I've been thinking about this for a while, and the early conclusion I've come to, is that 64bits of provable random entropy in a password that's also memorable is a very high bar to clear.
Imagine this, you take four word types/groups, say, substantive, verb, adverb, preposition/place.
You list 128 of each - all with identified uniqly by the first two letters. You let a machine pick a word from each column at random. The phrase is your mnemonic key, the password (to type in) is the first two letters of each word, concatenated.
If you want to appease password strength checks, capitalise the first letter, and end the input with a period.
So: "girl runs happily up", becomes "giruhaup" (or, with equivalent entropy, but satisfying "at least three symbol groups": "Giruhaup.").
Now, that's then 4 picks out of 128 words, or an encoding of 4 times 7 bits (2^7=128) - 28 bits. You'd need three such passwords concatenated to break past 64 bits of entropy. And you'd have to type in 24 letters. That's pretty hard to type in blind without a typo.
You might be able to use lists of 256 words - but it'd make it a bit more difficult to make the wordlists (because words should be identified by the first two characters) - and you'd still need two "phrases" and type in 16 characters.
Adding random numbers, symbols or capitalization is probably not worth the challenge they add in remembering where they go, for the single/few bits of entropy they add.
And I'm still not convinced 16 characters is short enough to be usable for "most people".