Warren Buffett: $516 trillion bubble is a disaster waiting to happen
marketwatch.com
marketwatch.com
Another example is Comerica's apparent misstep with its money market funds: http://venturebeat.com/2008/03/11/credit-crunch-hits-start-u...
You'll start seeing more stories like these.
I wonder to what extent Warren Buffett's treatment as a oracle by the financial press creates a non-helpful feedback loop where complex financial activities that can't be reduced to simple homilies (i.e., buy low, sell high) are immediately viewed as inevitably catastrophic and diabolical.
I say this with particular focus on the notion, which is once again stated in this article, that if Buffett doesn't understand it, who does? Apparently, a whole lot of very very smart people understand these systems (exotic financial instruments, electronic trading systems) enough to make them a significant part of the modern economic structure. Certainly, there is something more complex and nuanced going on here but you would not know it from the way the press (via Buffett) is presenting it.
Headlining this story 'Warren Buffet: *' is very misleading. Please don't.
BIS estimates that amount, but its really misleading...its a measure of the nominal size of the derivative and not the actual financial exposure.
The fact that this is going on outside of the regular banking system seems like a feature to me.
I don't know if the article's right or not, but...
I couldn't get over the figure...$516 trillion is...a lot of money. I thought the total wealth was closer to $125 trillion...wow. Of course, there are issues with how you count this money, and whether it's real or not, but, damn, 516 trillion...that's almost a quadrillion.
516,000,000,000,000.
5.16 x 10^14
Damn.
Of course, I'm sure we'd all give a quadrillion quadrillion for two seconds of joy.
Since nobody has canceled any of their speculative contracts, the notional value of the derivatives is the sum of the value of all of the trades: $5000. And yet, all but one of the participants made a positive bet (buying $1000 worth of oil) followed by an exactly-offsetting negative bet (selling the same amount of oil). So they all net out to zero, except the oil-well owner; we're all back where we started.
The problem is credit risk. If the gas station is destroyed in an earthquake, the commuter may not be able to collect on his bet with the station owner, and may thus be unable to pay the speculator, who may thus be unable to pay the oil well owner, forcing everyone to cut their spending or possibly even default. But in this case, it takes an outside catalyst, and the problem is not the derivatives themselves. The problem is credit risk. Also, earthquakes.
Any time people get comfortable making a promise they can only keep if promises to them are kept, you will be able to calculate a scary notional value for these promises, and argue that we're all betting with vastly more than we own. But everyone who makes a promise -- whether to pay $80 for a barrel of oil next June or to finish debugging next week -- implicitly accepts that there is a chance of default, and expects their counterparties to factor this in.
Somehow, despite giant chains of subcontracted promises, our economy has survived. I think it will keep surviving. I think derivatives are not so much a new promises as a way to formalize promises. We might be making more promises than we used to, but we're probably just measuring them better.