The men who stare at airline passengers
economist.com
economist.com
Wow. Terror as an excuse for draconian policy, I have come to expect. This is the first time I am seeing terror as an excuse for flawed and unscientific 'research'.
His excuse is remarkably thin.
He flashed his badge and I was pulled to one side, and he asked if his partner could look through my carry on. As she did this, he asked me about where I had been eating in Boston. He asked many, many questions about Santarpio's, saying he'd never heard of it, asking what they sold, etc.
Given that Santarpio's is immediately next to the airport and sells amazing pizza, it's extremely unlikely that someone who worked at Logan was unfamiliar with it.
At this point, the lady looking at my bag said "he's clean" or similar, the first guy lost all interest in Santarpio's, and they put me back in to the front of the queue.
EDIT: it's really good and worth a visit. Get there early and/or be prepared to queue.
Baseline response.
Turns out my baseline for him was a quizzical "Are you serious?" look on my face.
(I guess maybe that looks different to a "OMG THEY'RE ON TO ME!" reaction.)
A very strange little encounter.
And if it was just "security theatre", I can't imagine the passengers behind me were comforted by someone being snatched from the line, having their bag riffled through and then put back in line just before getting on a 7 hour flight.
As a student of English as a second language, I find it rewarding whenever I spot the references.
From a washington post article: "But the day I spent at Logan confirmed for me that SPOT violates no one's civil rights. Few people were identified. Nearly always, the answers to initial questions made further investigation unnecessary. No record was made, and the passenger lost no time.
Observational techniques are not a substitute for all the other techniques we now use to catch would-be terrorists. But they add another layer to transportation security. They are now being used at fewer than one in 10 major U.S. airports. We need to use them everywhere." How to Spot a Terrorist on the Fly http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/10...
That's not the point. The question is whether the efficiency of that layer in any way justifies the cost and hassle.
During an interview on Tuesday, General Jabiri challenged a Times reporter to test the ADE 651, placing a grenade and a machine pistol in plain view in his office. Despite two attempts, the wand did not detect the weapons when used by the reporter but did so each time it was used by a policeman.
“You need more training,” the general said.
...No scientific evidence exists to support...
...the TSA is "unsure" whether SPOT has ever led to the arrest of an actual, real-life terrorist.
Which probably makes this program fit in perfectly with everything else that TSA is doing.
http://www.forward.com/articles/122781/
Thankfully we have very few attempted attacks in America so we don't have the will to implement racial profiling.
If it gets ever gets bad enough we will and it will probably work.
I got stopped leaving Israel once and it wasn't because of racial profiling. I gave them my family's phone number and they called around and it all got resolved.
Since inception the DHS has been a huge money pit of questionable efficacy. This level of incompetence smells like corruption to me.
40 Billion dollars in funding for 2010. http://www.wallstats.com/deathandtaxes/
Realizing the costs associated with TSA security theater are frustrating. We all fund it.
Imagine the expression on the face of the terrorist as he's thinking "Must not make suspicious-looking micro-facial movements... must not make suspicious-looking micro-facial movements..."