Munchery Stiffs Early Backers and Cuts Staff in a Bid for Survival
bloomberg.com
bloomberg.com
I really wonder what was going on. At a fundamental level, when competing in an ultra-competitive market (food delivery), you have to take price seriously, and they just didn't. Everything they were offering was 25% more expensive than similar delivery options from neighborhood restaurants.
Pretty much everybody involved in food works like a dog, and gets paid an absolute pittance. That nice restaurant down the street? Their head chef probably makes ~$34,000/year, works 100 hours a week, and sleeps in the kitchen. Oh, and the restaurant is as likely as not to go bankrupt and shut down in <2 years. (And he's not doing it with the hopes that Ricky's Pizza Joint will IPO as the next Facebook.)
Yet, for some reason, people think that this business model has the margin to pay a team of developers, working out of a hip, air conditioned Market Street office, complete with a free beer fridge and a Foosball table.
For example, in the Brooklyn branch of the service the prep kitchen and delivery center was located in Gowanus (low rent, industrially zoned neighborhood) and they were certainly not running a full-compliment of front-of-house and back-of-house staff the way a restaurant would. They also don't have to pay high rent for a good location. They also don't have a head chef on premises, and they aren't locked in to a specific menu style.
I'm not totally familiar with the economics of it but I can easily imagine that it could, in principle, be a profitable operation even with the overhead of having a technology division to produce the website and app.
for point of comparison: https://order.andofood.com/
that's David Chang's delivery-only food service, which also has a technology division that produces a website and app. the prices on ando's menu are in line with their competitors in NYC. Munchery was always overpriced. I don't know if ando is taking a loss on every order or what, but I doubt it.
The lack of head chef isn't an upshot for their business. It's a symptom of the problem. Compared to the cost of an engineering team, it's penny-wise and pound-foolish.
If no-front-of-house-delivery-only could afford this kind of extravagance, then street food trucks would have gold-plated steering wheels.
I just took a look at the Munchery menu for my zip code, and honestly not sure why I'd ever use them in a market as competitive as NYC. The "aren't locked into a specific menu style" thing seems like more of a bug than a feature - lack of specialization means I drift towards more specialized restaurants that deliver.
Why go for their beef stroganoff when I can get it from the amazing Ukrainian place that delivers to me? Why get the Korean rice bowl when there are several Korean places nearby? Chicken teriyaki - no shortage of Japanese-focused places that deliver, also.
The nature of NYC's food market (and I'm sure true of other places too) is that delivery restaurants are running incredibly lean operations on razor thin margins - I think it's far from a given that a no-front-of-house-delivery-only restaurant operation can generate the kind of numbers that justify stratospheric VC-tech valuations.
I'm also skeptical that they can achieve the kind of volume/market share they'd need to make their unit economics work. There seems to be this weird idea that, by serving 10-15 dishes a day, that they can capture a significant fraction of the total delivery orders in their service areas - in every zip code they operate in NYC they are up against literally hundreds of other delivery places.
To the consumer they appear as one restaurant in a sea of many choices - I don't see how they can expect to capture and outsized portion of orders this way.
Its kinda fun to watch VC dollars get burned up on each cycle of the attempt though.
The competition in this field is just immense. I don't get how any of these companies are going to make any money—Munchery, Ando, CookUnity.us, Uber Eats, and others are all competing fiercely against each other for a relatively low-margin, high-elasticity of demand business. In some ways, Blue Apron, Hello Fresh, and the other box companies are also competitors.
Like you I've used the various discount codes at various times, but they're all too expensive to be worth using with any regularity.
Did none of these companies check, before moving in to "disrupt" the restaurant industry, that there was actually anything to disrupt? Restaraunts are not lazy incumbents growing fat on their unchallenged dominance: it's a cutthroat business. And their costs are almost entirely the food and the labor, which are, for all practical purposes, fixed. There are no margins to steal from here.
Then of course success isn't necessarily contingent on providing a reasonable service at a sustainable price... see: Uber.
Sheer VC-fueled insanity.
Also, that was over a period of almost two years, so 'only' about 1000 a day, and the company claims most of it was donated to charities.
From those two Bloomberg articles, I don't think that's the main reason they need more money.
e.g. the next round could be at $40mm, and if it's priced, then this $5mm note would be at $40mm (minus any discount on the note). or if the next round is at $100mm, then this note would be at $80mm.
it might be to make room for a new shareholder to get a larger stake of the company for a given dollar amount than might otherwise be implied by the current capital structure (a down round).
so, it's a lot easier to do this kind of thing when there's a downround and the alternative to these terms is the company shutting down - basically, the new folks diluting old folks can say this is ultimately in the best interest of the company because the alternative is a shutdown.
in the context of MS or FB, both companies were on the up and increasing in value, so harder for the big stakeholders to say pushing out another SH was just about "serving the best interest of the company" with a straight face.
IIRC Zuckerberg and Thiel created a new entity and gave Saverin a difference class of shares/equity then diluted that class. They must have known they'd never get away with it, it was likely just a move to be able to fire him quickly and just cut a check at a later date.
in some cases, a recap is also formulated to incentivize existing investors to put in more money by setting up a deal where existing investors who don't put in more money will end up with their shares converting to common stock (thereby losing their liquidation preferences and anti-dilution provisions), but those who put in their share (usually pro rata) will maintain comparable preferences to the new investors (or whoever is leading the round). (this is sometimes called pay to play, and it's one of the more common recaps i saw when i was an attorney)
In this case, could be a novel spin on the same dynamics using a convertible note valuation cap: they are raising a down round (their last reported valuation was $300m, so a major down round here), and "Old investors were asked to pony up more money or see their stakes lose their value, according to one person familiar with the matter." it does not go exactly into the mechanism for how the value would be reduced, it might just be through straight up dilution (see note below), but in any case it seems like the ultimate objective is the same: using a new structure to reward new (or returning) investors who are willing to save the company in these (arguably self-imposed!) hard times, and push/punish existing investors who may have lost faith in the company.
one thing I'd note: honestly, they seem to be implying a significant recap, but there's nothing specific in the article that points directly to any particularly unusual mechanisms. In fact, it's possible that this is just be a down round using a relatively straightforward convertible note with a cap, and even in that case the following statements that seem to imply a recap could still be true: "The value of shares that may be doled out to backers later will change depending on the company's subsequent valuation." (that can be true in a regular convertible note deal) and "Old investors were asked to pony up more money or see their stakes lose their value, according to one person familiar with the matter." (weirdly worded, but this could be true for any new infusion of capital). also, for relatively small investments ($5m) on mid/late stage companies, convertible notes are used just because they are fast/easy to negotiate and execute on, so i would not be surprised if this is just something like that - still, a major downround in any case!
In August of 2015, Munchery held a party at the Line Hotel in Los Angeles to celebrate a new partnership with chef Roy Choi. He's known for his Korean taco fusion food truck, Kogi, and for his L.A. restaurants, including two in the Line Hotel. Choi's new contract promised him more than $100,000 a month to design his own line of meals. He was also consulting on branding.
At the party, people lined up around the block for free kimchi pork fried rice served in Munchery's cardboard containers. Pishevar, Munchery's chief hype man and a major investor, arrived wearing a black cowboy hat. Hollywood filmmaker Jon Favreau attended.
By the end of the year, the startup ended Choi's contract. It cost the company more than $500,000, according to people familiar with the matter. Choi had provided Munchery with just two recipes. An agent for Choi declined to comment.
Around the same time, Munchery also terminated a contract with marketing agency West, according to former employees. The firm had helped Munchery offer free meals to attract new customers and to strategize about its branding.
Munchery spent heavily on direct to consumer marketing ahead of fundraising rounds, former employees said. In a month, the company could easily spend hundreds of thousands of dollars putting flyers on people's doors offering discounts on Munchery, they said.
1. https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-11-21/munchery-...
If I were a scout for executives, I would make sure that Munchery leadership is engraved in eternity on some no-hire blacklist.
I wonder how pervasive these delusional people are in SV in other industries.
It's really easy to call out the losers once they fail.
You call this delusional because you fail to factor in the scope of the opportunity. The food industry is enormous. If the founding team and investors believed they had a mere 1% shot at disrupting it, spending $100M to run the experiment is entirely rational.
I feel the need to leave a quote here in the hopes of deterring other people from espousing your attitude.
"It is not the critic who counts; not the man who points out how the strong man stumbles, or where the doer of deeds could have done them better. The credit belongs to the man who is actually in the arena, whose face is marred by dust and sweat and blood; who strives valiantly; who errs, who comes short again and again, because there is no effort without error and shortcoming; but who does actually strive to do the deeds; who knows great enthusiasms, the great devotions; who spends himself in a worthy cause; who at the best knows in the end the triumph of high achievement, and who at the worst, if he fails, at least fails while daring greatly, so that his place shall never be with those cold and timid souls who neither know victory nor defeat. "
Wasting $100 Million on a 1% chance to disrupt an industry that is not ripe for disruption, and has been famously known for having razor thin margins is not a rational action.
If you're a libertarian too, then perhaps your level of doublethink rivals the one I made my comment about. If it does, it's pointless to discuss with you anything of substance.
Ironic that the former head of a recruiting company has cut jobs at Munchery