Glad to know his opinion is here well-informed. Perl only came out 30 years ago, so I guess I can understand not having had the time to learn it and just assume that it and other languages must be inferior.
I also didn't learn those in the sense of working with them, but I studied their reference material and numerous examples. That is more than enough for me to see what the underlying requirements are which these languages implement. I don't agree with most of the requirements (by which I mean the detailed specifics, not generalities like "we would like a useful language with good libraries for a wide range of applications" which is a universal).
I've borrowed from some of these languages into my own Lisp dialect. For instance, I like Python's array indexing, with how negative indices work backwards from the end, so I copied it.
I don't claim to say he's correct or not; rather, I'm saying that a bad attitude is inexcusable regardless of correctness. It's perfectly fine to not want to try a language (or even to dislike it), but in that case there aren't any grounds to criticize it.
Obviously I was exaggerating a bit in my original comment, but as I said in my second one, the issue I have with his statement is the attitude, not the content.
Transparency is a dependency of trust. If any component lacks transparency, then it cannot be trusted. Period.
This means neither macOS nor FileVault are sufficient; neither are transparent, and therefore neither are trustworthy. Even a fully-free operating system like a Linux distro or OpenBSD is insufficient if you rely on closed-source drivers or firmware.
Next step is to detect tampering. This means that your laptop needs to prevent booting any operating system unless you've signed it with some private key, and needs to clear any full-disk encryption keys if any attempt is made at physical tampering. This is also the step where you ensure the physical security of that machine.
Once you've established physical security and full-stack transparency, you can start worrying about the encryption itself (which will need to be much stronger than the norm) and about sandboxing untrustworthy software.
Really, the only perfectly-secure computer is an incinerated computer. The best anyone can do is minimize the opportunities for such a state-level actor to, well, act. Transparency, tamper-resistance, cryptography, and isolation are the keys, and even the slightest error or concession for "convenience" can and will permit the likes of the NSA to actually infiltrate your systems.
If access to data "after the fact" is what you're really asking, then you use the strongest encryption possible (a few options), and have a deadman switch to physically destroy the hardware (e.g., melt the platters/chips) including any caching mechanism(s) that's off-drive.
Can somebody explain in more depth whether this is likely true, or an over reaction, and why?
Is there literally no way to stop the NSA from snooping? What if I built a laptop from multiple separate components ordered from different websites or purchased from different B&M stores using heavily tumbled bitcoin and ordered to several different addresses or PO boxes from a public library, encrypt all of the drives, boot Tails from a flash drive, use a yubikey or some other physical authentication method in addition to passwords, and never connect the laptop to the internet (remove the Ethernet and WiFi cards)? Put some dynamat in the case, just to avoid some type of fancy-ass soundwave-based snooping... maybe even throw some thermite activated by 5 or 10 failed password attempts. Oh, and a super-silent keyboard to avoid password grabbing via the sound the keys make. And a pop-up visor to avoid people looking behind your shoulder.
https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2015/08/mickens_on_se...
If your objective is instead to prevent data theft by identity thieves or commercial spies, the FileVault type precautions and standard security practices are probably good enough.
First they need an RCE, probably for your browser, maybe your TLS library. For a state actor, this is not a problem. Let's assume it's your browser. They need you to visit a page with their malicious payload. They can use phishing, they can take over a site you visit. Or they can take control of some machine in the path between you and sites you visit. From there they can MitM a TCP connection to inject the payload. (They might not even need to be in the path, but most exploits to MitM a TCP connection not in your path only work for long running connections). Now all you have to do is make an un-encrypted connection to any site, and they've got you.
Now they have taken over the browser process. Maybe you decided to be safe and do all your browsing in a VM, or use something like Qubes. Then the NSA has to break out a virtualization escape from Xen/VMWare/whatever. Difficult, but not impossible, and entirely within the NSA's capabilities. Once out of the VM, they can use an OS exploit to get into kernel space, or just do some privilege escalation and load a kernel module.
From here they've got complete control of your machine. They can do disk and memory capture, capture all your keystrokes, record your screen, etc.
All of the above can be done without leaving a clear footprint in network traffic or on disk. An analyst could find it, given time, but I wouldn't trust any sort of AV program or network monitor to catch any of this automatically. Exfilling data is a little more complicated to avoid leaving a giant footprint in the network traffic. Probably the best thing is to take advantage of that staging server they set up in your path: your machine can make a TCP connection to an innocent-looking IP address and get the connection MitM-ed. Break the data into pieces and hide it in innocent-looking requests to generic places and have it intercepted.
Notice everything I've described can be done completely remotely, without any physical access, and can be applied to basically any setup you have. The bottom line: once you're dealing with a adversary sophisticated enough to be able to use multiple 0days against ubiquitous programs, there's not much you can do. Your best defense at this point becomes security through obscurity: force them to have to figure out what setup you have to progress through your system. This might slow them down enough that they get caught.
Seems easy to ensure that doesn't happen. If I block all non SSL requests going out from my machine, what's the next step?
If that is insufficient it's not a fight over security. It's a fight about mobilization of lawyers and political contacts.
'Persistent intrusion' involves long-term monitoring to gain psychological and behavioral insight. The industry has evolved, it's not always just about running a keylogger and capturing some files, anymore. Some example of what persistent intrusion is about: running a 'wmctrl' equivalent every 12 seconds to capture classes and titles of windows currently opened, which is then uploaded and assessed. Keyboard typing patterns are also captured. Your music collection is captured, including which tracks you listen to and how often. Over the course of months/years an large amount of information is ultimately collected which is then sent to a team of data scientists and psychologists for data mining and analysis. The wealth of information allows you to predict the target's thought patterns and movements.
The microphone is NOT captured for standard targets.
Persistent intrusion is easier to prevent:
- Prefer Linux to OSX/windows. Prefer Arch or similar but Ubuntu is infinitely better than OSX/windows.
- If you are using Ubuntu, never download apt-get packages over http (the default), switch to a mirror that uses https. The reason is there is MITM monitoring on the packages you are downloading in order to look for packages they need to find exploits in, and to gain information about your system.
- Obviously, never connect to a website unencrypted. The connection will be MITM'd, a 0day will be injected in-flight on the return path from the remote host and your browser will crash.
- On Linux, in the event of a normal crash, never use the crash reporters to send a crash report. The connection will be MITM'd, a 0day will be injected in-flight on the return path from the crash acknowledgement server.
- Routinely reinstall your operating system every 2-3 weeks. It's easy on Linux and you can automate the install using scripts. Additionally you can mount your home directory seperately. Physically change the installation drive.
Unfortunately, incidental (one-off) intrusion is more difficult to stop since assumedly a single attack is all it will take to lose your data on disk, if this is the resource you are trying to protect.
Even if you are not a high profile target, any connection to a VPN or TOR is monitored, and your IP address is added to an array and entered into a lottery for penetration.
It's maybe the wrong question, or part of a bigger question of how do you secure information you want to keep from a state-level actor. Your laptop may be part of that but also your mobile device, home phone, cloud services, and other people who also have access to the said data. Also how determined they are to get the data is another factor, and can they achieve what they need to another way without 'your' data.
edit: assuming it is not "connected" to the physical world, I'd partner with an embassy to house the laptop there. preferably a communist state where we don't have good relations.
Oh, you mean a usable laptop?