MOSS supports four more open source projects in Q3 2016 with $300k
blog.mozilla.org
blog.mozilla.org
What are the funds used for? Hosting? Paying developers?
If it's for paying developers, then I imagine there could be political issues where some contributors are working for free, and some are paid. How do you apportion the funds?
Mozilla plays a small but valuable role in shepherding fixes that assists any team unprepared to deal with such an audit report. I think having Mozilla broker the conversation helps with framing the report too: it communicates that the project is important enough to warrant such an interaction and that this was done to help, whereas I think that communication directly from a security firm is more typically viewed with suspicion or denial.
Hypothetically, the target of the assessment not being paid to fix the discovered issues could present a problem. I have never seen compensation to fix security bugs in practice. In some ways, it feels wrong since the compensation might go up based on the number or severity of bugs found, in essence a reward for insecure code. If you're maintaining a critically important project, security fixes seem like the cost of entry, not something that needs an extra push.
In my opinion, it is better to earmark funds to developers for strategic improvements anyway (eg. sandboxing, verification, privilege separation, etc). The Foundational Technology Fund from Mozilla requires a "clear and current project goal" [1], so if they funded a security improvement it looks like it would follow this approach [2].
In our experience, working with zlib was a pleasure. They fixed nearly all of our issues before we even noticed and we had a detailed, technical discussion about one of them. I credit Gervase at Mozilla for assisting with that and I would certainly work with the whole team there again.
[1] https://wiki.mozilla.org/MOSS/Foundational_Technology#Projec...
[2] https://blog.mozilla.org/blog/2016/06/22/mozilla-awards-3850...
Let's be honest, the "temporary home" solution is not really what the users' community wants to hear.
Summary:
* They tested on binary level with CRS from Trail of Bits and on source level with TIS Interpreter from Pascal Cuoq.
* CRS found no bugs, TIS Interpreter found 5 from which they classified 4 as low and one as medium severity. All are C undefined behavior issues.
This doesn't necessarily mean CRS is bad, it may just mean that there are no bugs of the classes CRS finds in zlib.
Also notable that zlib hasn't released the fixes yet, they're just in the github repo. The last version is from 2013.
> This doesn't necessarily mean CRS is bad, it may just mean that there are no bugs of the classes CRS finds in zlib.
Yes, exactly! This is why we included so much detail about coverage in the report. Basically, "stop looking for these kinds of bugs in these places, focus your efforts elsewhere in the code."
I believe Mozilla pays him to spend a substantial amount of his time (like 50% or more) working on ZAP.