That's for volumetric attacks (udp reflection), tls handshaking can eat all the CPU way before we run out of network :(
Edit: Not sure what alternate reality the downvoter lives in, but vast majority of the attacks these days are just "dumb" packet floods or even easier to filter reflection attacks. (Linode clarified this to be a mix of dns and ntp traffic on IRC)
But hey, go on and find me a layer 7 attack that'll take down entire datacenters :)
I'd imagine it's easier to filter out bogus L3 traffic when the vast majority of your target IP space comes with explicit configuration as to what sort of L7 application traffic is acceptable.
It's actually not that easy to Filter "bogus" traffic. In the hosting world, especially cloud, you have thousands of customers doing whatever they want. Who knows what is bogus or not. And even if you can filter it at your edge routers your transit links are still going to be getting slammed. The filtering needs to be done upstream in the ISP network. This is usually a manual process as no one supports BGP FlowSpec at the moment.
RTBH is the best way to defend if you don't have the bandwidth to absorbe.
Put an ELB in front of the services, the ELB only listening to port 80/443, roll out the ELB publicly, roll out new instances only accessible privately, kill old instances being DDoSed => Problem solved => Repeat for all other services, they shouldn't be publicly accessible in the first place.
Ain't saying it's easy but there are some options to help mitigate the attack.
source: been on the receiving end of a several hundred gigabit L7/HTTP DDoS from the aforementioned providers.