Yeah, I think this is probably true. Hume was trying to argue that normative statements can't be reduced to or derived from natural statements about how the world is; Nagel's fighting the reduction of consciousness to positive, objective statements about consciousness, because of the existence of phenomenal character. There's a certain way to be a bat that's wrapped up in the very fact of its being a conscious being with a specific biology and neurology, but which is still irreducible to those features.

If you wanna link this up to an older philosopher, this is basically what Kant's on about in his Critique of Pure Reason. Our special human brain stuff is responsible for providing us with the faculties (e.g. understanding of things like causation) we have for understanding the world. We are always trapped in our experience of the world, and though that shouldn't preclude us from experiencing the world, you can't separate how we experience objective reality from the fact that we experience it as humans, with human brains and faculties.