Good. They're trying to clean up all the private data leaked everywhere. I tempted to say "why couldn't they figure out this google dork themselves" but they've probably been slammed for the past 7 days cleaning up a bunch of stuff anyway.
"CF-RAY" "CF-Force-Miss-TS"
"X-SSL-Server-Name"
"Internal Upstream Server Certificate0"
The short waiting period balances the vendor's interest in coordinating the smoothest fix to the problem with the public's interest in knowing its exposure and maximizing it's options for reacting to the exposure.
The fixed waiting period keeps the process sane. Every vendor you'll ever disclose a serious vulnerability to will try to delay disclosure, usually repeatedly. If you set a precedent of making arbitrary exceptions, you'll never be able to stare anyone down.
Again: as the reporters, you're trying to balance the vendor's interests with those of the public. Your credibility in these situations is pretty important, not just for this vulnerability, but for the next ones. With P0, we all know there will be a long series of "next ones" to be concerned about.
I feel like adding even just another day or two would've allowed them to purge more of these search results. I think that would greatly outweigh the increased risk of letting it remain undisclosed for slightly longer.
And yet, I occasionally see working cache links on relevant unaffected pages.
Really, really awesome to see this kind of response. It's an obvious course of action (also considering corporate liability that you're publicly holding/offering this data) but it's really cool to see everyone work to fix this en masse so quickly.
I think a lot of people would enjoy hearing campfire battle stories of the past ~week once this is all over.