Just how bad is OpenSSL? (2012)
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Modern documentation has gotten way better, as seen in the Stripe docs and many others, and I wish the man pages could be updated accordingly.
One other nice thing is integration with an editor. I view manpages in emacs, and can yank the snippets directly into my other buffers for extra convenience.
The last thing our discipline needs is us thinking we got it all and it just needs polishing.
If you genuinely disagree and believe the 90s were as ripe with quality tooling and documentation as 2016, well, that's a bit strange, but you're certainly entitled to your opinion.
But even in big corps corps with ISO9000 accreditation there is seldom self- questioning as to whether documentation is useful rather than just ticking the box for process-completeness.
The problem I usually find is that man pages give equal importance to every possible flag - making really hard to figure out which elements you most likely will need to do common tasks.
Having a summary of the options right there at the top is the most valuable thing in a reference.
Plus, every program does --help differently. Does it spit out short output or tons of output so that I need a pager? Does it fork and execute a pager itself, or do I have to run the program again and pipe it to less manually? And then it turns out some programs print --help output to stderr, not stdout, so the pager doesn’t display any output until I do “blahblah --help 2>&1 | less”.
A good manpage beats --help all hollow. It’s simultaneously more brief and more (usefully) verbose. The Synopsis section provides a quick overview of flags, if I just need a quick reminder to jog my memory. But if I want to know the details of a particular flag, I can just scroll down to it or search for it. Mandoc, the default manpage formatter in OpenBSD, even has semantic search built in. It uses more(1)'s built‐in tags functionality to take me straight to whatever flag I want. (You can get this functionality on Linux too by installing mandoc: http://mdocml.bsd.lv/)
Really, horrendous and arcane manpages are a trope that mostly exists in the Linux/GNU world. In BSDs, especially OpenBSD and FreeBSD, clear, simple documentation is a priority. No need for --help or “bropages” when the actual manpages are perfectly clear. For example, check out OpenBSD’s signify(1) manual (http://man.openbsd.org/signify.1), used for cryptographic signing and verification. Compare that to the monstrosity that is gpg(1)… (https://www.gnupg.org/documentation/manpage.en.html)
Most of the time, if I'm looking up a man-page for something, it's because I've just installed a new package that sounded like it would solve a problem and then did a dpkg-query(1) to find out what binaries came with it—or used apropos(1) to find a relevant binary already installed—and now I want to know what the uses of a given binary are and whether those uses include solving my particular problem.
† Well, except for the utilities with absolutely horrible command-line UX-design, like tar(1) or ps(1) or rsync(1), where I just memorize the options I need for my usual case, and then have to look in the man page to do anything novel.
They are.
Shipping a reference to a binary with that binary may have made sense before the internet. But nowadays, it's the opposite.
• Complex programs with many options have (sometimes dozens of) websites documenting them thoroughly. (Try searching with any search-engine for "wget mirroring", for example; the number and complexity of the results is overwhelming.)
• Meanwhile, for the simple "corner-case" programs, you really hope that they shipped with docs—because seemingly nobody else out there on the web cares to bother documenting them. With a lot of these little programs, the only web doc you can find are, in fact, online mirrors of their man-page.
For the popular-and-complex programs, man-pages are just redundant, because everyone will document what they did to achieve whatever. But for the simple-but-weird programs—the ones for which man-pages aren't just redundancies—if the man-page doesn't give usage, then nothing is going to give usage.
Now, I can understand why man-pages for these little utilities are the way they are. These programs are usually created by a single author, so time spent writing docs is time not spent fixing bugs or scratching their itch or whatever else. And an options reference certainly is the "minimal normalized form" of documentation: it lets others brute-force combinatoric-search the space of invocations until they find some combination that Works For Them™. Basically, you can (through a lot of trial and error) generate a cookbook from an options reference. So the author probably doesn't feel a strong need to add anything beyond an options reference, because the people who really need to solve the problem their binary solves are willing to go to that effort.
But if you're a distro downstream packager, and it's your job to make your distro easy for people to use, you should have every incentive to submit upstream patches to said author, with manpage additions of cookbook example usages resulting from your trial-and-error experimentation with their program.
Annoyingly, you, as a distro packager, probably don't have time to do that trial-and-error experimentation, especially if the utility serves a niche use-case that you don't even understand. That—and not the fact that "manpages should be a reference and nothing more"—is most of the reason manpages continue to be the way they are.
An ideal man page is concise, informative, and complete. Learning to read them is like learning to read scientific literature: a pain, but once you figure it out, you're at a higher level.
No, I don't. But that's what they are, and what they're meant to be. Complaining that they are is like complaining that Haskell is functional: It may not be ideal for your circumstances, and you're welcome to make that known, but there's no use complaining about it, because it's the entire point.
how would you improve their design
• As well, for top-level switches that are really preferences—that is, switches that don't apply to a use-case, but rather to a user—read those from ~/.config/foo/foorc with defaults in /etc/foo/foorc. Don't expose them at all as runtime switches. If there are features that would be customized by different wrapper-client UIs, provide a --config-file=[file] switch that takes a config-file that sets those. And for special drivers, like Makefiles or CI setups, that have a matrix of different UI options they might want to ask for, you can provide FOO_OPTION env-vars. (See: curl, compiler toolchains, ffmpeg, apt). In ffmpeg's case, there are even config-file presets—basically little plug-ins of config options you can enable as a group. You can dump new files into the /etc/ffmpeg/presets or ~/.config/ffmpeg/presets to add them as presets.
• For switches that are exposed individually, but which are also aggregated into switch-group-setting switches, in most cases there's literally no use-case for setting the individual switches, only the switch-group-setting switch. Remove the individual switches. Just because the program could theoretically be configured to do X compatibility thing for old-arch Foo, but not Y other old compatibility thing for old-arch Foo (where any time you're talking to Foo you always need both), you don't have to expose both an X switch and a Y switch. Just expose a --foo-compat switch and be done with it. People trying to use your binary on other weird OSes shouldn't be doing so by combining tons of option-switches; they should sit down and port your program to that OS, by finding the place in your program where you've defined {arch -> shim flag set} mappings, adding a new mapping for their arch, and exposing it as a new external --bar-compat switch.
• Speaking of compat flags, try just making such behaviors always-on when you build targeting the relevant arch, rather than needing to specify them at runtime. The only real use-case for runtime compat switches is as an IPC/RPC client talking to a server that expects the weird behaviour. And even then, your client should first try to auto-detect the server's expectations, and you should only add the runtime switch if that auto-detection turns out to be unreliable. (Meanwhile, If you're the IPC/RPC server, the compat settings belong in the config file. See: Samba, NFS, Netatalk, ...)
• If your binary manipulates state (like, say, how git manipulates repos), and you change the way it does so in a backward-incompatible manner, you might be tempted to add a runtime switch to turn the old behaviour back on to allow collaboration with people using older versions. If your state-store is at all extensible, though, you should instead add a field for a schema-version and a flag for pinning the state-store to that schema-version, as well as a subcommand to pin/unpin a given state-store's schema-version. Now your binary will upgrade the schema of its state-store by default, but will respect "protected" state-stores and perform only backward-compatible operations on those. (Importantly, this guides the code architecture into failing by default instead of doing something backward-incompatible; whereas, with backcompat switches, you're always forcing a state-store schema-migration on people by default every time you add new code, unless/until you add a matching backcompat-switch.)
• quiet/verbose and interactive/batch are silly "mode switches" to have in modern programs, just like forking is a silly way to do daemons when you've got a modern init(8). Put interactively-useful information on stdout, and do interactive prompting, if-and-only-if isatty(STDIN); put information of all levels of usefulness on syslog with appropriate error-level tags attached. It's up to the thing running your program to provide a PTY or not, and to filter your output or not. Be friendly to expect(1).
These guidelines together should trim each subcommand to a reasonable "visible" option-set. Now just ensure that typing "man command subcommand" gets you a separate man-page written just for the subcommand, and add bash/zsh completion for each subcommand and for the subcommands list itself.
In principle I agree. In practice, all of the commands you listed are multi-tool commands. For example, git overall can be described as a "content tracker"; only its subcommands can be described as doing one thing, and even then often they do multiple duties (to a newbie, git reset apparently does three different things). In contrast, two of the commands you listed (ps and rsync) do only one thing; list processes and copy files. The third, tar, does technically have multiple modes, but most of the switches apply to multiple modes (-f, compression settings, etc). How would you break these up into subcommands?
> • As well, for top-level switches that are really preferences—that is, switches that don't apply to a use-case, but rather to a user—read those from ~/.config/foo/foorc with defaults in /etc/foo/foorc. Don't expose them at all as runtime switches. If there are features that would be customized by different wrapper-client UIs, provide a --config-file=[file] switch that takes a config-file that sets those. And for special drivers, like Makefiles or CI setups, that have a matrix of different UI options they might want to ask for, you can provide FOO_OPTION env-vars. (See: curl, compiler toolchains, ffmpeg, apt). In ffmpeg's case, there are even config-file presets—basically little plug-ins of config options you can enable as a group. You can dump new files into the /etc/ffmpeg/presets or ~/.config/ffmpeg/presets to add them as presets.
Some would argue that this is an anti-pattern and that such configuration should reside in your shell as an alias or function. Regardless, with the possible exception of ps, for the commands you listed, which options exactly would you move into a configuration file? It would likely not be a good idea, for example, to say that all tar -c commands should imply -J, since that would break lots of scripts.
> • For options that are aggregated into option-set flags, where there's literally no use for the options outside of their use in the option-set flag, remove the individual options. Just because the program could theoretically be configured to do X compatibility thing for old-arch Foo, but not Y other old compatibility thing for old-arch Foo, you don't have to support both an X and Y option. Just expose a --foo-compat option and be done with it. People trying to use your binary on other weird OSes shouldn't be doing so by combining tons of option-switches; they should sit down and port your program to that OS, by finding the place in your program where you've defined {arch -> shim flag set} mappings, adding a new mapping for their arch, and exposing it as a new external --bar-compat switch.
I don't understand what this means. Can you give a concrete example?
> • Speaking of compat flags, try just making such behaviors always-on when you build targeting the relevant arch, rather than needing to specify them at runtime. The only real use-case for runtime compat switches is as an IPC/RPC client talking to a server that expects the weird behaviour. And even then, your client should first try to auto-detect the server's expectations, and you should only add the runtime switch if that auto-detection turns out to be unreliable. (Meanwhile, If you're the IPC/RPC server, the compat settings belong in the config file. See: Samba, NFS, Netatalk, ...)
Again, I don't understand what this means.
> Those four things together should trim each subcommand to a reasonable "visible" option-set. Now just ensure that typing "man command subcommand" gets you a separate man-page written just for the subcommand, and add bash/zsh completion for each subcommand and for the subcommands list itself.
I agree with this conclusion given the premises you provided, but the issue is that the premises themselves appear to be incorrect.
Broadly speaking, most complaints about the commands you listed originate in poor understanding of their interfaces; everybody thinks they're hard, so nobody ever reads the man page and learns how to use them correctly. For example, complaints about not knowing tar -z from -j are mostly a result of not knowing that GNU and at least one BSD tar know how to automatically select compression format in at least some cases. A similar situation is the cause of "ps -aux" and such monstrosities as "rsync -arlv -e ssh dir host:dir".
A proper multi-subcommand refactoring of tar, I would think, might involve an interestingly different usage—a "fluent OOP interface" involving either a series, or pipeline, of invocations, all involving tar subcommands. For example:
tar manifest create --new-root=/ . | tar archive assemble --extended-attributes --timestamps --compression=lzma > foo.tar.xz
tar manifest create --new-root=/ . > foo.manifest
tar archive new --extended-attributes --timestamps --compression=lzma > foo.tar.xz
tar archive insert foo.tar.xz foo.manifest
tar manifest read foo.tar.xz | grep -E '...' | sed '{ ... }' | tar archive extract foo.tar.xz
2. One interesting thing about ps is that it takes two separate sets of switches—BSD switches and GNU switches. Given that any given user will only want to use one or the other, these two interfaces should be broken into two utilities (likely using argv[0] detection, like gzip(1) and zcat(1)), with separate man-pages. Setting which one plain "ps" means when ps is called TTY-interactively should be a configuration-file thing.
3. Look at the man-page for GNU coreutils ln(1) or cp(1). They're messes of compat-switches, and compat-switch aggregates, aimed at allowing you to reproduce the default behaviour of the OS you're used to on any-and-every OS you can compile coreutils for. This configuration doesn't belong in argv[]; it belongs in a ./configure script, or in a ~/.config/coreutils/ui-rc file. (Some of the switches are maybe for things you might want to do even in your initrd before you've got the rootfs mounted; those are what env-vars are for.)
4. rsync(1) has options for copying ACLs, copying Extended Attributes, "handling sparse files efficiently", and so on. rsync should just try to do these things automatically, and fall back to not doing them if the source or dest doesn't have support for them. There's no use-case where both the source and target support EAs but you don't want them copies. There's also no use-case where one or the other doesn't support EAs and so you want to fail the sync instead of copying. There's no need for these switches, just like there's no need for an FTP PASV switch. It can be detected.
---
As an aside:
> not knowing that GNU and at least one BSD tar know how to automatically select compression format in at least some cases
For extraction, sure. But why not for creation? RAR and Zip can pick the best compression they "know how to" do at the current moment, and offer compression speed/quality presets that actually involve picking different algorithms.
The real confusion over tar's compression switches is more fundamental; it comes from the fact that a tar archive is "wrapped in" an arbitrary compression-container file-format, without there being any standard for those to allow you to detect something as a "gzipped tar" rather than "gzipped opaque data", and thus the inability of tar, or your OS, to recognize an "[unknown compressor]ed tar" file.
The gordian knot of tar(1)'s switches is for tar—already having treated the compressor as a subprocess rather than a pipe-destination for a long time now—to just begin adding a "this is a tar archive with a compressed stream of archive files inside it" header to the outside of the compressed stream. Even though full backcompat is still possible after defaulting to such a change (user pref files! env vars! in-file hinting that the previous binary can recognize!), everybody's too lazy to want to make that sort of change.
... it was my understanding that the goal was to make the interface easier, not three times as complicated.
> 2. One interesting thing about ps is that it takes two separate sets of switches—BSD switches and GNU switches. Given that any given user will only want to use one or the other, these two interfaces should be broken into two utilities (likely using argv[0] detection, like gzip(1) and zcat(1)), with separate man-pages. Setting which one plain "ps" means when ps is called TTY-interactively should be a configuration-file thing.
"bsdps" and "gnups" seem much worse than "ps" and "ps -".
> 3. Look at the man-page for GNU coreutils ln(1) or cp(1). They're messes of compat-switches, and compat-switch aggregates, aimed at allowing you to reproduce the default behaviour of the OS you're used to on any-and-every OS you can compile coreutils for. This configuration doesn't belong in argv[]; it belongs in a ./configure script, or in a ~/.config/coreutils/ui-rc file. (Some of the switches are maybe for things you might want to do even in your initrd before you've got the rootfs mounted; those are what env-vars are for.)
cp I'll kind of buy, but ln? It's only got 14 real options, none of which can be described as a "compat switch". Again, I'll have to ask you for a specific example. Here's an example of a specific example: "cp -Q does <weird thing> that HP-UX does and nobody else".
> There's no use-case where both the source and target support EAs but you don't want them copies.
Security?
> There's also no use-case where one or the other doesn't support EAs and so you want to fail the sync instead of copying.
Wait, what? "fail silently"?
> There's no need for these switches, just like there's no need for an FTP PASV switch. It can be detected.
copying ACLs isn't like PASV, it's more like ASCII vs binary mode. trying to auto-detect makes the situation worse.
> The gordian knot of tar(1)'s switches is for tar—already having treated the compressor as a subprocess rather than a pipe-destination for a long time now—to just begin adding a "this is a tar archive with a compressed stream of archive files inside it" header to the outside of the compressed stream. Even though full backcompat is still possible after defaulting to such a change (user pref files! env vars! in-file hinting that the previous binary can recognize!), everybody's too lazy to want to make that sort of change.
how about "updating the compression algorithm requires everybody to install a new (de)compressor and until they do they can't open your files"?
1. more learnable, which usually translates to more discoverable, which in turn translates to more orthogonally-decomposed and regular. You want the grammars, syntaxes, sets of verbs/subcommands, names for taken parameters, etc. of all the binaries on a system to obey the Principle of Least Surprise with respect to one-another, so you can learn the syntax for one binary and then reuse that learning on another binary. (Much more likely to be done in a BSD than in Linux, but still possible.)
2. more wrappable, which usually also translates to being more orthogonally-decomposed and regular. You want your binaries to provide an API not only for humans, but for anything that wants to wrap your command in a GUI, or in a friendlier CLI UI, or in a network service, or whatever else. (If you write your binary as mostly a library with a small binary driver, this is even better—see e.g. curl's libcurl—but this is incredibly rare for some reason, and it's a bit much to demand that people refactor their entire codebases this way.)
Being wrappable means that your binary itself is 100% allowed to be "dumb" and "tedious" for experienced users (like in my tar pipeline-UX example), because aliases or scripts or entire conventional-command packages can be built around your binary.
The fact that there's no e.g. `docker gc` subcommand built into docker(1) is a feature, not a bug; the docker(1) binary just provides a set of orthogonal primitive subcommands. Someone else then wrote a docker-gc package containing a configurable script that calls docker(1) a bunch of times.
There should certainly be a high-level UX that doesn't require three separate commands to create a tar file. But tar(1), the core "engine" handling creating that archive, should not be the binary providing that convenient CISC UX. (Maybe you could follow the git model and allow people to call installed "tar-foo" binaries using `tar foo`, but even this is a bit silly.)
But personally, in my mind, tar(1) itself should be a low-level implementation-detail sort of binary anyway, like mknod(8) or losetup(8). tar(1) only handles .tar files, and that's a silly UX for any user-visible task. The only time you already know you've got a .tar file, or want a .tar file, is in a script—and in a script, you want exactly the kind of verbosity, strictness, and interposed-shell-gloop flexibility I was talking about.
Meanwhile, what a user wants 99% of the time for their TTY-interactive use, is a command equivalent to the things a GUI archive-manager does. Users don't want or need tar(1); they want an xdg-archive(1) that uses libarchive.
> Security?
Not the right layer to enforce that in; that's what the [no_]user_xattr mount option is for. (Or, alternately, hierarchical xattr namespaces, with everything coming from foreign sources tainted into a quarantine namespace.)
> Wait, what? "fail silently"?
rsync(1) actually prints a ton of warnings (one for each file, in fact) when you tell it to copy EAs but it can't manage either the read or write step. But it doesn't fail. Because, like I said, there's no use-case. rsync(1) mostly isn't used TTY-interactively; it's used as a recurring batch job. If you said you wanted data+EAs the first time, and the remote's sysadmin remounts their computer's filesystem so EAs stop being available, you don't suddenly want to stop syncing the data. You just want a syslog full of errors telling you that you missed the EAs, plus smart logic such that you can message the other sysadmin telling them to fix their box, and then rsync(1) will gracefully just add the now-available EAs to the files rather than having to re-copy the files. Which... it does. So, great!
(I mean, I can see a use-case for rsync being told "these files should have EAs" and then performing its sync in two steps, where it copies the files from the remote to a local cache, and then only moves those files into place in the local dir if the EAs are there. This would be important if e.g. your local dir is a public NFS mirror of the remote and people will immediately start downloading and trusting your copies to be full-fidelity copies. But! This isn't rsync(1)'s job. This isn't the negotiated details of mechanism; this is policy—policy that can be, and should be, entirely enforced outside of rsync(1) itself. What you really want to do is to rsync(1) the remote to a local spool dir, and then have an fsevent listener watching that dir, checking the local copies in it for semantic-level validity, and then hard-linking those files into the NFS-export dir if-and-when they become valid.)
> copying ACLs isn't like PASV, it's more like ASCII vs binary mode. trying to auto-detect makes the situation worse.
EAs and ACLs are separate things (one is implemented in terms of the other, but they are separated semantically by almost all programs that handle them, and for good reason.) Allowing rsync(1) to blindly sync ACLs across hosts is a much more complex question than just allowing it to sync userland/"shell" EAs.
My first-pass design would be to just never do it ever, instead just inheriting the local effective ACLs rsync(1) is running under, unless it's clear from nsswitch that the local and remote are part of the same AD/LDAP domain and thus share security objects.
But even then, this gets into the domain of "security considerations for programs when you run them with superuser privileges, allowing them to manipulate security metadata", which is totally separate from the UX considerations of regular userland binaries. SMB has, like, seven interlocking protocols, implemented by smbd(8) through twenty-odd libexec-binaries—some run as root, some setuid, some in userland—required to ensure remote-RPC-exposed objects are seen to have the correct ACLs on all hosts. It's awful and ugly. rsync(1) doesn't need to be that. It's a userland binary, sitting in /usr/bin, for users to sync things and then own those synced copies. It doesn't need to be more than that.
> how about "updating the compression algorithm requires everybody to install a new (de)compressor and until they do they can't open your files"?
It doesn't, though; that's what I was talking about with 'in-file hinting that the previous binary can recognize'. You can create a "wrapper format" that doesn't literally 'wrap' your previous format in a container, but rather embeds itself as an extra block in some conventional place that all the old (de)compressors ignore. In a sense, you're encoding your new metadata using lossless steganography into the old format. This is how e.g. the various versions of ID3 tagging have been implemented: since there are many hardware MP3 players that can't be updated—and MP3 is not an extensible container—each update to the ID3 spec is instead done with a formatting change that those old players will just ignore.
In the case of tar(1), here's one possible implementation of that idea: let's say that all the compressor algorithms tar(1) currently supports have a common notion of (though different instructions for) building a Huffman prefix tree, and of throwing away said Huffman tree. You could just stick instructions to build a special kind of Huffman tree at the beginning of the compressed data, one that is a valid but improbable tree from the compressor's perspective (i.e. something that it would never emit itself, but will accept), and which is represented in the compressed data as a static bytestring (i.e. magic numbers.) Then you can add to libmagic, tar(1) itself, etc. a set of new "compressed tar archive" content-signatures—one for each compressor's instruction-sequence variant, all pointing to the same media-type.
Similarly, documentation seems to have apexed with the TeXbook. :(
Yet it has all the CA crap thrown in, via the overloaded openssl binary. As "examples". And according to the documentation, not even "correct" illustrations of how libssl should be used.
Encryption and authentication are two separate problems.
Just because you figured out a way to encrypt a message does not mean you have also figured out how to a way to send it to only the correct recipient... over an insecure network. (Insecure not only in the sense of "plaintext" but in the sense you are not in control of much of anything - routing, PKI infrastructure, etc.)
It seems to me that one would want to solve the authentication problem first, and then move on to encryption.
This comment shows that for proponents of using SSL on the public web, it's been the other way around. Authentication was never sorted out.
When it comes to authentication, all due respect to the OpenSSL authors, SSH has provided a better attempt at a solution than any implementation of PKI using SSL/TLS.
And one more thing, how many ciphers does a user really need? As we've heard time and again, many of them are not even "safe" to use. Some of the alternative SSL libraries have wisely removed them. But I guess OpenSSL is append only?
In the case of openssl, you might be better off rolling your own. At least the vulnerabilities you end up with are different than the ones that the rest of the world has.
"dont try and do it all on your own but trust no one else to do it for you" probably better.
An open, modular project with a wide choice of options would be a godsend and wipe out most digital crime almost overnight.
Of course, then, they couldnt use the likes of yahoo and google to read drug dealers emails.
"Experts"... lol...
So it doesn't surprise me that unit testing, documentation, code review etc. weren't a top priority for spending more unpaid hours on - people literally got what they paid for.
That plus the larger trend of developers ignoring basic, good practices is why I critique the project a bit. Plus, LibreSSL team illustrated my point nicely by doing 10x what I expected in a very short time with no pay.
I'm curious how much of this still stands today.
0. http://www.cvedetails.com/product/383/Openssl-Openssl.html?v...
1. http://www.tedunangst.com/flak/post/analysis-of-openssl-free...
OpenSSL fixed the problem quickly, but one year on still haven't accepted the regression test for the issue. It would be amusing if it wasn't so horrifying.
In contrast, libsodium deserves praise for writing documentation like they want people to actually use their library.
shock horror it shows.
i find it really quite painful that no one seems to be taking this as seriously as it deserves.
cost must be literally hundreds of billions a year now of electronic crime simply because we have been denied secure communications from day 1.