Missiles of North Korea
missilethreat.csis.org
missilethreat.csis.org
And ballistic missile subs of the world: http://www.hisutton.com/Nuclear%20Missile%20Submarines.html
You can see photos from someone else here: http://www.catracing.org/hendrb/out-and-about-in-korea-tongi...
Speaking of equipment, it was obvious the submarine was stripped of any useful electronic equipment, such as navigation or communication equipment. In its place were items taken from a dump.
I imagine that all the original equipment was removed and analyzed by a South Korean Intelligence Service before the Sub became accessible to the public.
EDIT: Yeah, all of those flags are ridiculously high-resolution. Pretty rough on the browser.
Luckily, another site has it:
https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/Nuclearweaponswhohasw...
There you go!
0: https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/us-ai...
- if they relax the control
- if some other country decide to "liberate" NK
They probably don't see any possible way out.
To preserve its sovereignty, and preserve the inflow of foreign aid that the regime uses to prop itself up by preventing the starvation and likely resulting chaos that'd occur if forced to try to support its population from its own ill-managed resources.
I'm sure at least someone close to Kim knows that to actually nuke an American city would invite massive retaliation. But seeming plausibly crazy enough to do it anyway is a good way to make an otherwise absurdly insignificant little country seem like one that needs to be reckoned with. They're banking on the idea that the US will go far out of its way to avoid even the remote possibility of even a minor nuclear strike, and thus far it's worked out for them.
The Norks have also gotten a lot of mileage from their blackmail/bullying behavior over the years. They may be calculating other countries will be willing to make concessions to keep the crazy guy with nukes quiet.
Their missile systems have a lot of scrutiny upon them and they seem unreliable at best.
North Korea already moves a lot of people and trade via China, they could probably co-ordinate Nuclear strikes on several coastal cities just by putting them onto shipping containers.
North Korea's nuclear weapons program stems from a reaction to the US deploying cannons and missiles on the border and pointing them at them in 1958.
This freaked them out a little.
Rather than a vanguard invasion force, I've read that the 28,500 US military personnel in Korea today exist as a sort of political tripwire. There aren't enough of them to hold the line, let alone successfully invade the North, but their deaths in the event of a conflict would commit the US to the fight.
I'm bemused that this is considered a controversial fact.
Edit : I meant to say nuclear missiles and artillery were deployed in 1958 which is what NK reacted to, they had conventional weaponry deployed before that.
In this light, I'll note that Bush the elder removed US all nuclear arms from the Korea peninsula in 1991 (although Pyongyang's certainly still in range of American missiles and bombers):
http://thediplomat.com/2013/03/not-a-good-idea-american-nuke...
Overall, my impression is that North Korea fears a conventional ROK/US invasion much more than a nuclear exchange scenario, and that this fear (rather than of American nuclear artillery, missiles, etc) has been the primary motivation behind their nuclear arms development.
I don't think a conventional US invasion is likely, hence my comment. I also don't think the situation would be different if NK didn't have a nuclear arms program, given their alliance (or subordinate relationship?) with China.
True, but:
* given the US's nuclear submarine, bomber and ICBM capability this was likely seen as a moot point. The threat was still there. Indeed, one of the reasons the US cited for removing its nukes was that they were no longer needed.
* They actually never fully confirmed this withdrawal until 1998.
>Overall, my impression is that North Korea fears a conventional ROK/US invasion much more than a nuclear exchange scenario
I think so too - for now, but it probably didn't seem that way in 1958 when they had nukes pointed at them.
>I also don't think the situation would be different if NK didn't have a nuclear arms program
I do. They'd be much more vulnerable to invasion. Given the US's military history in the last half century (Vietnam, Iraq, etc.), I think their fear of that is somewhat justified.
Their alliance with China does provide some protection but relations have soured over the last few decades and if I were them I wouldn't see it as a relationship they could depend upon.
Nukes were pointed at them because they've invaded South Korea first.
A peaceful, East Germany-style transition would be preferable, but I also think it's possible that an invasion to free the current generation of North Koreans could do more good than letting them die under another Kim's boot. Millions live there today in deprivation and fear, not to mention the hundreds of thousands of North Koreans reportedly living (and dying, via torture and brutal execution) in Nazi-style concentration camps. Needless to say, a successful reunification of the Korean peninsula would benefit future generations of North Koreans as well.
If you're curious, here are the books which formed my impression on the subject:
"Without You, There Is No Us," https://www.amazon.com/dp/B00JTC9QBO/ref=dp-kindle-redirect?...
"The Cleanest Race: How North Koreans See Themselves and Why it Matters," https://www.amazon.com/dp/B004EWETZW/ref=dp-kindle-redirect?...
"Dear Leader: My Escape from North Korea," https://www.amazon.com/dp/B00IBYRQ18/ref=dp-kindle-redirect?...
http://www.latimes.com/nation/la-na-trump-allies-20160930-sn...
I suppose if the government in Seoul no longer felt it was worth the cost, they could stop paying and ask the Americans to leave.
EDIT: Oh yeah, why did you put "protection" in quotes? That's exactly what it is. The US doesn't pay North Korea to break the South's windows, if you'll excuse the mixed metaphor.
First paragraph of https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Korean_War
> By 1949, South Korean forces had reduced the active number of communist guerrillas in the South from 5,000 to 1,000. However, Kim Il-sung believed that the guerrillas had weakened the South Korean military and that a North Korean invasion would be welcomed by much of the South Korean population. Kim began seeking Stalin's support for an invasion in March 1949, travelling to Moscow to attempt to persuade him.[94]
> Initially, Stalin did not think the time was right for a war in Korea.[95] Chinese Communist forces were still fighting in China. American forces were still stationed in South Korea (they would complete their withdrawal in June 1949) and Stalin did not want the Soviet Union to become embroiled in a war with the United States.[95]
> By spring 1950, Stalin believed the strategic situation had changed. The Soviets had detonated their first nuclear bomb in September 1949; American soldiers had fully withdrawn from Korea; the Americans had not intervened to stop the communist victory in China, and Stalin calculated that the Americans would be even less willing to fight in Korea—which had seemingly much less strategic significance. The Soviets had also cracked the codes used by the US to communicate with the US embassy in Moscow, and reading these dispatches convinced Stalin that Korea did not have the importance to the US that would warrant a nuclear confrontation.[96] Stalin began a more aggressive strategy in Asia based on these developments, including promising economic and military aid to China through the Sino–Soviet Friendship, Alliance, and Mutual Assistance Treaty.[97]
A 2011 article from The Atlantic concerning Pakistan's nukes [1] offers clues as to how North Korea's arsenal might be rendered safe:
"This 'disablement campaign,' as one former senior Special Operations planner calls it, would be the most taxing, most dangerous of any special mission that JSOC could find itself tasked with—orders of magnitude more difficult and expansive than Abbottabad.
...
JSOC would take the lead, however, accompanied by civilian experts, and has been training for such an operation for years. JSOC forces are trained to breach the inner perimeters of nuclear installations, and then to find, secure, evacuate—or, if that’s not possible, to 'render safe'—any live weapons. At the Nevada National Security Site, northwest of Las Vegas, Delta Force and SEAL Team Six squadrons practice “Deep Underground Shelter” penetrations, using extremely sensitive radiological detection devices that can pick up trace amounts of nuclear material and help Special Operations locate the precise spot where the fissile material is stored. JSOC has also built mock Pashtun villages, complete with hidden mock nuclear-storage depots, at a training facility on the East Coast, so SEALs and Delta Force operatives can practice there.
At the same time American military and intelligence forces have been training in the U.S for such a disablement campaign, they have also been quietly pre-positioning the necessary equipment in the region. In the event of a coup, U.S. forces would rush into the country, crossing borders, rappelling down from helicopters, and parachuting out of airplanes, so they could begin securing known or suspected nuclear-storage sites. According to the former senior Special Operations planner, JSOC units’ first tasks might be to disable tactical nuclear weapons—because those are more easily mated, and easier to move around, than long-range missiles.
In a larger disablement campaign, the U.S. would likely mobilize the Army’s 20th Support Command, whose Nuclear Disablement Teams would accompany Special Operations detachments or Marine companies into the country. These teams are trained to engage in what the military delicately calls “sensitive site exploitation operations on nuclear sites”—meaning that they can destroy a nuclear weapon without setting it off. Generally, a mated nuclear warhead can be deactivated when its trigger mechanism is disabled—and so both the Army teams and JSOC units train extensively on the types of trigger mechanisms that Pakistani weapons are thought to use. According to some scenarios developed by American war planners, after as many weapons as possible were disabled and as much fissile material as possible was secured, U.S. troops would evacuate quickly—because the final stage of the plan involves precision missile strikes on nuclear bunkers, using special 'hard and deeply buried target' munitions."
[1] http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2011/12/the-ally...
Anyway, I hope NK understands that any kind of unprovoked offensive nuclear action on their part will result in the rest of the world banding together to crush them. I think they do understand that. It would probably happen to any country that uses a nuke offensively, and maybe defensively too.
If the US was planning a coup, why would they bother destroying all of their nuclear weapons?
It's merely discussing one such event that could lead to this plan being used, though the risks of failure mean it's unlikely to happen without a coup. What could North Korea do to make it seem like an attack was imminent and then leave enough time for this plan to take place?
North Korea will only use nukes if they're in threat of being crushed anyway, or if they have the support of China and either Russia or the US.
Edit: that assumes that SK would be the 'liberator', but chances that it would be China are probably higher.
While they will end up killing lots of people and causing heavy economic damage the real inability to deliver on the threat that has been kept alive by those who want a stronger stance against North Korea is likely one reason they are pursuing nuclear weapons. They know they don't have a strong threat and they want one. Whether this is to truly for self protection or for aggression is for teh intelligence wonks to figure out
http://thebulletin.org/evidence-shows-iron-dome-not-working7...
Also don't forget that next after artillery fire the NK can march in couple millions of soldiers - short of nuclear strike there is no way of stopping such a mass of infantry.
Not to mention that even if N. Korea were to be "liberated", I'm not entirely sure the South would want to bear the cost of reunification. Korean reunification would make German reunification look cheap in comparison.
But for US situation with NK and SK is already good enough: no profit from invading NK, and US already profit from having military base in SK because SK pays them huge money for it.
USA gains nothing from invading NK. When any variable change and invasion will become profitable, NK will be inevitably "liberated".