I turned a traffic ticket into a constitutional trial
arstechnica.com
arstechnica.com
Due process does not set hard and fast rules about indictments, etc. Rather, the due-process analysis is dependent on context. Part of that context is the "amount of the deprivation." Where the deprivation is minor, the amount of process the government must provide is less.
For example, courts have long recognized that there are a class of offenses such as breaches of the peace that do not require the jury trial ordinarily required by criminal proceedings:
> So, also, in New Jersey, where the constitution guaranteed that "the right of trial by jury shall remain inviolate," the court said: "Extensive and summary police powers are constantly exercised in all the States of the Union for the repression of breaches of the peace and petty offences, and these statutes are not supposed to conflict with the constitutional provisions securing to the citizen a trial by jury... . This constitutional provision does not prevent the enforcement of the by-laws of a municipal corporation without a jury trial." McGear v. Woodruff, 4 Vroom, 213, 217. In State v. Conlin, 27 Vermont, 318, 323, the court sustains the right of the legislature to provide for the punishment of minor offences, having reference to the internal police of the State, "with fine only, or imprisonment in the county jail for a brief and limited period." See, also, Williams v. Augusta, 4 Georgia, 509.
Callan v. Wilson, 127 U.S. 540, 552 (1888).
Many states have a concept of civil infractions. When dealing with such an infraction, the state is invoking its police powers (and thus does not have to show an injury to itself as would be required in an ordinary civil action), but the ordinary rules of criminal procedure do not apply. That does not offend the Constitution because due process,[1] does not require full criminal procedure for a $50 fine.
[1] The word "due" literally means "warranted" or "appropriate."
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State "Within these parameters it was determined that the five year wait for this case to go trial was not in violation of the Constitution."
The Wikipedia page for that case further explains:
> More importantly, the Court determined that Barker did not want a speedy trial (a fact that Barker's counsel conceded at oral argument). The Court speculated that Barker's reason was his gambling on Manning's acquittal (the evidence against Manning not being strong as evidenced by two hung juries and two appellate court reversals), believing that if Manning was acquitted, he would never be tried (which Barker's counsel also conceded at oral argument). The Court further noted that, after Barker's counsel objected to the February 1962 continuance, he did not object to the June or September 1962 continuances; only in March 1963, after Manning's convictions became final, were objections raised to further continuances (this time brought about by the ex-sheriff's illness, which Barker conceded was a justifiable reason).
As the Court pointed out, the right to a speedy trial is different than other rights because in many cases the defendant wants to drag out the process, especially if they are free on bail. I don't think it's "ignoring the Constitution" for the court to take that into account in deciding whether a Defendant's right to a speedy trial was actually violated.
First of all, I wish you would elaborate on what specifically you disagree with the author about. If you are talking about the section regarding standing, I would agree there is much more nuance to the question than there may seem at first glance. Also, I agree that the distinction between civil and criminal law isn't "baked into the Constitution" as you say, but I don't think just because it isn't specifically laid out in the constitution doesn't make the distinction any less clear or important taking into account the whole of the spirit and princple of the law (such as common law). I would also agree with you that due-process is largely open to contextual arguments because it was not so clearly deliniated by the founders either. (I can never not think of John Yoo and his twisting of due process to justify torture when discussing this matter.)
That is where our agreements stop though, because the rest of your argument seems disingenuous. You begin citing "McGear v. Woodruff", when in reality you are citing CALLAN v. WILSON [1], and you take the text you cite out of context completely. First of all, the primary issue of the case is the following:
"It is contended by the appellant that the Constitution of the United States secured to him the right to be tried by a jury, and, that right having been denied, the police court was without jurisdiction to impose a fine upon him, or to order him to be imprisoned until such fine was paid."
Skipping to the end result:
"The judgment is reversed, and the cause remanded with directions to discharge the appellant from custody.", preceded by, "we are unable to hold that a person charged with having committed it [conspiracy] in this District is not entitled to a jury, when put upon his trial.", and that the governments argument that trial without jury was acceptable "given an unobstructed right of appeal to, and trial by jury in, another court to which the case may be taken.", "We cannot assent to that interpretation of the Constitution. Except in that class or grade of offences called petty offences, which, according to the common law, may be proceeded against summarily in any tribunal legally constituted for that purpose, the guarantee of an impartial jury to the accused in a criminal prosecution, conducted either in the name, or by or under the authority of, the United States, secures to him the right to enjoy that mode of trial from the first moment, and in whatever court, he is put on trial for the offence charged."
In short, this series of argumentation you use in which you take out of context clips and miscite them in an attempt to defend a position, that seems to state that the right to a jury is not always present, is flatly wrong. If that is not the argument you were making and I have misunderstood you, please clarify your position for me.
If you had cited the section about "Except in that class or grade of offences called petty offences" and argued the authors ticket constituted a petty offence "proceeded against summarily in any tribunal legally constituted for that purpose", this conversation would have gone differently.
As far as I know, in both civil and criminal cases the right to a jury is preserved, though in the civil case the right must be specifically demanded. Of course one can waive this right, but it is preserved until that point. Either way, attempts to cite random state level cases to apparently argue otherwise is the constitutional analysis here I disagree with.
[1]http://www.leagle.com/decision/1888667127US540_1609/CALLAN%2...
I'm not quoting Callan for its holding, but its discussion of what courts understood the jury trial right (which predates the Constitution) to mean. Hence the relevance of the state court cases--state courts were the ones interpreting the jury trial right before federal courts existed.
Although Callan does not find conspiracy to be a petty offense, it acknowledges that there is a class of such offenses that do not fall within the right to a jury trial, which is the only point I wanted to make. I thought it was pretty clear that I thought a speeding camera ticket was a petty offense of the sort Callan refers to.
Please consider trying to not fall into this trap by learning how to state your arguments more clearly. Among other lawyers and judges things like this pass, but by creating a seperate language the common people don't understand, I think the people are done a disservice. (I also think this was one the highlights of the Code of Hammurabi... the first time the law was written in the common tongue.)
It's baked in the way that lots of preexisiting understanding is; the Constitution was not intended to be creating a novel understanding of law from first principles; it was written in a particular legal and historical context and assumed quite a bit from that context. The distinction between criminal law and other aspects of law (and that between suits in law and those in equity) are part of that pre-existing context.
> If we are going to stop those nefarious evildoers who jeopardize the health of the republic by sliding through yellow lights when no one else is around and driving through empty streets at thirty miles per hour in twenty-five zones, then we need a way around such pesky impediments as a lack of eyewitnesses.
And fuck this line. Over a million people are killed every year due to car drivers. You can make light, make it funny to speed, but one of the big problems is that people don't take driving seriously. It is incredibly dangerous.
If someone invented cars today, and not a 100 years ago, they would never be allowed.
Are you serious? Because he wasn't the one speeding. If I lend you a screwdriver and you stab someone with it, should I go to prison?
Also are you aware its legal to drive thru a yellow light?