Did you really mean to say "assumes" there? (As in assumes as aximoatic.) Because that's one hell of an an assumption.
Did you really mean to say "assumes" there? (As in assumes as aximoatic.) Because that's one hell of an an assumption.
However when we accept the 'panpsychist' axiom, we're free to come up with more detailed theories (as Integrated Information Theor) that eg. predict under what conditions physical systems and consciousness coincide in a way we can experience. And indeed they claim they can explain eg. why brain, as opposed to silicon circuits, coincides with it.
To be clear, I'm not saying this theory is correct - I've no idea. I'm just saying that this whole approach is as valid as the physicalist one.
Well, except you snuck two assumptions in there. I'm certainly not assuming, nor claiming to know definitively whether consciousness is an emergent phenomenon.
> However when we accept the 'panpsychist' axiom, we're free to come up with more detailed theorie
If you assume a false premise you can come up with literally anything, so this is not particularly surprising or illuminating.
> I'm just saying that this whole approach is as valid as the physicalist one.
One is grounded in what can be observed objectively[1] and the other is not.
... and to believe your explanation, I'm going to need evidence that it's as valid as the "physicalist"[2] one.
[1] Well, at least as far as others can confirm that they observe roughly the same things, e.g. "red" or "consciousness".
[2] I think you're thinking of "materialist"?