Have you read Gilbert Ryle's "The Concept of Mind" (1949) [0]?
This is a very old and tired argument. The form you seem to be endorsing has fallen out of favor in philosophy circles. For an intuitive understanding of why interactionist dualism is a bad explanation of phenomenology, consider the following problems:
- How does your non-physical substance (what you call a fundamental force in the universe) interact with a physical "antenna"?
- Given that this force interacts with matter (as evidenced by consciousness disappearing after certain brain injuries), how is it that it evades physical measure by scientific instruments?
It's also an idea that few philosophers of mind agree with at this point. Gilbert Ryle did a pretty good job of showing that the mind-body problem is a pseudo-problem [0].
[0] https://www.amazon.com/Concept-Mind-Gilbert-Ryle/dp/02267329...