Google Determines that FIDO U2F Security Keys Improve Security
eweek.com
eweek.com
And the actual study: http://fc16.ifca.ai/preproceedings/25_Lang.pdf
(Which helps answer some of the arguments in the discussion thus far. In particular, on page 11, they list the systems they compare against: SMS OTP, Google phone-based OTP, and three hardware tokens, including the FIDO U2F. They compare in Figure 6 explicitly with SMS OTP and app-based OTP.)
Given the vulnerabilities in GSM, that's not a high bar. http://security.stackexchange.com/questions/11493/
The big problem with TOTP is that real time attacks can still get you when you get MITM.
Edit: I now understand you were talking about the article, not the technology itself
That said, this is mitigated pretty well usually with the "thumbnail USB" style key (like Yubikey has) where you pretty much keep it plugged in all day and click it when you need to access something. Security is still maintained as we're mostly concerned about remote attackers, though still a good idea to pull the key out at the end of the day or if leaving the laptop for a considerable amount of time.
Physical ease of use will definitely be the trick for mass adoption. I recall seeing wireless U2F keys at some point?
(Edited my comment to correct a mistake)
I have some hope that a product like that is coming, I just don't know when.
Ever since adopting a security key, I've had to set my user-agent to Firefox (to prevent the U2F auth attempt) and fall back to Google Authenticator for 2FA.
Then again, maybe the recent Bluetooth 5 announcement will be enough to drive adoption. Or possibly the next iPhone / Pixel could act as a U2F device. Maybe then we could get "normal" people to use real security instead of asking them what street they grew up on or what their mother's maiden name is.
Also curious if I can use a U2F for anything PGP-related, signing or encrypting regular stuff.
All this to save $20/piece!
You can! This works mostly out of the box if you enable it using the manager application (looks like newer models may have it on by default) and install the required gpg smartcard stuff.
https://www.yubico.com/support/knowledge-base/categories/art...
Thanks for pointing this info out though!
Read this for some background.[1]
In some ways they are in technical competition but the company is making money regardless because they just implement both.
> including One Time Passwords (OTP)via SMS phone messages
That "SMS" bit is critical. OTP over SMS sucks. OTP using the same app that already manages my passwords (1Password) is a breeze. Sure, if I had a U2F Security Key already plugged in, then it would probably be even faster, but the downside is I need to have a physical key plugged in, and if I don't have that key with me then I'm screwed (whereas with 1Password I can get at my OTP codes from any of my devices).
Net-net, it depends on how sensitive the data is that your are protecting, and whether you prefer increased security or ease of use.
https://twitter.com/jonoberheide/status/804363754842554375 "Nothing < SMS < Push < U2F"
https://twitter.com/alexstamos/status/804367695860744192 "Seems like the right ordering, but when deployment is 98% < 2% < .5% < .01% complaining about SMS security is pretty silly."
Except my iPhone, which can't get OTP codes over NFC like Android phones can. So actually I have Google Authenticator for TOTP codes.
As for adapters: they significantly increase the profile of the yubikey nano, which I feel is a dealbreaker in that particular case, as the main selling point of the nano (to me, at least) is the always-plugged-in capability (see the image on the far right in [1]).
[0] https://www.yubico.com/2016/07/yubikey-route-usb-c/
[1] https://www.yubico.com/products/yubikey-hardware/yubikey4/
https://www.yubico.com/products/yubikey-for-mobile/
But yeah, I use a Surface Pro and a Chromebook Pixel. The Surface is annoying in that it only has one USB port, my Yubikey Nano is actually on the dock and I use the portable key otherwise. The Chromebook Pixel is fine, two USB-C ports, two USB A ports.
In the case where you need true second factor authentication, it needs to be another factor (i.e. device). This is a good place to have a Fido U2F key.
In my experience, it takes about the same amount of time to use the key vs. using the OTP token from 1password (assuming you keep your key on you).
So really it comes down to what your threat model is and what risk profile you're willing to accept for a given site. For me, all I really care about is TOTP and not having "real" 2FA. But of course if you're talking about something like an AWS account that controls access to your company's data, it's probably worth investing in a YubiKey or similar.
So no, the two factors are not on the same box being attacked, in the threat modes of interest.
For the threat of "my stuff was stolen" then both factors are in the same box, so even having a separate piece of hardware is no use (unless you can convince the thief to not take everything and please leave the authenticator dongle behind).
Well, if they gain access to your machine, they can't access your iphone. Or yubikey. Just don't kid yourself—you use the same password for everything, and that's your only factor.
Regardless of where your password database is, the attacker only needs to compromise 1 password on the website to access your account. It doesn't matter how they got that password, your physical devices are irrelevant.
With 2FA, the attacker would also need access to the secondary device that has the secondary authentication, whether that be a phone, RSA key, FIDO key, etc.
1Password is not "real" or "fake" 2FA, it's straight up not 2FA at all and doesn't claim to be. It's fine to not want 2FA if you don't handle high-risk data (though that's increasingly rare these days in reality), but lets not conflate the term =P
What are you talking about? The whole point of TOTP is if the attacker compromises your password, they still can't log in because they don't have the TOTP code.
You quoted: including One Time Passwords (OTP)via SMS phone messages
The sentence that phrase is lifted from: U2F is an alternative to other forms of two factor authentication (2FA) including One Time Passwords (OTP)via SMS phone messages.
So you either deliberately or carelessly misquoted. What's more, I quote:
> Additionally, Google's research found that with OTP based authentication there was an average failure rate of three percent. In contrast, with the U2F Security Key approach, Google experienced zero authentication failures. The improved efficiency of using Security Keys instead of OTP is estimated by Google's support organization to have saved the company thousands of hours per year.
And further:
> "While any 2-SV mechanism is better than having only a password on your account, FIDO U2F provides strong authentication that's resistant to many forms of advanced phishing attacks that traditional 2-SV doesn't protect against," Brand said. "It also provides for a much better user experience."
So no. The headline is not misleading and in fact your hot take and comparison to 1Pass is a misunderstanding.
For people curious what these keys look like in the wild, by far the most famous brand name most people in our space would see is Yubico, which you can see here: https://www.yubico.com/products/yubikey-hardware/fido-u2f-se...
You _can_ integrate this approach into your product, into your AWS environment, into your Azure environment, or into your linux servers. And it works, and it can be self-hosted if that is a priority for you.
Oh, and if you'd like to try the best of ALL THREE WORLDs, LastPass directly supports Yubikey FIDO keys. And also lacks 30s of impromptu vault animations and supports touchid. They're working on facial recognition for Windows as a 3rd factor as well, I'm told. That'll be great.
The real problem here is the fact that the title of this post was edited multiple times, and now bears very little resemblance to what my comment was responding to. The original title alleged that Google said FIDO U2F Security Keys were better than OTP, without any mention of the fact that the article was only comparing it to SMS-based OTP and therefore the headline was inaccurate because OTP does not mean SMS-based OTP, and I expect (well, I hope) that most commenters here don't even use SMS OTP but instead use TOTP with an app.
In any case, I did edit my comment to mention that the title has changed, so the fact that you're saying I'm wrong immediately after accusing me of not reading something is pretty hypocritical.
But the burden is on you to update it make it clear what you're referring to. If you think that this is truly unfair then I apologize for only reading your post and the linked article and not the entire historical context.
But I think even without that, you went on to make a point counter the article using article text as if it was a valid counterpoint is wrong.
> But the burden is on you to update it make it clear what you're referring to.
Not when I can't edit the comment anymore. When I edited my comment to say the title has been changed, the title had just been changed to say "SMS OTP" instead of "OTP", so it was still (I thought) clear what my comment was about. By the time I saw the post had had its more dramatic title change, my comment was past the edit period.
And yes, I do think it's unfair that you're accusing me of misquoting and writing an incorrect comment, when my comment was perfectly correct when written, and when it's impossible for me to "fix" it later (not to mention I didn't even know the title had been edited again until I saw your comment).
> But I think even without that, you went on to make a point counter the article using article text as if it was a valid counterpoint is wrong.
I did not use the article text as if it was a counterpoint. I used the article text to illustrate that the article was talking specifically about SMS OTP, and that the article did not even attempt to address non-SMS-based TOTP. And then gave my own opinion, which is that non-SMS-based TOTP is much better than SMS OTP and has some benefits as compared to a physical U2F device. Since the article didn't even address non-SMS-based TOTP, it can't be a point either for or against that opinion, but what it could be was context.
So no. Absolutely not. SMS is an additional problem, but OTPs in general suffer from logistic issues separate from their medium.