Areas near Sacramento evacuated as Oroville spillway collapse feared
sacbee.com
sacbee.com
There's a data feed from sensors at the dam.[1] "Level" is probably good data. "Out" flow rate may not be meaningful; the emergency spillway probably lacks a flow meter. Here's a plot of "Level".[2] When it's below 900, the auxiliary spillway should stop flowing. As of 2330, it's at 900 feet almost exactly.
[1] http://rdcfeeds.redding.com/lakelevels/oro.cfm [2] http://cdec.water.ca.gov/jspplot/jspPlotServlet.jsp?sensor_n...
They had reduced the main spillway flow prior to water starting to flow out the emergency spillway, but they increased it after that happened.
edit: it seems that the water level is below the emergency spillway now, but the main spillway is still open, probably at least partly out of concern about coming rain.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=EQSUJGzjmAI&t=0s
The video clearly shows the over-topping of the emergency spillway and the flooding/over-topping of the recreational area.
It also shows the main spillway and the damage is obvious, particularly at the 22 minute mark.
It's actually surprising how bad the damage is to the main spillway, it's not just a 'sink-hole' as was earlier described, it appears totally destroyed across a large portion of the middle part causing severe erosion of the land underneath and water spilling to the left side as well as rebounding up and over to the remaining lower section.
This video shows the damage to the main spillway even more clearly:
edit: it should be noted that the main spillway damage in itself doesn't threaten the hill and the lake, the issue is fragments or rocks and concrete sent downstream, that might partially clog the river or destroy some infrastructure.
https://apps.axibase.com/chartlab/dee79515
The overflow lasted for 45 hours.
The water level appears to be dropping quickly at the moment:
See pic: http://s4.reutersmedia.net/resources/r/?m=02&d=20170213&t=2&...
I believe they're worried about the erosion tearing apart the hillside and thus destabilizing the entire hill; at which point the whole hill would just collapse.
Google "Major sinkhole on spillway at Lake Oroville" to avoid the paywall.
http://www.latimes.com/visuals/photography/la-me-lake-orovil...
The lake near my house was down 120 feet. You could see land and structures never seen in decades. Prime opportunity to get in there to inspect and maintain said infrastructure. Not sure anything was done at all.
I am no expert in concrete but I would like to think the break in the Oroville spillway could have been detected and dealt with with cursory inspections over the last several years, when access was easy due to the drought.
I don't like it when folks are put in danger because other folks who are supposed to be working for us don't do their jobs. Not saying this is what's happening here, I don't know, but the question needs to be asked.
They share the data about the level of the reservoir:
http://cdec.water.ca.gov/histPlot/DataPlotter.jsp?staid=ORO&...
The wet season last year basically filled the reservoir up from its lowest levels. So a project started in the middle of 2014 would need to leave the system operable by December, and they have that same ~6 month period in pretty much every year.
Nobody ever seems to do this. We always wait for disasters before fixing or maintaining anything. This, despite the fact that we pay taxes, plenty of taxes, to fully staff, train and employ departments with thousands of people who are supposed to actively be looking after these things.
It's the infrastructure equivalent of a sysadmin who never looks after security and then, when all hell breaks loose, proclaims we need to do something about security.
There's lots of possibilities. Maybe they didn't do inspections last year. Maybe they did inspections and noted damage that did not yet warrant repair. Maybe they did inspections and missed damage. Maybe they were unable to secure funds to repair the damage. Maybe the damage was noted too late to do repairs last fall. Etc.
The thing to do is wait and see if they come forward with a reasonable explanation of what went wrong and then feed that information into the maintenance plans at this dam and others.
In other words, the idea that things could go bad once lots of water came back isn't a far-fetched concept. Yet we are reactionary. We don't seem to spend any time a-priory to try and get ready for such events. History is full of such fuck-ups.
This was the first time the spillway was EVER used in its existence; for all we knew at the time, it would have never been used.
Downstream destruction is of concern because that entire region depends on flood control. The habitability and agricultural production of the corridor between Oroville and Sacramento relies upon, and was created by, the flood control of Plumas, Yolo, Butte, etc counties. There are a number of canals, diversions, and reservoirs both above and below the Oroville to further control flow the dam as it reaches our rivers. However, most of the re-routing is also man-made and thus untested for such an event.
Dirt hillsides are not designed to have 100,000 cubic feet of water rolling down them. They tend to erode extremely quickly and can quickly turn into uncontrolable discharges if the lip erodes.
For the main service spillway, the main concern is that the flow of water will cause erosion damage upstream of the existing damaged site[1]. If the damage to the concrete continues up the spillway to the top, it could render the spillway inoperable.
For the emergency spillway, the main concern is that a continued flow of water would erode the soil off the hill to the point that the hill would no longer support the spillway (the concrete lip at the top of the hill). If this happened, the spillway would fail. The effect wouldn't be as severe as if the dam failed (because there would still be a large hill in between the water and where it wants to flow), but the erosion along the path of the water would get out of control pretty quickly.
It would still be a catastrophe, the outflow will go from inches per hour to feet per hour.
https://www.google.com/maps/@39.5400137,-121.4931958,3617m/d...
Also: the top 70 meters or something is still a lot of water!
http://www.hcn.org/external_files/40years/blog/NearBreachGle...
It's a fascinating read.
I'm sure the California folks right now are studying up notes from the Glen Canyon incident.
Fingers crossed that things stay drier and cooler for the sake of all these people
I wonder, how do you test for something like this? I mean, you can certainly plan, and I imagine that the emergency spillway was examined at the time it was planned, but no plan survives contact with the enemy, and the best thing to do is to test.
But, to test the emergency spillway you need to fill the dam to the point where it's overflowing, and I believe it's been a few years since we've gotten close to that. Certainly not any time in the last year.
Besides, if it was tested in the past, it may be that the drought conditions--followed by all the rain--changed the soil in such a way as to enable this.
I need to make a note to read the report when it comes out; I'm sure it'll be interesting.
It was supposedly designed to handle 350,000 cubic feet per second, but began to fail at around 6,000 to 12,000 cubic feet per second.
Same principle seems to apply to spillways.
> Sunday night gridlock as Marysville residents evacuate
> After having to evacuate several times before, Agrifoglio said, she was used it.
> She’s confident her husband will be able to evacuate if he needs to, but Tommy would have to wait out a flood.
> Erin English of Linda said she got a robo-call a few minutes ago telling her to evacuate and get to higher ground.
"The Wire: to evacuate":
Thankfully, it appears the actual body of the dam is unlikely to fail, so hopefully even if the emergency spillway fails, it won't be a catastrophic, immediate draining of the whole lake.
Under a stream of water moving 65,000 CFS, ripping out chunks of solid cement, probably not so much.
40 million cubic meters in 24 hours means just 15 2m diameter pipes running at 10 m/s.
I would imagine the same amount of water flowing over a longer period time would cause less erosion even if the pipes wouldn't reach all the way down...
Edit: You could even do it with 6000 20 cm diameter pipes, probably plastic would do.
Good idea, but this is happening in CA, where pipelines don't sprout so quickly.
Between 130,000 and 180,000 people are being evacuated upstream.
(I just realized the Oroville Dam is for a reservoir rather than power generation, but the risks are similar.)
http://cdec.water.ca.gov/jspplot/jspPlotServlet.jsp?sensor_n...
1: http://cdec.water.ca.gov/jspplot/jspPlotServlet.jsp?sensor_n...
2: http://www.abc10.com/weather/sierra-snowmelt-peaking-earlier...
http://cdec.water.ca.gov/histPlot/DataPlotter.jsp?staid=ORO&...
Or I also wonder if they could drill into the bottom of the Resavoir and let the water drain into the ground?
The main spillway has been running at 100000 cubic feet per second. To carry that in 3 foot pipes (7 square foot cross section), you'd need hundreds or thousands of them (so a few just wouldn't do much of anything).
Same with trying to bypass the water to somewhere else. To make a difference the bypass needs to be at a similar scale to the spillway, carrying tens of thousands of cubic feet per second.
http://www.mvn.usace.army.mil/Portals/56/docs/PAO/FactSheets...
Each can do 1740 cubic feet/second. And they are permanently installed and basically don't have anything resembling pipes.
Live coverage.
They say situation is better now that drain is sufficient.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=hSaAE6MbKE0
Not that you can see much as it's dark...
If it fails, it will be a double disaster, many people will lose property, and California will lose some or all of the water in its largest reservoir. The challenge is going to be keeping ahead of it through to the next storm.
"Countryman: It’s not going to be the (main) embankment failure, but it’s a failure. If it does happen, there’s nothing saying that the ground is going to stay where it is. That force of water will start tearing that hill apart, and it could eat back into the reservoir and drain the reservoir."
No, it's not. The local geology is fairly solid rock. The overflowing water will wear down the overlying soil and loose Earth, but should be sustained by the rock formation. It is a risk, certainly, but such a site is chosen because of the suitable foundation.
The issue right now is to see how the spillway fares over the night. If it handles the increased flow, then it should be able to continue to relieve the situation.
To be fair, I think it is a little ethically troubling to refer to the emergency spillway as anything other than that (e.g. auxiliary spillway), but it is designed to function in an emergency, not just fail catastrophically.
Where did you find the info on the area being solid rock?
That would go a long way to giving an idea as to how bad any increased failure might be.
Lake Oroville is actually the second largest reservoir and one of six reservoirs with a storage capacity over 1M acre feet of water: http://cdec.water.ca.gov/cgi-progs/reservoirs/RES
The largest is Lake Shasta: http://cdec.water.ca.gov/cgi-progs/stationInfo?station_id=SH... with a storage capacity of 4.3M acre feet of water, approximately 800,000 more acre feet than Lake Oroville.
There's definitely worries about the erosion on the main spillway moving back upstream towards the dam, but that is something folks are going to have to look at and consider over the remaining duration of the water season, unlikely to be a danger tonight.
However, my original comment was still substantially correct. See http://www.sacbee.com/news/local/article132356269.html
"It’s not going to be the (main) embankment failure, but it’s a failure. If it does happen, there’s nothing saying that the ground is going to stay where it is. That force of water will start tearing that hill apart, and it could eat back into the reservoir and drain the reservoir.
I don't know enough about the geology of the area to know how likely it is to happen. But history does show that dams can go very quickly once erosion reaches the dam/reservoir, so alarm isn't exactly unwarranted.
I imagine the most straightforward way to patch a hole, at least for a short period, is to use the water pressure to your advantage and inject objects to plug the hole from the dam side. Perhaps a thick metal plate lowered onto the main breach, and then malleable plastics/rubbers to slow seepage around the plate. Could probably push a hotfix out to master in a few days, for far less than 100 million dollars.
Disclaimer: I haven't found any details on the design of the emergency spillway and the suspected damage, so this is speculation.
You can see the extreme damage in this photo: http://fm.cnbc.com/applications/cnbc.com/resources/img/edito...
The current solution is to drain the reservoir of water as fast as possible--this removes pressure on the hillside, and reduces the scope for damage should the thing actually go.
As for actually patching it, the solution is dumping lots of grout. But that only helps if the slope is actually stable and capable of supporting the embankment and dam. If the slope is washing away, all of your patching is just adding more weight to a structure that can't support its own weight anymore.
While looking at old examples of dam failures, I came across https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sweetwater_Dam#1916_failure ... this seems awfully similar to what's happening at Oroville right now.
Anyway, the Sweetwater Dam article led me to an entertaining read about Charles Hatfield, the professional rainmaker: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Charles_Hatfield
Now this guy was a great salesman. It leads you to wonder if his apparently high success ratio was a result of pure luck, if there's some truth to his "evaporative mix," or as suggested in the article, he had great meteorological prediction skills.
If weather patterns are not independent one year to the next, then just the fact that only statistically significant drought-ridden cities call for his help probably suggests that all of these cities are "due" for rain regardless.