What they will vigorously defend is disruption to their reputation and their bottom line. What benefit does a business get from Symantec that they do not get from Let's Encrypt? EV?
What they will vigorously defend is disruption to their reputation and their bottom line. What benefit does a business get from Symantec that they do not get from Let's Encrypt? EV?
Let's encrypt is great but let's not pretend it's the right solution for all websites.
What's their stance on wildcard certs with SANs? Is it simply too risky / ripe for abuse?
Wildcards certs have value in some settings.
Not that I would really suggest this, it's a DOS waiting to happen.
dokku config:set --no-restart myapp DOKKU_LETSENCRYPT_EMAIL=mail@example.com
dokku letsencrypt apphttps://letsencrypt.org/docs/rate-limits/
> Combined with the above limit, that means you can issue certificates containing up to 2,000 unique subdomains per week.
GitHub, for instance, has three million users. Provisioning a cert for each github.io domain would take 29 years. Yes, you can contact LE and ask for a limit increase, but three million certs would still spam the public cert transparency logs, LE's internal records, etc. significantly. That is a cost. LE rounds down the cost of an individual cert, even 20 certs per week, to zero, but the cost of three million certs is very nonzero.
2. Wildcards work in mass-hosting situations where individual certs don't. Again, for my college computer club's server, putting a few thousand <VirtualHost> blocks in Apache's configuration makes it take forever to start. I tried this. It was a bad plan. The better plan is mass-hosting tools like mod_vhost_ldap or even RewriteRules based on the hostname, but they don't let you interact with SNI, because as far as Apache (and thus mod_ssl) see, it's just a single <VirtualHost>.
3. In order to issue a cert, you need to publicly respond for the name on the cert. If you're issuing public-CA certs for private-network websites (which is generally a best practice over running an enterprise CA), you need to briefly configure a DNS entry for the private name to respond to either the DNS challenge or the HTTP challenge. You can't just configure a DNS entry internally. So your internal deployment process now involves updating public DNS. For anyone who's not running publicly-facing infrastructure (i.e., most companies, whose public Internet presence is just a website), there may not even be an automated means of updating public DNS.
A wildcard cert, meanwhile, will just email the owner of the registered domain via e.g. WHOIS contact info, which requires no external configuration, and is a one-time setup process. Everything else is internal at that point.
I love Let's Encrypt, but it's ill-suited to use cases where wildcards are popular.
Administratively, we use mod_vhost_ldap, and it hasn't been complicated. If anything it's less complicated, because a number of larger websites (departments, courses, etc.) get somename.example.edu CNAMEs from the IT department, and those are virtual hosts too. Back when we were using only webhost.example.edu/~username URLs, the separate virtual hosts were a special case. Now they're just an entry in LDAP with a different DocumentRoot, that's all.
If you have a service that serves to a fleet of STBs, TVs, or other embedded devices, they have a fixed set of RootCAs and getting the OEM to update those (and possibly through a ton of different resellers) is a nightmare.
While the embedded devices won't be impacted by this announcement (if the deprecation goes ahead), there might be some additional work for anyone that services web browsers AND embedded devices from the same endpoints.
Of course, there's not a good way for clients to indicate which root CAs they accept, and so they don't. If you get into the situation where newer devices don't support Symantec certs, and older devices don't support non-Symantec certs, it's time to figure out how to guess if you're talking to a newer or an older device and give appropriate certs. :(
And as mockable as that might sound, it comes in handy for businesses with special requirements.
(Sorry, I couldn't resist.)
EDIT: Apologies, didn't notice the other poster beat me to it.
You don't need a HTTP server to do authentication, it's also possible to use DNS and TLS SNI. There's certainly no need to spawn a server per domain, even for HTTP.
If your implementation is complex enough to require many certs, these problems are already solvable. Either fork over the money for a wildcard cert, or account for the extra work in your planning.
The setup we use is to have our own authoritative nameserver for a 'dyn' subdomain, and do DNS auth. We auth a subdomain with LE in less than 10 seconds.