C "executable" cipher text that is (presumably) made by prepending a js decryptor (executable code) to encrypt(M,K) - ie: C=make_executable_js(encrypt(M,K)).
C' could be anything (B only sees a minfied blob of js) - but at the very least is likely to be runnable js code. In the simplest case, it's simply a modified message M', encrypted with K and prepended with the (presumably) benign decryption code -- the change now being that when A wrote ("HI MOM, PLZ SEND MONEY TO ACCOUNT #121"), M' reads similar except for the account number (etc, etc).
The main difference (apart from implementation details of encryption and so forth under a js runtime) from Gnu Privacy Guard - is that one can/should/would get a trusted gpg binary that should be safe(ish) to run on potentially untrusted ciphertext.
Note that in the example above, Eve doesn't start out knowing the Key, K -- but as B runs any random js-code found at the "drop" point, Eve might be able to use said code to obtiain K (B types it in and allows untrusted code to handle the secret).
Contrast with getting a cd-rom from a trusted source with an OS and gpg on it - feeding gpg some reandom cipher text C' that Eve created, barring gpg bugs, a) doesn't give Eve access to K, and b) doesn't trick B into reading some bogus message M', different from the message A wanted to send in the first place.
In short - it would make more sense to distribute the decryptor js-script in a public but trusted manner - and then run the decryptor on the cipher text that could then be obtained in a different manner.
What an executable self-decrypting file (weather .exe or .js file) might be good for, is if A hands it to B on a USB key or transfer the encrypted archive in some trusted manner - the data would then be "safe" until B sits down and types in K. How useful this actually is, is up for debate.
All that said - I think it's great fun to make little tools like this, but we should be a careful about teaching people (even for fun) to run random code - be that js or other code.