But Air France 447 is a recent example where it's really tempting to say that sheer pilot incompetence was the biggest factor: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Air_France_Flight_447
A stall horn is hard to overhear.
>appropriate action is the opposite in normal and alternate law
I'm not sure what you are referring to here, but the fact that the appropriate action was to push forward to bring the nose down was the same regardless of alternate law/normal law. The bad UI was that the stall alarm shut off when the stall became so severe, which is why the pilots pulled up to stop the stall alarm (making the stall worse).
>Even worse, the second pilot can't "feel" on the stick what the first pilot does.
The system warns on dual input when it conflicts like that. Again, recognizing this condition is a very basic requirement of understanding the airbus control system. Regardless of that, the pilots did not communicate what they thought the problem was and what they were doing to solve it. Competent pilots don't end up in a situation where one is silently doing the opposite of the other and they don't realize it.
Nevertheless, I wonder whether that particular accident would have happened with the physical link between yokes, rather than the side sticks; and whether there are lessons to be learned from that regarding UI/human-system-interface.
But then, how idiot-proof should planes be...
I am convinced that much of human error is due to bad user interface, especially in technical settings. I think it is an important lesson that both pilots failed to recognize (in a stressful situation):
1. the plane was in alternate law 2. either actions contradicted each others