Rare implementation of RC5/RC6 in ShadowBrokers dump connects them to Equation
securelist.com
securelist.com
$LL8@f:
; Line 4
mov ecx, DWORD PTR [edx+eax*4-4]
sub ecx, 1640531527 ; 61c88647H
mov DWORD PTR [edx+eax*4], ecx
inc eax
cmp eax, 44 ; 0000002cH
jl SHORT $LL8@f
Flipping the sign of addends is a common compiler transformation, likely there to optimize for code size in some cases. Unless that code looks weird enough that it _had_ to be coded by hand, that constant switch doesn't mean much of anything.Searching for "0x61C88647 0xB7E15163" on Google results in barely two pages of results, indicating this combination of constants is relatively rare. Most of the hits are on Chinese forums. Searching for the 2-inverse constant "0x9E3779B9 0xB7E15163" results in a whopping 2500 hits. ... This suggests that the EQUATION group and the Regin group are two different entities.
https://securelist.com/files/2015/02/Equation_group_question..., page 28.
They seem to be totally ignoring the fact that Google is more likely to index text files than binary executables and short lived assembly temp files. If you search on Google, you do indeed find source files with the "0x9E3779B9 0xB7E15163" pair, which makes sense as these are used in the reference implementation: https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc2040.
But as you say, if you compile the reference implementation, you are likely to produce an executable which contains the negated form. If you then "decompile" this executable, you get the "rare" pair, where "rare" just means that Google is more likely to index the input source code than compiler generated assembly or the output of 'objdump'.
I think you nailed it --- all the compilers are in cahoots, and the perpetrators can assumed to be using one! But not Clang, which gamely tries to vectorize. What's less clear is whether the authors of the exposé are charlatans or just "logically challenged". Since they are obviously smart enough to be working for the "goto source" for commentary on these issues, I'd be inclined to guess "charlatan".
Second of all, the Shadow Brokers announcement reads like how a native English speaker thinks a non-native English speaker writes. There's no consistency to the mistakes, they just omit random articles from the text, whatever fits the "Russian accent" stereotype.
> TOOLS/Apache/httpd-2.0.52-9.ent.i386.rpm
Heh RHEL4! Nothing points to a 3 letter US govt agency like an outdated RHEL version. Even for 2013 (based on file date) RHEL4 was ancient. RHEL7 beta for example, came out that year.
Also another striking thing about it, there are no swear or l33t-speak words in there. I know if I had to write ASN.1-based SNMP firmware hacks for obscure Juniper switches, that code would be drowning in curse words.
Seeing this kind of stuff is fun too:
ar rules update filename `/tmp/.b` type ar url http://topsec.com.cn
Also a bit of whimsy perhaps, can't be too serious after all, even at the NSA: class ELCAExploit(HTTPSExploit):
name = "ELIGIBLECANDIDATE"
version = "v1.1.0.1"
desc="What is the sound of a single thread blocking?"
modes = ["nopen"]...or means that they're just extremely thorough, like you might expect a state actor to be.
From Nicholas Weaver[1]:
> Because of the sheer volume and quality, it is overwhelmingly likely this data is authentic. And it does not appear to be information taken from comprised systems. Instead the exploits, binaries with help strings, server configuration scripts, 5 separate versions of one implant framework, and all sort of other features indicate that this is analyst-side code -- the kind that probably never leaves the NSA.
If you think for a minute about the motivations here, you can see that it would be absolutely idiotic for a state actor to release this kind of volume of their own exploits and malware frameworks. On the other hand, a state actor would love to release this information from their competitors' toolchest, as it virtually guarantees the entire set of exploits will quickly be rendered useless against high-profile targets.
True or not, this would also explain these news.
There's no need to "think" that; it's well established that Eugene Kaspersky and Vlad Putin are BFFs, or if not that then at least Kaspersky is very careful not to offend the Kremlin: http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-03-19/cybersecur...
So the world believes that this a bona-fide stuff?
I have no opinion on any of that.