Ask HN: Best encrypted messaging app atm?
Donald Trump getting elected I am no longer playing around, my life is going full encrypted.
There are, however, some upcoming developments which will change the situation in the next couple of months:
1) The main matrix.org client, Riot (https://riot.im) has end-to-end encryption now in beta. This will offer Signal-strength encryption, but in a decentralized, e-mail-like system with federated servers. This will create an ecosystem where people are no longer dependent on the goodwill (and solvency) of a single entity to use a good, encrypted messaging app.
2) Briar (https://briarproject.org) is a new (Android-only) app, designed for people with an especially high need for privacy. It works without central servers (through Tor hidden services, but hides the complexity of that), even works when the internet is down (e.g. when mobile networks are shut down during a protest) via Bluetooth and direct Wi-Fi connections, and it offers extra features, like a panic button that deletes all your data. It's in beta at the moment, with a planned release early next year.
TL;DR: Use Signal or Wire for now, but be ready to switch to a better system when available.
I did not know about Briar, that seems useful, even for cases where you are just of the grid with your friends.
Of course, this is the arm of the US government that very actively doesn't want back doors, because they operate in territories controlled by other not-necessarily-friendly governments. They need communications to be reliably secret, and they have no need to tap those communications. It's the same reason that government funding for Tor isn't inherently a problem for Tor's security, and you see other parts of the US government, like the FBI, trying to hack it.
It's definitely worth worrying that the government could decide that this part of its mission is no longer worth funding. But it isn't likely to be a risk of back doors. (Especially compared to all the other usual risks, notably simple bugs like Heartbleed and Weak DH.)
[1] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Open_Whisper_Systems#Funding
The best way to go is Threema, IMO. Can be used completely anonymously. Servers are located in Switzerland. Uses NaCl. Recommended by Steve Gibson. Not free, though.
- proper implementation of e2e means where the servers are shouldn't matter
- threema uses GCM too -> whole google play services framework
- this steve gibson? http://attrition.org/errata/charlatan/steve_gibson/
It has text (one-on-one and groups) and voice calls. Things that could use improvement: group management, switching to a new device. It doesn't have some of the features some people like (stickers and whatnot), but personally I don't care much about those. Video calls would also be nice.
edit: clarification
edit: I'm also unsure about the warning against fingerprint authentication. I use Touch ID with a long passcode and consider that the best trade-off. It prevents everyday attempts to get into the phone and offline cracking. The passcode is required after a longer time of inactivity. If you're paranoid you can touch your pinky against it five times in predictable situations (border controls etc). It's not perfect, but I think it makes the best tradeoff between convenience and security for most "normal" people.
Note that Tor doesn't mitigate the three-letter agency problem, as they can just sniff the exit node's target (I certainly would, there's bound to be lots of interesting traffic there).
try to stay within tor network or just rely on ssl and assume adversaries know the site but not the content you access.
First of all, if you want total encryption, you'll need to make sure your connection is encrypted and secured as well (meaning following you back is not trivial), so the whole messaging should go through Tor[1].
There are plugin solutions for bitlbee[2], for Pidgin[3], and many other clients supporting OTR and similar encryptions.
If you want all-in-one solutions, you probably should look at Tox[4], which is a protocol, not just an app, built to be encrypted by default. It's complicated and nasty to use and set up, but it's pretty secure.
Other ideas might be drawn from the prism-break Communications list[5], listing apps like Chatsecure[6] or Xabber[7], both encryption-capable jabber apps.
[1]: https://www.torproject.org/ [2]: https://wiki.bitlbee.org/bitlbee-otr [3]: https://developer.pidgin.im/wiki/ThirdPartyPlugins#Securitya... [4]: https://tox.chat/ [5]: https://prism-break.org/en/protocols/ [6]: https://chatsecure.org/ [7]: https://www.xabber.com/
Mobile only, paid, end-to-end encrypted with in-person verification. Team and infrastructure is based in Switzerland
Accounts not tied to phone number, available on IOS, Android and Windows Phone, perfectly working group chats.
Happy to walk you through it (I'm siim@wire.com).
Personally I use Signal and Whatsapp from that list.
I did read that facebook messenger now has end to end encryption, but as far as I can tell this is only for "secret" conversations - which are only available from the device you initiate the conversation from. Whatsapp would probably be a good choice if you (OP) have a lot of friends already using it.
http://gizmodo.com/why-you-should-stop-using-telegram-right-...
My mistake. Text isn't end-to-end, only calls are.
Refer to http://www.apple.com/business/docs/iOS_Security_Guide.pdf which specifies that RSA 1280-bit keypairs are used, and the private key is held on the device. So in terms of transit - the protocol should be secure.
The only remaining option would be to question whether iOS is secure/insecure.
Apple claims: "Apple does not log messages or attachments, and their contents are protected by end-to-end encryption so no one but the sender and receiver can access them. Apple cannot decrypt the data."
Why's that? (I'm asking seriously, because I don't understand how people get this impression.)
iMessage has some very fundamental design flaws that led to this attack: https://blog.cryptographyengineering.com/2016/03/21/attack-o...
The attack is not super-spectacular, but the more worrying thing is that the design is not sound. They use an ad-hoc crypto construction that fails to follow usual best practices. And they haven't really fixed it, they just put some duct tape over it to avoid the attack.
Encryption, fantastic stickers, photo editor, tons of interesting channels, probably the best bots platform out there.
+ all mobile platforms and desktop version (as well as web based)
You can also find it's code on github.
Correct me if I'm wrong though
There's also http://öä.eu/bac.html (based on http://öä.eu/bac.pdf thesis) but I've emailed with the author and he said that he's not keeping it up to date.
https://www.vulnerability-db.com/?q=articles/2016/10/27/wick...
Situation: Us "techies" know or easily can learn how to set up encryption and protect ourselves, the general public will not. Everyone needs encryption but most will only use it if: -their friends are using it -it is so easy a cave man can do it -it is beautiful
Complication: Current products are hard to use and are built for hackers. Encryption products need to build in vitality and understand the use cases of most users. To be successful this must be built with usability and UX first, not security methods first. Sormthing pretty decent that people use is much better than a great system that most people don't use.
Solution: Browser plugins that act like they are a part of the current email experience. Beautiful phone apps that give users the same functionality that they are used to having with much better security. More info below, this is my current thought process and work, not perfect I'm sure, would love input.
UX: Most users use email via browsers and default phone app. Initial plan is browser plugins + standalone phone app. Browser plugins exist for pgp but are too complex for the general public to understand and set up and require a user to get the recipient's key. We streamline the process by just having the user click "encrypt", enter a passphrase (will get to this in tech section), and click send. We take care of setting up the recipient with their account if they don't have one to be able to view their message. As for mobile messaging, users will enter their passphrase when launching the app and then be able to freely message, call, video chat until the switch to another app or exit.
Tech: Encryption using private/public key pairs according to pgp spec, of which implementation is gpg. Encryption/decryption happens on device or browser. We host last known good info for user public keys to prevent MITM attacks and will only use other sources if we don't have info of a user. Private keys are stored on our platform for cross device compatibility and so they are not stored on the users device. However these keys will be encrypted/decrypted on the users device using symmetric key encryption implemented as a complex passphrase.
https://www.prettyeasyprivacy.com/
They have iOS and Android clients, along with a subscription available for Outlook (Windows), and planned desktop versions for Apple Mail, Thunderbird and Web Browsers (Safari, Mozilla, Chrome and IE).
I've also used Wire and I really liked it, but I had the same problem. The update to the new technology broke it in such a way that I can't actually message anyone anymore. If Wire can get their ducks in a row, I might switch back.
I've never really understood the argument of well its Facebook so obviously they are lying. They are getting a lot of value out WhatApp, and the blowback on Facebook would be pretty significant if they were lying and found out.
Telegram use end-to-end encryption only on so called "Secret Chats".[0] And in my experience very few people use "Secret Chats". This is the main reason I don't use it anymore and recommend against using it to others.
—Tanenbaum, Andrew S.
- Encrypted local on-device storage. We have an always-on mechanism and never store the entire local storage decryption key on the device. It's half on the device and half on the server. In case of lost or stolen device, all data is still safe. In fact you can effectively "wipe" your biocoded app data even if the device is offline by deleting the server part of the decryption key.
- We allow private servers (not for free).
- Double ratchet algorithm for communication.
This is true.
> For sensitive governmental and corporate use, open source solutions are often dismissed outright."
But this is a false argument. Open source solutions aren't dismissed because they are open source per se, but because they generally lack predictable longer-term support.
Not for governments. Some are pragmatic, others will not even consider it if open source.
That is, of a government entity that explicitly rejects software products made by recognized (for-profit) companies because it's an open source.