Facebook Investors Criticize Marc Andreessen for Conflict of Interest
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I'm glad this is being brought to light... and that investors are angry. This sort of action I think should be wildly illegal.
It's removing a great deal of value from one's share. That value is being able to vote. I'm not a FB shareholder but if they had removed my voting power (or rather made it a 1/3 of what it was) I'd want compensation and then I'd sell my shares.
This sort of crap is propagating a big issue: the separation of management and control from ownership of companies. It invites irresponsibility and selfishness because the cost of such to management is continuously decreasing. While the owners (shareholders) are the ones to pay the real price for their actions.
This is how we have problems like CEOs losing money quarter after quarter but still getting bonuses and ever larger golden parachutes...
It's easy to say he's a "visionary" now but the markets facebook has ridden its growth on were not a result of it being amazing. It was a combination of the right time, luck, and a bit of vision (he does deserve some credit). Now that markets are saturated we'll see how truly visionary he is... acquiring for growth targets doesn't make him visionary it just makes him a good business person. If he can't grow it or his vision is off-- it won't matter, if he missteps and costs his shareholders. He and his cronies will still be rich as hell and his shareholders will pay the price.
Edit: typo
I think a lot of investors are largely ignorant of the voting fact and I also think, most don't get involved until things go badly; so, we'll see how the long term plays out to really know.
I wonder if there are any other companies with stock structures similar to Google but without all powerful founders that would provide more data on this question? I don't know of any off the top of my head but my knowledge in this area isn't particularly strong.
> Many companies list dual-class shares. Ford's dual-class stock structure, for instance, allows the Ford family to control 40% of shareholder voting power with only about 4% of the total equity in the company. Berkshire Hathaway Inc., which has Warren Buffett as a majority shareholder, offers a B share with 1/30th the interest of its A-class shares, but 1/200th of the voting power. Echostar Communications demonstrates the extreme power that can be had through dual-class shares: founder and CEO Charlie Ergen has about 5% of the company's stock, but his super-voting class-A shares give him a whopping 90% of the vote. [1]
[1]: http://www.investopedia.com/articles/fundamental/04/092204.a...
I found the tone in this exchange particularly galling:
'"The cat's in the bag and the bag's in the river,'' he messaged Zuckerberg. "Does that mean the cat's dead?" Zuckerberg texted back, not understanding the spy speak.
Andreessen replied: "Mission accomplished "'
Facebook's growth over the last few years is a direct result of Zuckerberg's decision to get serious about mobile advertising and his acquisition of Instagram.
Fully agree.
> This sort of crap is propagating a big issue: the separation of management and control from ownership of companies. It invites irresponsibility and selfishness because the cost of such to management is continuously decreasing. While the owners (shareholders) are the ones to pay the real price for their actions.
This is a non-issue if your point 1 in upheld. I am happy to own FB shares without voting rights if I am compensated for giving up those rights upfront. I would know that my shares mean no control on the company and hence I value them less over some other company's shares where I have got voting rights keeping everything else same.
Then they should have kept the company private. Once you go public, you have to play by the same rules as every other public company.
Let us speak truth. At that size, scale, and reach, you play by a different set of rules and even get to define some of them.
If you don't like it, don't buy the stock - becoming a shareholder and then complaining about voting rights is an angle shoot.
> problems like CEOs losing money quarter after quarter but still getting bonuses and ever larger golden parachutes...
You're thinking of appointed CEO's. Founder CEO's, especially those with voting control, almost never grant themselves bonuses or golden parachutes (they don't have to, they own the stock)
The entire company was structured so he had control, forever. The only reason to buy stock is if you think he will continue to print money. I think it is refreshing to have a company built to be able to completely ignore quarterly profits and activist investors fighting for short term gains.
Google is a similar offender. Let's not even mention what happens when you buy Alibaba shares, whatever you own is not Alibaba.
The problem arises when company starts going in a direction that most shareholders would object to. What can you do then?
Let's say Zuck ends up owning 10 % of FB but still has the control of the voting shares.
Zuck decides that FB should buy an island and attempt to breed dinosaurs at a cost of cool 50B, should not the other shareholders have any say in this?
Seems ridiculous but what if instead of an island that 50B is spent on building some futuristic headquarters. Ok Apple is going along this path but as a shareholder you should have a say in major decisions.
At least with a company like Oracle there is a possibility that Carl Icahn could raise enough money to put Larry in his place should Oracle start making boneheaded decisions.
With FB you cannot do anything if you do not like the direction Mark is taking the company.
As someone else posted, if you want to call the shots without being subjected to public scrutiny then own 51% of the company or do a private buyout like Dell did.
Again the fault lies with the investors who are not averse to buying phantom claims since there is the next greater fool after them.
We’ve seen that so often in the past years in Germany, it’s completely ridiculous.
For the other side of this equation see Japan, and their zombie companies.
A common scheme is buying control of a company when it’s in a crisis, selling off all assets and real estate, forcing them to rent the real estate again, then the company goes bankrupt, after having no assets left, and the shareholders made profit, and the company has to pay huge amounts of debt.
It’s the usual way of destroying jobs.
unfortunately, if a company is trading below BV it means it's expected to destroy jobs on its own. better to put it out of its misery quickly than to allow it to run itself to the ground.
The larger issue to me is allowing Zuckerberg to maintain control while working in government, private and public sector interests shouldn't be comingled like that.
"The cat's in the bag and the bag's in the river," [Andreessen] messaged Zuckerberg.
"Does that mean the cat's dead?" Zuckerberg texted back, not understanding the spy speak.
Andreessen replied: "Mission accomplished :)"Wouldn't it be a bad signal that this person, if on your board, might pull a similar thing but to your detriment?
Say if FB wanted to acquire you, would he take your side or MZ's? Would he give you advice that was beneficial to MZ but detrimental to your company?
To be clear I'm not saying MA is actually guilty as the lawsuit alleges, but I'm assuming the facts are true since your conclusion relies on the same premise.
>The plaintiffs suing Facebook's board include pension funds, like the Employee Retirement System for the city of Providence, Rhode Island, and individual investors
It may be "founder-friendly", but it's hurting thousands of Average Joes.
So it appears pretty clear that there's a bigger career game being played here, and it isn't even strictly about stock.
Apply your line of thought to democracy and you'll see what's the problem.
If you want an accurate government analogy, look at the military: it has to move fast to succeed. You only run a war by committee if you want to lose.
Go radically against these and chaos will erupt. It's both unintelligent and ideological to take speed as an absolute.
Actually no. As recently as Burwell v Hobby Lobby, the Supreme Court said:
"Modern corporate law does not require for-profit corporations to pursue profit at the expense of everything else, and many do not."
For example, if you're trying to maximize cash on hand in the very short term, you simply stop paying your bills and declare bankruptcy when creditors attack. But if your goals are further out, this becomes the exact wrong strategy. Whatever your goal may be, you need a time frame to determine what is and isn't a good use of resources in realizing it.
Conversely, anyone who says "maximize shareholder value" without specifying a time frame is either a fool or a grifter. You can imagine how well things go when these types get together and "agree" on something this dangerously unbounded as a fundamental operating principle.
Probably a one time thing they don't have to worry about too much. But do that a couple of times, and they might start to have problems finding co-investors on bigger deals if the perception is that the investors won't hang together as a class.
Is that like corrupt bankers being "shareholder" friendly, or "executive-team" friendly? It's okay as long as you get yours.
in this case, being founder friendly is at odds with looking out for minority shareholders.
1) The article highlights that a16z is founder-friendly.
2) The lawsuit alleges that Andreessen acted against the behalf of shareholders that he has a legal obligation to protect.
Part of the thesis that a16z operates under is that great companies keep their founders as CEOs longer and more often than non-great companies. So on the surface being founder-friendly doesn't have to imply a legal conflict. The argument that the lawsuit rests on is that common shareholders would be better off (had a high price) if Zuckerberg lost his special voting rights. In the end it's a moot point. If the board wouldn't let him do it, he would have postponed the charitable foundation.
Instead, he sent a crib sheet to Zuck, scripted potential responses to questions so Zuck "knew what they wanted to hear", and even texted him in the board meetings to provide live coaching.
There's no way that this is not a bad move.
We don't know. It does not say either way.
I'm going to be blunt but when was the last time a16z had a hit on their hands?
Help me understand the branding value of a16z because I didn't get any of that vibe from the article. Also most founders aren't multi-billionaires to boot, so I don't see the connect.
But asking for this friendly help would also be a violation of the law and in general, not a very ethical thing to do.
The whole point of the lawsuit is that certain shareholder rights were violated by board's actions.
It's possible that these things weren't monitored, but were disclosed as part of the suit. Even so, I'm a bit surprised that an exchange like this was retained at all, rather than run through an encrypted texting app and the history regularly deleted. It's one of those stories where the existence of the records is at least as surprising as their contents.
Under U.S. securities law, the term “insider” is technically used to refer to any individual who is an officer or a director of an issuer or who is a beneficial owner of more than 10% of any class of an issuer’s outstanding securities. Insiders are subject to special reporting requirements and certain other restrictions upon their ability to trade securities of the issuer. Because of their relationship with the issuer, these individuals are also more likely to become aware of material, nonpublic information regarding the issuer.
However, for purposes of insider trading rules and regulations, insiders are not just limited to those who meet the technical definition of a corporate insider. Any individual who has special access to or otherwise comes into possession of material, nonpublic information regarding an issuer could be considered an insider. If such an individual trades in the securities of the issuer based on this information, he or she is considered to have engaged in insider trading and may be subject to both civil and criminal penalties.
"The case In RE Facebook Class C Reclassification Litigation, CA 12228, Delaware Chancery Court (Wilmington)"
You can read the complaint here: https://www.chimicles.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/05/File-St...
If you are a big investor, the first question during an IPO roadshow of the next a16z-backed company may well be: "a16z, are you leaving the board after the IPO?"
So he wants to run for office while maintaining control of the platform where people get their news from?
When the Snowden revelations came out Andreessen said that Snowden was a traitor because the revelations didn't reveal anything that anyone in the know didn't already know: that there was a massive dragnet surveillance program by FVEY.
Now, I know I'm a distant minority here when I say that I think that dragnet surveillance is a good thing (I think our opponents are going to do it anyway and we should know what they get, though I'm mostly against secret courts / laws / etc), but what I don't like is hiding information of critical importance from the democracy.
Should we have dragnet surveillance, I say Yes, and I'd like to convince you all of my view; but the critical part is that I don't presuppose myself so important as to label someone like Snowden a traitor just because he's brought to light something that a few of us have known for a while. Andreessen not only argues for dragnet surveillance, he argues that Snowden is a traitor. It's in the same elitist vein as the conflict of interest issue with Facebook. He views himself as above us all. This isn't unique amongst the SV elite, but it usually isn't so hopelessly beyond the pale that it so obviously spills over into becoming obvious.
John Galt.
So, does anyone know what would happen in that case?
Voting power of an investor = votes held by investor / total votes
While the dividend will slash the economic ownership of my class A stock, that stock still has the same voting power because the number of votes and distribution of those votes has not changed.
Am I missing something?
So he proposed setting up a new Facebook stock class.
The new shares would automatically dilute the voting
power of existing shareholders, because every share
with voting power will split into three shares -- one
that has power, and two that don't.
I think the argument is something like: people knew Zuckerberg would want to get money out of FB, so even though he currently had majority control they expected he would give it up soon. Introducing multiple stock classes allows him to sell stock while keeping majority control, so he's reducing other people's voting power relative to expectations, while technically everyone who had N votes before the split still has N votes after the split.A young man who was presumably actively using internet didn't know what Netscape was, around 2004?
(Though in 2004 we had already had Netscape -> Mozilla Suite -> Phoenix -> Firebird -> Firefox, so lots of names to keep straight.)
But, its OK because some of the money would be used for philanthropy?
In a nutshell: when Zuck & friends moved to Palo Alto for the summer to work on Facebook, Saverin decided to take an internship at Lehman Brothers in NYC instead. It became increasingly hard to get his attention, even as his approval was required for a crucial funding step. Worse still, Saverin then ran unauthorized ads on the platform for a side project of his. He kept asking about parties in Palo Alto. That's when Zuck decided that enough was enough and started to cut him off.
So it's fair to say, at the very least, that the culture fit wasn't there and that the Social Network movie didn't paint the whole picture.
I think it's also fair to say that Saverin brought all this upon himself by repeatedly failing to show commitment in the company, and that he still got a sweet deal in the end because Facebook wouldn't have been anywhere near as valuable had he remained involved.
Here, the board of directors appointed a special committee of supposedly disinterested directors to review the proposal and ensure that it was fair to the minority shareholders. When a transaction is "blessed" in this way it is very hard for a shareholder to challenge it.
The investors allege that two of the three committee members weren't really disinterested because of their personal and business ties to Zuckerberg.
The lawsuit is alleging Andreesen had no right to do that, regardless of how you try to colour it.