What he calls the "free will camp" sounds like a weird mishmash of libertarianism (determinism is false, and we have free will) and hard-determinism (determinism is true, therefore we don't have free will). It completely ignores compatibilism (https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/compatibilism/).
Moreover, the argument he gives regarding Leopold and Loeb is baffling. That a jury has no free will to listen to your argument for hard-determinism is prima-favor irrelevant. A hard-determinist holds that some people are determined to believe in free will, and moral responsibility, but they're incorrect. Any graduate student in philosophy would be expected to note these distinctions.
As for the view that free will is an illusion, he presents one of the canonical arguments uncharitably. Leaving aside the question of whether the invocation of NP actually establishes what he says it does (something non-determined but non-random), the opponent of libertarianism doesn't need the claim that determinism and randomness are our only options. They just need (something like) the premise that if our actions don't follow from our reasons/emotions/volition, they can't be considered free, and that anyone proposing some status between randomness and determinism needs to account for the sense in which decisions flowing from that status are free.