to that narrative.

> Few companies intentionally expose SMB to the internet. Generally users are required to VPN in before then being able to contact an SMB endpoint.

And what did (and likely still does) the NSA possess? Exploits for Cisco gear, which many enterprises and universities use to provide VPN access.

> So either the article author lacks the technical literacy to understand why this is untrue, or they know it to be untrue and are trying to implant fear into their readership. In either case, not a good look for The Intercept.

Place a drive-by-infection malware on a news site, or a well done email, which contains a payload that exploits said SMB issue, and boom you've infected the entire network.

Also, many people don't upgrade their Windows servers if not absolutely neccessary.

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