Shaw has created a merit badge sash of crypto exotica: Needham-Shroeder key exchange (oh, sorry, "ISO IEC 48798783 without the Helsinki vulnerability"), a bizarro block cipher mode, a custom PRNG, and no explanation whatsoever of the motivation behind his choices. Of course, this is all just libtomcrypt under the hood, which probably explains the showy idiosyncrasy.
You'd be able to take something like this more seriously if Zed "So Fucking Awesome" Shaw had ever contributed any findings against TLS, or even SSH. But that would be Hard, Harder than "fighting the cargo cults" --- people much more demonstrably competant than Shaw have already shaken the bugs out of TLS.
Generally, I find Shaw's arguments and reasoning about security unconvincing. For instance, there's a place in that article where he argues that "binary protocols have fewer buffer overflows" --- he might as well just write "I don't pay attention to vulnerability research". He seems to believe that Ragel, an obscure regex-modeled lexer, is a talisman against vulnerabilities. His "Hate" protocol assumes that attackers originate from single sources, not from armadas of compromised machines.
Sigstoat isn't the first person to comment on this "top 10 list of signs of bad security" --- this is a point Schneier makes, often.