Problem I had with the book is that he either misunderstood or misrepresented that triggering event. Yes, there were overgrown trees, high summer demand and temperatures that made power lines heat up and stretch. Wind speed dropped from 5 to 2 knots and cooled the line less than it normally did in that place. Cables stretched more than usual and grounded. These are all true facts.
However, that's not what brought the power grid down that day. Here's what did.
At 12:40 pm, an engineer working for MISO (transmission company, sort of like a traffic regulator) switched a regulation system to manual mode to make a correction. Note that the correction was made because the system had an errant piece of information regularly enough, which through a phone call the operator knew was false and corrected.
The regulation system was called a "state estimator." It basically takes tons of factors, loads, schedules, downtimes, capacities, etc and optimizes power transmission. Like intelligent traffic control. Of course, all systems have input garbage from time to time, and he corrected this thing.
At 1:30 PM that engineer went to lunch, forgetting to re-enable the automated mode.
At 2:02 PM, a 345k-volt line tripped after touching a tree and started this cascading reaction resulting in a system blackout for a week. Other operators looking at the system readouts didn't know that the state estimator was now sending a false picture, being frozen in manual mode.
By the time the unnamed engineer (from the NERC report) returned, it was too late. Other regulators, operators and power plants had been making uninformed decisions, preparations and adjustments for the power grid based on outdated, non-realtime information. However, the blackout didn't happen instantly -- it took four hours for a cascading chain reaction to trip every safety device in the system.
Lets not even go into SCADA vulnerabilities. Here's some positive outcomes from the blackout: investigators made a staggering list of 46 recommendations -- none addressing tree trimming because vegetation events happened all the time. Those were routine. They did focus on computer security, even though there were no computer faults in this incident.
Secondly, during the blackout the Department of Energy ordered state of Connecticut to energize one of their power plants despite their objections. They complied, and that restored power to metropolitan areas. This action is now a precedent for any future outage events: the legal framework for prioritizing power restoration exists and is in place.
SCADA systems show up on HN often enough to be a point of ridicule. Good news is that the outdated SCADA systems are getting replaced with synchrophasors for the most critical power integration functions. Since 2003, nearly 1700 phasors were added to the national grid, and they're well on their way to be fitted in the roughly 7,000 power plants in the U.S. What it will do over SCADA is improve recovery times of an unstable power grid segment.
Edit: derp, northeast, not nw. Also http://energy.gov/sites/prod/files/oeprod/DocumentsandMedia/...
(grid blackout == PLL loss of lock, too)
I read the the US government estimates a 80% civilian mortality if the power grid is down for a year.
Our food production, waste and water treatment, hospitals, etc run on electricity, sure. But 80% doesn't seem anchored in reality.
I feel like this irrationality about the risks posed by a blackout is what the article is meant to address.
A small thought experiment: imagine that you live in a city and for 1 year there was no electricity, no trash pickup, likely no water to drink and to flush toilets, and no gas for cars and trucks.
I think this scenario is very unlikely, but it is still worthwhile hardening this infrastructure.
I admit to being cautious. If it were up to me, I would also spend a lot of resources hardening computing systems: servers in business, kids' school laptops, home computers, IoT, network infrastructure, etc. would have maximum crypto, and we would have a "going to the moon" level effort pushing those aspects of computer science for general security issues.
Today its 1000X that. There's no way to get food to people without efficient transport, which depends utterly on energy. No way to get sewage out. No way to get water flowing. Heck even the traffic lights are needed to keep transport going.
A year without food and water? Without sanitation? Of course nearly everybody dies.
Manual solutions could be found, but its impossible that they could support the current population density. So folks would have to flee the cities. To the countryside, where they just die a different death. After pillaging and destroying any remaining food pipeline.
It's the water supply that would be the big killer, you can't go without it for more than a few days, and that just wouldn't be enough time to get enough to everyone.
I'm not sure they'd be so successful in "pillaging and destroying any remaining food pipeline" ... how do you to that to an interstate highway? At most, to the fueling stations, but those are a fairly small scale, and I would expect easily replaced thing. But that would also help to self-limited the radius of the pillaging and destruction, keep it mostly away from the farms themselves, which aren't exactly defenseless if such is needed for only a relatively short period of time.
Hybrid seeds aren't used for all crops, not for wheat as I recall, I'm not sure about soybeans. Corn is of course the big one, but at least going forward humans wouldn't particularity want to eat corn if wheat is available.
But I agree with your bottom line, on the problem of big cities, well, Dean Ing, in the appropriately titled novel Systemic Shock, put it this way:
The American public had by turns ignored and ridiculed its cassandras: city planners, ecologists, demographers, socialists, immigrants, who had all warned against our increasing tendency to crowd into our cities. Social stress, failure of essential services, and warfare were only a few of the spectres we had granted only a passing glance. We had always found some solution to our problems, though: often at the last moment. Firmly anchored in most Americans was the tacit certainty that, even to the problem of nuclear war against population centers, there must be a uniquely American solution; we would find it.
The solution was sudden death. A hundred million Americans found it.
Still, spending money hardening our infrastructure would improve general reliability, help prevent deaths do to storm outages, etc. Good thing to do.
But it would be a terrible gamble for them, and most any scenario besides total failure results in the country being turned into the proverbial "fused glass parking lot".