Not sure if 1Password does as well, but it seems like a fairly obvious feature to add.
The certificate/password link is a guess since on their website they say to change the password starting with date that matches the date of certificate reissuance.
This seems to be related to Hearbleed, also it lists a site that didn't reissue certificate after Heartbleed as vulnerable too, and so for passwords there, seems to be regardless of age.
I am a long-time 1password user and have a lot of old passwords, so for me like 90% of passwords are listed as compromised, which I'm pretty sure is not the case.
Thankfully the notification emails from this service are prompt and helpful (not to mention totally free).
Also it's an email address, not your credit card number.
Which I suppose forces more awareness, but it doesn't instill a lot of confidence.
FWIW I was subscribed and didn't get anything until this most recent breach. Unfortunately GMail thought it was spam (speaking of false positives!).
My primary personal email address is routinely used by a small handful of other real people (all strangers) for all sorts of things - college applications, car insurance, some address books think it belongs to a cousin who gets included in a lot of group threads about reunions and full of photos. I've found the families more difficult to unsubscribe from than the services, name+email associations spread like a virus. I routinely get alarming/misleading "Someone has your password!" security alerts from Google after someone tries to list my email as a backup account.
These little strings we use to identify ourselves can be typed by anyone, anywhere, bot or human. I wouldn't worry too much about false positives.
It's not that I'm worried, it's that it's a distraction. When the margin of error is high enough, it becomes less signal and more noise, which leads to either panic (spending all your time managing access credentials) or complacency (ignoring the indicators).
Why do I see my username as breached on a service I never signed up to? When you search for a username that is not an email address, you may see that name appear against breaches of sites you never signed up to. Usually this is simply due to someone else electing to use the same username as you usually do. Even when your username appears very unique, the simple fact that there are several billion internet users worldwide means there's a strong probability that most usernames have been used by other individuals at one time or another.
They might not even know it's yours, like if your email is davidsmith@gmail and they fat-finger davidrsmith@gmail--boom, "you" now have an account.
Good services use double-opt-in to ensure that every account is actually tied to a correct and working email address. But not every service does this.
And even services that do use double opt-in would create a row in their database to note that a confirm email was sent out. If they never scrub those invite rows, "your" email address would still be in the DB when it's exfiltrated, even if the confirmation process was never completed.