What’s so bad about Scientism?
philpapers.org
philpapers.org
Any method, whether scientific, philosophical, spiritual or otherwise should be used to spawn debate, and to contribute to a rich discussion.
But science being used to stop debate, used to stop exchange, used to stop meaningful conversation does more harm than good to all involved.
The scientific method isn't being used to crush debate. It simply isn't being used.
What's most responsible for crushing debate today is (empirically false) post-modern social constructionism coupled with female mother/protector ethics. Jordan Peterson is one of the best people on these (and many, many other) topics:
Stupid question. What is an example of a hypothesis that is not falsifiable by experiment but should still be considered "knowledge"?
Is it an axiom of the scientific method? [No?]
Is it a tautology? [Maybe?]
Are there other examples other than the basis of knowledge being knowledge? [?]
These all need to be taken as axioms if any further knowledge is going to be possible.
There's a book called Introduction to Objectivist Epistemology which covers this in much more detail. (Ayn Rand gets a bad rep, but few people know about her theories of concepts and knowledge. They indicate the path to solving many of the issues in philosophy of science).
A lot of people believe that fundamental principles of ethics also belong there. For example, we may be able to demonstrate whether or not something is a net benefit to the combined happiness of sentient beings, but I cannot see how one might even attempt to falsify the hypothesis that sentient beings matter at all.
If it doesn't aid in understanding the world then I'm not sure it qualifies as knowledge.
(Or, if as in the other comment chain, 1+1=2 is too obvious, you can take any sufficiently non-trivial theorem of your choosing).
You can investigate whether it is consistent with other definitions. I believe that doing so is empirical work, which I think is consistent with a broad notion of science
The experiment would be to go about the deduction. It is falsifiable.
If you include thought experiments based on nothing but arbitrary axioms, a lot of crazy claims about supernatural beings and other metaphysical curiosities would also qualify as falsifiable. I'm not sure whether you'd like to go down that rabbit hole. Science is about understanding the actual physical world that we live in -- not some fantasy world no matter how internally consistent it might be.
What does the number 1.97 even mean in a world where 1 + 1 ≠ 2? When you falsify 1 + 1 = 2, you also end up denying the validity of the very experiment that you used in the process. If a hypothesis can only be falsified by self-invalidating experiments, does it count as falsifiable?
1+1=2 does not relate to an experiment; it is a statement about relations of concepts, not material entities.
And no, apples are not the same things as numbers.
(and BTW, there are real-world situations where '1' and '1' do not make '2'... e.g. putting a snake and a mouse in a box. We only apply maths statements like that to the kinds of entities/situations where they will apply).
In other words, if you can imagine a reality where 1+1=2 for some meaning of '1', '2', '+' and '=', then a series of conclusions will hold true.
You can hardly accuse that of being an axiom, or just introducing frameworks of thought.
Science is based on (lots of things but primarily) empirical induction. You observe some phenomena, decide that they are of the same type, generate a model that predicts how all phenomena of that type behave. By necessity you observe an infinitesimal fraction of the phenomena in your type.
In math proofs are universal and timeless and complete. There is no additional observation to be made. A proof can be wrong, but if we conclude that it is logically correct then that's it. (edit: well, there's the incompleteness theorem: it could be that a set of axioms is inconsistent, but then EVERYTHING based on those axioms becomes invalid. It's still quite different than scientific progress which changes models a little bit at a time.)
Scientific models are approximations of reality(very good approximations often!) but they get tweaked as new observations come in. Or just wholesale thrown out(or at least become obsolete), see Newtonian orbital mechanics vs relativistic orbital mechanics. Newton was right-ish, but relativistic solutions are right-er(possibly fully correct?)[1].
With deductive reasoning you are expanding a definition. With inductive reasoning you are guessing at connections between observed events.
[1] http://physics.stackexchange.com/questions/26408/what-did-ge...
Newtonian orbital mechanics is not obsolete: Within the limits of its applicability, it's a perfectly fine framework and in use to this day.
Was I 100% precise? No. Did you add something meaningful to the discussion? That's for you to answer.
The scientismist's (?) standpoint could be that it exists because it is manifested as a concept in human brains. But by the same argument, wouldn't they then need to acknowledge that God exists?
The crux of the matter is to do science, you need formalism to express your theories, to interpret measurement results etc. Those formalisms are what we usually call "math". But any mathematical system has axioms, i.e. something we need to just "believe" in in the first place, and those believes are not themselves provable by science.
I switched from physics to art to (ultimately) design and programming. You have no idea how much ignorance many physicists have of research that isn't easily quantifiable and turned into predictive formulas. I had to go through a period of growing more "aware" of my tunnel-vision myself. As a result, flat-out rejection of entire fields of research, claiming they do not create "real" knowledge is common.
On the flipside there's people trying to apply physics-style reductionism to problems that simply don't fit, because human societies aren't built up of spherical frictionless humans in a vacuum[1].
Example: I did my master thesis of interaction design on gesture interfaces (the waving-hands-in-the-air kind, not the touchscreen kind), a topic that has been researched over forty years but has yet to really break through. One paper I read mentioned that on average the right index finger was raised one-point-zero-something times more often than the left. Sample size twenty or so. I still don't know how that is supposed to help me design better interfaces; right-handedness being the norm is a known, and I cannot conclude anything from these numbers. But hey, it's quantified and measured, therefore "proper" knowledge!
As the paper points out, things like the following are problematic from a purely experimental approach:
"Scientific knowledge is better than non-scientific knowledge."
Yet many scientists treat it as common knowledge.
Isn't this a falsifiable hypothesis?
If you analyzed various predictions made by scientific and non scientific knowledge then you could compare them and determine if one was "better".
That historical performance might not hold but the sun may not rise in the east.
That the scientific method has not be employed because our heuristics say the answer is obvious does not mean it cannot be employed.
I do agree that the scientific method is too high a bar for something to be considered knowledge.
The problem is labelling what is beneficial and what is not. That is a value judgement. But if certain human rights are universal, we can agree on at least a subset of benefits.
That's an acceptance that philosophy is useful. Pragmatic utilitarian is one kind of philosophy.
> The problem is labelling what is beneficial and what is not. That is a value judgement.
See my reply to the other post above. [1] Philosophy is the discipline that specialises in the problem of rational analysis of value judgements. A good way to agree on which rights and valuable benefits to use is to discuss them philosophically.
Isn't the loss of objectivity just a result of the question having more degrees of freedom than it does constraints, and the subjectivity just comes from picking which constraints to assume? Doesn't a well defined goal turn that question into a positive question?
A simpler example could be, "is it better for me to build a bridge over a highway out of cardboard or out of steel?"
It's superficially normative but becomes a positive question as soon as you define the constraint that a bridge that no one needlessly dies while walking across is better than one that kills people.
At that point all of these questions become scientifically approachable, although some are likely still hopelessly complex, as soon as you assume an axiom like, "it is best to maximize the ratio of well being over conscious suffering."
What that axiom should actually be is likely a nearly unapproachably complex amalgamation of philosophy, but it seems more reasonable to work with something than assume that there is no right answer, especially when we seem to be rapidly approaching the point of needing to have software systems make quick ethical decisions.
Science is necessarily neutral in that regard; it's a tool to achieve some goals that, as you said, require a judgement value. There is some moral knowledge that provides value and motivation, and which is not scientific knowledge.
> Is this not just an underdetermined question?
Not in philosophy, no. The mother of all sciences has ways to deal with the question, which is meaningless from a purely scientific POV, but which nevertheless merits being studied. For example, it could guide you to choose and refine the guiding principles for programming your autonomous car, and to analyze whether your missing something in your "amalgamation of philosophy" that you used as the basis of that technology project.
1) Who are you talking about.
2) What is sperm.
3) What do you mean by conceived.
4) Whether the statement is literal or requires specific context.
The physical existence of an external world, beyond my (TuringTest's) self-consciousness.
So, the scientist in me asks: what areas of knowledge are out of the scope of science and the scientific method?
Modern scientists don't usually like philosophy and don't write about this stuff from a philosophical point of view. It's more necessary than ever that philosophers get with the program. Pretending that science hasn't taken the lead in explaining the natural world won't help. People like Nick Bostrom who think about what science reveals do, even though he's probably hated in philosophy circles, like Daniel Dennett or Lawrence Krauss are.
Science as an empirical practice of truth-seeking is reliant on philosophy for its foundations. Of course it is possible to "do science" without having any interest in epistemology, just as it is possible to program computers without having any interest in computer science, or to do mathematics without having any interest in mathematical foundations.
Theorization of multiverses...
Please keep in mind that multiverses haven't actually been discovered. They are a very real possibility if the model of inflation of the early universe (and thus eternal inflation) is correct. But since the Planck satellite hasn't found conclusive b-mode polarisation patterns, inflationary models should be viewed with a bit of scepticism. On the other hand: inflation can explain a lot of problems in the early universe that would arise without it: magnetic monopoles, the large-scale homogenity and isotropy and geometric flatness. So, it remains a valid model, and the best explanation of the very early universe.
We should be aware of the things we don't know, and not just assume multiverses, when there is no conclusive evidence.
I mean, you wouldn't say that "Large areas of science are routinely demolished" by newer science, even though strictly speaking it's true, and you'd therefore give up on science as a whole?
(And if I'd really want to be mean, I'd ask you if science has ever even proven the "real world" exists or that science is true, but I think you got my point.)
I know philosophy is extremely rigorous. Science is fiddly, it works in approximations. Philosophers hate ad hocs postulates like dark matter or cosmological constants. They hate not knowing how certain things work. That's part of the problem. They need to apply their rigor to theories that have the chance of being false.
You also have to remember that science operates within it's own framework, and assumes concepts of truth that are accepted within this community, such as the scientific method to gain knowledge. But these are presumed to be true, without anyone having had proven them.
Philosophy on the other hand, as a more general subject, even questions these frameworks and has to operate without any pre-given framework. A Platonist won't be shunned by a scientific discovery, since it isn't a threat to it's epistemological framework.
Therefore I say that science is part of philosophy, but this doesn't mean it's wrong or bad. Everyday life proves it's helpfulness. One just has to keep in mind, that there is no proof it's ultimately true, and that all objections are "appeals to emotion". Followers of Scientism, even though they wouldn't say it themselves, do this, dogmatically believing that they are the true way and that's the problem everyone has with them. (I'm not saying it's better when Platonists or anyone else does it, but the others are more common nowadays)
If Philosophy is going to argue that the scientific method doesn't work, or that the world doesn't exist, we can't trust our senses or stuff like that, go ahead. Has there been any practical advancement on this line of thinking in the last 50 years? do you envision that the scientific method will be revised by anything discovered in philosophy?
Could you explain what you mean with this?
>If Philosophy is going to argue that the scientific method doesn't work
The critique isn't as blunt as you make it out to be. Philosophers argue that the scientific method isn't the ultimate epistemological tool to find out everything and to understand all there is to know.
>that the world doesn't exist >we can't trust our senses or stuff like that
Just as a side note, this hasn't been disproven, since it's beyond the reach of science. Science, as a materialist/physicalist philosophy presumes itself to be true, while at they same time limiting itself.
>Has there been any practical advancement on this line of thinking in the last 50 years?
What do you mean with "practical advancement"? For one to ask or answer this question seriously, one has to take a lot of things for granted and such as concepts of "practical" or "advancement". And what's so special about the last 50 years?
>do you envision that the scientific method will be revised by anything discovered in philosophy?
Philosophy as a discipline isn't science, you don't "discover" things, since that presumes these truths to be out there, ready to be found, which doesn't mean that people don't search for them.
But besides that, what do you mean with "revised"? The critique isn't as already mentioned, that the scientific method isn't right (it most certainly is a very good tool regarding science itself), but that it can't be the only one, used to find out everything. That's just naive positivism.
What I mean is that every time this debate happens it's the same a lot of "what do you mean by that?" And "define achievement". My thesis is that as a tool to gain knowledge about the natural world philosophy is not helpful anymore because the parts that are useful, logic and argumental rigor, are integrated in science already. Philosophy is still useful in ethics and morals but not useful in epistemology and metaphysics unless they follow modern science, which very few do.
If you are talking about idealist philosophy, and are asking yourself how much their theories on the true substance of the world has contributed to the general wellbeing of the average human being, then I already said, that most people would agree that the products of science, as a materialist philosophy, are more helpful.
I might remembering it wrong, but I think one of the main questions asked by Socrates was "how can we be good persons?". And "what does 'good' mean?". That question absolutely does inform my every-day choices about the real world, because me not being a religious person and not believing in the after-life and such I base most of my every-day thingies on thinking if what I'm actually doing is "good" or not. Asking yourself that is a philosophical question. That and a little bit of Kant, and his "people should never be means to an end".
Well, now your are doing Philosophy of Science.
This comic shows the limits of empiricism nicely: http://existentialcomics.com/comic/132
Axioms that can be empirically shown to be likely true or likely false.
Also it treasures smaller set of axioms rather than larger ones.
I'm not the smartest guy around, but I see myself still reading philosophy while still very close to laying on my death-bed, while I know I wouldn't care that much then about whether worm-holes exist or if the physical Universe is finite or infinite. In that respect philosophy will still be relevant, at least for me. I find the human species one of the most interesting things that I've read or heard about, and I think philosophy does a good job of talking about us.
Do they sometimes try to answer the same questions? Yes, and it's usually in the case where philosophical ideas can be, and have in the past, been the best model for explaining phenomenon that we didn't have the tools to measure with science.
Now that that's out of the way...
There is, of course, nothing wrong with the scientific method for examining the world, but Scientism has many pitfalls:
- Biased scientists that only publish research whose results are favorable to their own idea of the world.
- Advocating for blowing up real-life systems in favor of new "scientifically proven" ones, because unintended consequences are a given in complex systems.
- "Scientists" promoting their research for their own monetary gain, regardless of known consequences.
- A culture where anyone who disagrees with the "general consensus" is labeled as an "idiot," even if they back up their claim with showing flaws in the research process.
- Even with good science and valid results, often the recommendation about what to do about the findings is not based in science, but followers of scientism will conflate the two.
Anti-scientism is not the same as anti-science.
An important real consequence of scientism: the war on fat circa 1960, overconsumption of sugar, and resulting diabetes epidemic.
(Spoken as a practicing scientist.)
Hm. Is it possible to construct a (sensible) physical correspondence to the incompleteness theorem or to an undecidable problem?
A mathematic, a biologist and a physicist are flying in a hot air balloon, but got lost. Then they see a men jogging under them, so they get lower and the biologist shouts to him: "Hey you, where are we?"
The man looks up, but does not answer.
Then the physicist shouts: "Hey you, can you please tell us, where we are?"
Still nothing, but then finally he shouts back: "you are in a hot air balloon!"
"Ah, a philosopher" says the mathematician. "How do you know?" ask the others. "Well, a) he took very long for his answer, b) it fits with objective reality and c) it is totally worthless for us."
(the main job of the philosophers back then and there was to defend the Marx-Lenin Philosophy to the people, where they tried to prove them, that the people are on the way to the best of every possible society, but people still complained about not having toilet papers)
Then a line I remember from Thureau: "We have Professors of Philosophy, but no Philosophers."
So, to get more serious and a wildly speculative hypothesis: maybe Philosophers got so bad overall, because they tried too hard beeing regarded as scientist, when maybe their field is not really approachable with scientific methods. At least not main parts of it.
Because there is a big, maybe infinite world, which we can't (yet) explain properbly with math. And maybe there are some areas, which you can never describe with math. To get a bit esoteric:
The Tao that can be told, is not the eternal Tao ...
This is in my opinion the purpose of Philosophy. Think freely and create modells about those areas. Philosphy as the art of wisdom. Trying to understand complex worlds, which you cannot put in (finite) numbers.
Humans for example.
Because we are more than just some numbers and can't be reduced to them, which is, what is sadly more and more happening. And philosophers trying to be, what they are not, might be a cause to it.
The gist of it is that the author starts with a decent argument about why philosophers against scientism might want to attack a weaker (i.e., more easily believed/more likely true) version of scientism, since that would give more weight to their arguments. But then the author goes off the rails by choosing to defend that weak version of scientism with some rather silly arguments, essentially arguing that since the term has been redefined, none of the work which has gone before (which has shown that these silly arguments are silly) applies any more.
But are you postulating that all arguments (for a weaker version of) Scientism (either all arguments there are or even only the all arguments the author presents), are silly? That's something I'd disagree with.
For example, while science isn't the perfect process like in the textbooks portrayals, a model that produces testable predictions (and thus can be evaluated) seems the very good way to characterize how we get new knowledge about various phenomena of the world and can convince others that it is knowledge and not just an esteemed opinion.
Also the bit "vicious circularity" resonated with me: in my opinion, (looking at what we know of the evolutionary history our species[1]) it's quite reasonable hypothesis that humans could develop logic and mathematics in the first place because of the physical world we observe is regular and predictive enough so that human cognition had a chance to develop.
[1] Not in the evo psych sense, just that we descend from the same great-great-*-parents as our cousins (the other) apes, and during the history we ended up being the ones with wider cognitive capabilities. Even though our cousins are relatively bright.