Troubled covert agency responsible for trucking nuclear bombs across America

You have a network of detection systems which you give you (optimistically) 15-40 minutes of warning before everything and everyone you've ever known and cared about ends. In that time you have to make the decision to launch a counter-attack. Your decision needs to be something which can be rapidly acted upon, but also needs to be something that absolutely cannot be interfered with by any adversary launching the first strike. If you delay, your ability to counterattack will be forever lost. If you're wrong, you'll be setting off Armageddon.

Now... describe how you make that work.

I'm not sure if "death to America" qualifies, but if so, it's not cool to call Iran "terrorist" at the moment.

On the another bomb, from which point of view the dropping sequence was less "normal" (the breakup of the plane made less clear-cut case from the perspective of that one, so some internal components didn't activate) the same switch was discovered in the "on" position.

So it was really, really close call.

(A "small" curiosity: These bombs are two-stage bombs, one weaker nuclear explosion forces the next, one stronger. The "weaker one" part of one of the bombs, with its radioactive content that has enough material for a nuclear explosion is still there(!) deep in the ground.)

In that sense, we would've lost Arkansas, turning it into a place with hardly any residents

Please do explain that. As far as I understand, the explosives and the radioactive materials are all there in the warhead, the "precision" only affects the "quality" of the explosion (i.e. the number of "megadeaths" https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Megadeath )

Only the first few atom bombs had the missing part of the radioactive matter outside the of the bomb when the bomb was fully unarmed, technically making the explosion impossible, as there isn't enough mass for an explosion without the missing part.

But since the early fifties, all the material needed for the nuclear explosion is always in the warhead.

Note that in the event here discussed (it was an explosion of the fully equipped H-warhead missile in Damascus, Arkansas, US)

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1980_Damascus_Titan_missile_ex...

really nothing "special" happened: one of the technicians just accidentally dropped one metal socket during his maintenance work, that was all:

http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/americanexperience/features/bonus-vi...

And that was enough to cause the explosion of the rocket. Would any "expert" before that event claim it was all that was needed?

> During the Cold War, the United States and Soviet Union both deployed nonstrategic nuclear weapons for use in the field during a conflict. While there are several ways to distinguish between strategic and nonstrategic nuclear weapons, most analysts consider nonstrategic weapons to be shorter-range delivery systems with lower yield warheads that might be used to attack troops or facilities on the battlefield. They have included nuclear mines; artillery; short-, medium-, and long-range ballistic missiles; cruise missiles; and gravity bombs. In contrast with the longer-range “strategic” nuclear weapons, these weapons had a lower profile in policy debates and arms control negotiations, possibly because they did not pose a direct threat to the continental United States. At the end of the 1980s, each nation still had thousands of these weapons deployed with their troops in the field, aboard naval vessels, and on aircraft.

> In 1991, the United States and Soviet Union both withdrew from deployment most and eliminated from their arsenals many of their nonstrategic nuclear weapons. The United States now has approximately 760 nonstrategic nuclear weapons, with around 200 deployed with aircraft in Europe and the remaining stored in the United States. Estimates vary, but experts believe Russia still has between 1,000 and 6,000 warheads for nonstrategic nuclear weapons in its arsenal. The Bush Administration quietly redeployed and removed some of the nuclear weapons deployed in Europe. Russia, however seems to have increased its reliance on nuclear weapons in its national security concept. Some analysts argue that Russia has backed away from its commitments from 1991 and may develop and deploy new types of nonstrategic nuclear weapons.

> The Soviet Union produced and deployed a wide range of delivery vehicles for nonstrategic nuclear weapons. At different times during the period, it deployed devices that were small enough to fit into a suitcase-sized container, nuclear mines, shells for artillery, short-, medium-, and intermediate-range ballistic missiles, short-range air-delivered missiles, and gravity bombs. The Soviet Union deployed these weapons at nearly 600 bases, with some located in Warsaw Pact nations in Eastern Europe, some in the non-Russian republics on the western and southern perimeter of the nation and throughout Russia. Estimates vary, but many analysts believe that, in 1991, the Soviet Union had more than 20,000 of these weapons. The numbers may have been higher, in the range of 25,000 weapons in earlier years, before the collapse of the Warsaw Pact.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/W48

That's much smaller than a suitcase. Heavy, sure, but quite a bit smaller than the carry-on suitcase I was lugging around last week, and I've got a small one compared to the monstrosities that are considered to be carry-on sized now.

[1] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/W48

We haven't had a nuclear war...

> Your claiming there aren't enough of them to be dangerous, while elsewhere in the thread someone is trying to scare us with a very large number.

I'm not claiming that at all, I'm just saying that just because one hasn't been accidentally detonated doesn't mean a whole lot. The biggest danger is surely an intentional detonation, but accidents do happen.

Probably because launching a nuclear attack doesn't benefit nation states, if other nation states also have nuclear weapons. Also, all large high GDP nation states currently have intertwined economic dependencies, which also makes it less likely they would be inclined to launch nukes at each other.

Obviously, at the moment, North Korea stands out as a potential exception here, but they have nowhere near the number of warheads or industrial capacity to even play on the MAD doctrine level - they're certainly far from becoming anything like the next USSR.

So the only really remaining scenarios that could lead to a nuclear attack (barring massive changes in the current geopolitical order) would be that some non-nation-state actor, perhaps with fanatical motivations, gains access to a nuclear weapon. Although, in this case, without the state infrastructure to actually launch multiple warheads at the same time, it's unlikely that such an attack would be in any sense civilization-ending (even though it would certainly be very devastating, of course).

My vaguely informed guess is that the probability of nuclear war is around 1% per year. This is roughly consistent with what we saw during the Cold War (both the lack of a nuclear war and the numerous instances in which it almost happened) and seems to be consistent with the way things are set up today.

> “Until my death I will never forget hearing my sergeant say, 'Lieutenant, we found the arm/safe switch.' And I said, 'Great.' He said, 'Not great. It’s on arm.'” https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1961_Goldsboro_B-52_crash#Bomb...

Also what you are describing is "One Point Safety" in which an external explosion or fire can cause a nuclear detonation. This is mostly true for the current US arsenal, but wasn't in the past. It's one of the main reasons why the Little Boy design was so poor for safety, it only required one (preferably intentional) explosion

Source: https://www.amazon.com/Command-Control-Damascus-Accident-Ill...

It has happened before, but fortunately without the detonation.

The Hiroshima enriched uranium bomb was about as safe as an IED. It would have gone off if it hit the ground hard or was in a fire. The bomber crew had orders to dump the bomb in deep water if they had to abort the mission and return to base. Landing on Tinian with the bomb was considered far too risky.