I want an explanation for why AQAP won't just hop on an airline unaffected by this ban, drive the bomb to a country unaffected by this ban, or put a timer/altimeter on the laptop bomb that's in the cargo hold.
And that's exactly what the gp is talking about.
I actually used to think the same way, until I mentioned how silly some of these security theatre steps seem within earshot of someone who did some kind of Federal security work.
He went through a long winded explain of all the steps that it would to make a switch to circumvent one restriction, how much time it would take, and how it would only take one suspicious interaction by one of the group members for something to be reported.
Basically, while you can't protect against everything, by making attacks an order of magnitude harder (going from blades to bombs), you greatly increase their chances of being discovered.
You wrote that as fact, but is it? Those "highly trained" guys could barely fly a small plane, but where able to fly huge airlines at top speed.
Most terror attack in western countries where commited by lone wolves or tiny groups. 9/11 was incredibly well-thougth in comparison.
America prior to 9/11 really seems like a different world. Social media was in its infancy, and 24/7 news channels hadn't kicked into overdrive (I don't even think scrolling tickers was a thing yet, outside of financial channels). By spring 2001 there was obviously political angst about the election and Florida's role in it, but both sides of the political spectrum weren't fueled by the constant outrage machines they are today.
Pre-9/11, hijackings meant you sit tight, land somewhere, and most of the folks probably walk away OK. Even an unarmed person could hijack a plane with the claim of concealed explosives or weapons.
Post-9/11, we have reinforced cockpit doors (the effectiveness of which were sadly demonstrated by Germanwings flight 9525) and passengers who know a successful hijacking probably means dying. Even on 9/11 itself we saw the impact of this - flight 93 wound up crashing in a field because the passengers knew there was nothing to lose by rising up.
Explosive detectors at airports are fine-tuned to detect a few substances; it is conceivable that some terrorist group have found a multi-component explosive whose ingredients will not trigger the current range of explosive detectors. (However, said components will need to be mixed for it to become an explosive, and this is where the 'We don't care what you put in the cargo hold' bit comes in.
That being said, I have a feeling this ban is more about commercial issues than anything else. But, anyway - for the sake of argument, &c. :)
If that's the case, having it apply only to certain airlines/airports is criminally stupid - it's quite clear terror groups are capable of getting into Europe.
edit: I was unaware that asking an honest question was frowned upon. Lesson learned, thanks.
* Accept that terror attacks will get through sometimes.
* Spend a large part of the trillions of dollars spent on ineffective security theater (it's not all security theater - some bits like reinforced cockpit doors are cheap and effective) on preventing stuff like heart disease and car accidents that kill multiple 9/11s worth each day.
* Ban laptops from carry-ons across the board if an undetectable laptop bomb (that can't be triggered in the cargo hold) is credible and likely. (Thus far the only incident we know of resulted in minor damage and a dead bomber.)
I don't disagree with you but this would be difficult for any one person to pass down from wherever it is the person making these decisions sits. They'd have to accept that people are going to die and that by rolling back precautions, they take that on themselves.
The other 2 I wholly agree with.
-Oh, we already do in other aspects of life, so why not?
An example:
Driving a car has become ridiculously safe; as long as you don't head-on another car, chances are you'll survive. (As long as you don't do silly stuff like drive at 120mph, skip seatbelts and such).
If we had separate lanes all over, there wouldn't be more head-on collisions. Lives saved. Only, we decided it wasn't worth the expense and inconvenience. We only have barriers between opposing lanes on the most accident-prone stretches of road.
Personally, I'd be inclined to vote for just about anyone who had the balls to tell the public that bad things happen.
Well, if they did it prior to something bad happening, at any rate.
If the odds of this happening are marginal at best (well, they are, apparently - airliners don't get blown up every day) and the risk is largest that such an attack will be instigated from a few, known places - then by all means focus your efforts on those places/airlines.
After all, nabbing the laptops of, say, a few million people daily or however many people fly because there is a non-zero risk that someone flying from one of a handful airports may be up to shenanigans probably isn't worth it.
Terror is exceedingly rare as long as you are not living in, say, the less savory parts of Syria or Afghanistan. We shouldn't spend an unlimited amount of time, money and convenience on a problem which is marginal on the worst of days.
Terror groups can get into Europe, but do they have people working airport security a CDG or FRA?
In a less serious vein, if you told me my kids couldn't have their Kindles or iPads on a seventeen hour flight, I'd probably want to kill someone by the end of it.
-Some of your co-passengers would probably beat you to it; you would likely be collateral damage.
Sounds to me like they're afraid of some sort of insider threat with those airlines. Maybe the other airports have sufficient screening for passengers but employees of those airlines might be able to sneak something on.
That reason is weak if one has ever flown out of Istanbul Ataturk (IST). It has has three security checkpoints to board the plane. You go through one just to enter the airport, one to get into the departure gate area (the standard one we know of), and right before you board the plane, there's a third check.
Yes, there was a suicide attack last June, but that happened at the outer layer--the entrance. I doubt other airports would have fared better except for ones in Israel (but I haven't been there). Also, those attackers were not intent on boarding a plane with the device we're proposing.
I know airport security can be inconsistent and people criticise it for being theatre, but with three chances of catching someone, I have no qualms flying out of Ataturk.