Never mind, look like I'm wrong :-) http://bgr.com/2017/03/08/cia-wikileaks-apple-iphone-hacking... http://bgr.com/2017/03/09/google-says-many-android-exploits-...
1. It is about CIA, not NSA. 2. What CIA did goes against the promise previous administration had made after Snowden leaks, where they promised that agencies will be immediately disclosing discovered vulnerabilities to the affected US tech companies.
2. Not only was such a promise never made, but it's well outside of the realm of reason. Of all the vulnerabilities out there (and the way the market works, there are more shipped every day), only small disjoint fractions have been discovered by intelligence agencies both friendly and hostile to the USIC, and hence there is absolutely no reason for them to disclose NOBUS vulns: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/NOBUS
2. I am not talking about all leaks ever, I am talking about the ones that CIA found. Also, NOBUS is in the domain of NSA, not CIA.
2. Makes no difference.
How do you know the CIA found these vulns, and that they weren't shared from IC partners?
You are, at best, advocating a policy which would lead to an absolutely disastrous disadvantage to the USICs SIGINT capabilities in relation to its adversaries.
Android: https://wikileaks.org/ciav7p1/cms/page_11629096.html
Now, some of those are known existing exploits, others are 0 days, but unless you think they're straight up making these lists up, they've got them.
My issue is with the claim of 0-days, because the bugs are dead. You cannot hack an up-to-date phone with anything in this dump.
There were social security #'s in those releases.
They try and play both sides of the fence: -we dont "editorialize", redact or make decisions on what is and isn't released -release specific info with sensational headlines timed for optimal impact
If they were to dump all the releases months before the election no one would have remembered them, no matter how significant.
They've done partial releases and released over time with many other leaks too. I don't see how that conflicts with transparency or impartiality.
Put yourself in their shoes - how would you have solved it differently?
> There were social security #'s in those releases.
When you're working with data in the volumes that they are and you have limited review staff, sometimes mistakes happen. If you'd like to help prevent it, I believe they do accept reviewers if you've got appropriate credentials.
If you'd like to volunteer that skill, they may be open to accepting it. It's entirely possible they just don't have developers with such abilities in their arsenal. You might try their IRC channels and such if you'd consider it.
It's not "mistake" if PII is revealed in every single release. It is incompetence or they are acting in bad faith. There are dozens of other organizations that have strong records on this. wikileaks is not one of them.
They've stated that's exactly what they're doing in several pieces.
> It's not "mistake" if PII is revealed in every single release. There are dozens of other organizations that have strong records on this. wikileaks is not one of them.
Likely because those "dozens of other organizations" don't publish many leaks and especially not in anything approaching raw form - every single leak I've seen in a major paper has been heavily filtered down and distilled into a specific narrative. WikiLeaks just publishes with minimal editing - any narrative from them is completely separated from the leaks. That rawness is what makes them better than other approaches for getting real information out, but it's also what makes them worse at censoring that information.
>WikiLeaks just publishes with minimal editing - any narrative from them is completely separated from the leaks
Wikileaks in king of clickbait and creating false impressions of what data they are and aren't releasing. Just look at their twitter account. There are even reports of withholding entire data sets when it doesn't fit their narrative.
I am on board for the premise of WikiLeaks is trying to do, but they have flatly failed in the execution.