Also it seemed like the author assumes great technological advances in AIs, but not in biology. If we're gonna dream shit up why not dream that brains in the future will be 10,000 times as dense and computers won't be able to keep up except as tools.
"Suppose, says Searle, that this computer performs its task so convincingly that it comfortably passes the Turing test: it convinces a human Chinese speaker that the program is itself a live Chinese speaker. To all of the questions that the person asks, it makes appropriate responses, such that any Chinese speaker would be convinced that they are talking to another Chinese-speaking human being."
> If we're gonna dream shit up why not dream that brains in the future will be 10,000 times as dense
Because... that is not a thing which is happening. And deep learning and AI progress are things that are happening. (Quite aside from the many issues with your proposal, like a brain 10kx as powerful due to 10kx density would probably break thermodynamic limits on computation and of course cook itself to death within seconds.)
Like i mentioned, i don't know all the AI terminology but isn't there an unresolved argument that ai architecture in the short run can't mimic biological decision making, and so the decisions will always be different/ tasks for which tool AI will be better to help the biological decision making processes?
That's one perspective on anatta, but not a particularly useful one. You may find this interesting:
http://www.accesstoinsight.org/lib/authors/thanissaro/selves...
If you've ever taken an introductory course on Buddhism, you've
probably heard this question: "If there is no self, who does the
kamma, who receives the results of kamma?" This understanding turns
the teaching on not-self into a teaching on no self, and then takes
no self as the framework and the teaching on kamma as something that
doesn't fit in the framework. But in the way the Buddha taught these
topics, the teaching on kamma is the framework and the teaching of
not-self fits into that framework as a type of action. In other
words, assuming that there really are skillful and unskillful
actions, what kind of action is the perception of self? What kind of
action is the perception of not-self?