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There's a parser on unauthentic input either way. Given the choice to do it online with NSS or OpenSSL or offline with the same library, I think it's a hair safer to do it offline---but this will be swamped by other factors particular to the project.

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Yeah, don't get me wrong. Not implementing TLS because you're worried about attack surface is a bad idea. But if all you're doing is verifying a gpg signature on some firmware, a TLS stack is probably overkill.

> Not implementing TLS because you're worried about attack surface is a bad idea.

[citation needed]

If you're doing things that should be done over an encrypted channel, but forego TLS (or a suitable alternative like Noise Framework or WireGuard) because it adds attack surface, you are adding more risk than you are removing. A better solution would be to separate the parts of the stack that are sensitive from the parts that do things that you don't trust/are not in your control. This could be openbsd/POSIX style separation between your sensitive and the TLS-terminating process, or ideally placing them on completely separate machines. (Just make sure you trust your internal network if you aren't going to encrypt traffic on the inside...)

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