Malicious computers caught snooping on Tor-anonymized Dark Web sites
arstechnica.com
arstechnica.com
With this setup, only those client machines onto which I pre-load a cookie can decrypt a per-client encrypted copy of the "introduction point contact info" part of the descriptor. Malicious HSDirs wouldn't even know where to introduce themselves to my services, let alone the correct cookie for the INTRODUCE2 cells.
If you want to host an onion service, but don't want it publicly accessible, use 'HiddenServiceAuthorizeClient'.
This makes me want to learn how hidden services work. I'm curious how complex the code is.
Search for HidServAuth and HiddenServiceAuthorizeClient at https://www.torproject.org/docs/tor-manual.html.en for further elaboration.
Thanks for the link.
I am aware IPFS has limitations and that there are valid P2P attacks to which it either couldn't resist well (reduced capacity) or it could straight out give away its users IP addresses -- but hey, in my opinion Tor has been mostly compromised by authorities around the world and is currently widely used to persecute people -- some of which might simply be paranoid like myself and dislike being tracked, without doing anything illegal.
Doesn't that mean that Tor has outlived its usefulness?
Must we be afraid or tracking and profiling everywhere we go on the net? Have the bad guys already won?
https://github.com/ipfs/notes/issues/37#issuecomment-2346976...
EDIT: Forgot to mention that since IPFS is a solid upgrade over the BitTorrent way of doing things, then yes, people downloading pieces of data by their content hash can still be targeted. My bad.
I attempted to ask some of the developers if there was, or any interest in, a Javascript version of Tor. My thought was that Electron apps or clearnet websites could use the javascript to load resources or data from onion addresses.
The push back I got from the concept made me feel sad. Some of the responses I got varied from "By only having one reference Tor, it keeps the whole network safe" to "Mixing clearnet with Onion access will make people unsafe."
Tor is doing a good job with the mission purpose of providing one software application that allows an individual to communicate with the world, even inside of a nation that practices extreme censorship.
But for the purposes of preventing the US, the largest and most prevalent state actor, from monitoring the entirety of the network? It seems to be failing.
For the purpose of hiding the source of an onion website, the jury is still out. It appears that the US government has enough of a view into the Tor network that they're able to often deanonymize the hosting location of the backend server.
They've been talking about refactoring the hidden service portion of the code for a long time now but I'm worried that all of the hits the project has taken lately will make that too little, too late.
On the wider issue, I don't know if Tor is really doing such a great job of helping people in censoring states. Whenever I hear about Chinese people crossing the firewall it's always with VPNs and never Tor, which is thoroughly blocked for a long time now. One of the theories of Tor was that if there was lots of legitimate usage, it'd be harder to filter out Tor traffic ("anonymity loves company" they call it), but that goal was clearly better achieved using VPNs which impose minimal performance costs and has left Tor itself largely isolated.
This sort of attack on the Tor network by large groups of malicious nodes is inevitable in a borderless community where there is no procedure for vetting or ID verifying new node operators. Tor assumes ideological loyalty from its node operators, that's a fundamental security assumption, but at the same time, a part of the Tor ideology is that there's no vetting procedure for nodes, nor are there any real rules for running them beyond a few trivial ones, and anyway without the former there's no way to enforce the latter. Tor is built on a giant contradiction, essentially.
Of course that's not a problem unique to Tor. All communities that make majority trust assumptions without any way to control group membership have that problem. Bitcoin has suffered from this too, as has the British Labour party (which recently changed its rules to allow anyone to become a member by paying just £3, a move which immediately led to Corbyn and may yet lead to ~all existing MPs being fired and replaced by hard-left zealots).
Yep, exactly. How exactly do you build a strong anonymizing service all the while assuming benevolent nodes? Doesn't make any sense to me.
Too much naivete in the programming profession, I feel. It makes for pretty hilarious fails periodically.
EDIT: For the downvoters: I apologize if the language is too blunt. But those of us who aren't actively developing Tor have the benefit of being slightly more objective towards it -- that's how I feel. I might be harsh by expressing it, in which case I am sorry; I don't aim to be ungrateful, only skeptical of its current technical design philosophy.
That's exactly what I am afraid of. I don't feel confident in their team and if they suddenly come up with a better security theme, from here on and I will simply suspect it'd be an attempt of the FBI to draw more Tor users into their honeypot servers.
Simply put, I actually already lost trust in them.
No, it's not obvious.
All evidence I know of indicates that compromises of anonymity have occurred at the web application layer (XSS, SQL injections causing servers to give out information they don't intend to share), the browser level (using HTTP instead of HTTPS, not disabling JavaScript, TorBrowser not patching vulnerabilities found in Firefox), or the human level (users giving out data that allows other people to figure out who they are). None of these breaches of anonymity are problems that Tor attempts to solve: Tor is only one part of an infrastructure that allows anonymity.
> I am aware IPFS has limitations and that there are valid P2P attacks to which it either couldn't resist well (reduced capacity) or it could straight out give away its users IP addresses
I don't know whether these problems with IPFS are real (I know little about it) but if it could straight out give away its users' IP addresses, it's completely useless as an alternative to Tor, to the point that I'm unsure why you're proposing it.
> but hey, in my opinion Tor has been mostly compromised by authorities around the world and is currently widely used to persecute people
Is this opinion based in any evidence?
> Doesn't that mean that Tor has outlived its usefulness?
You mentioned before "authorities around the world". I would not be surprised if some more technically capable governments (USA, Israel, China) have compromised Tor, but I would be extraordinarily surprised if even mid-level "authorities" even in those same countries has those capabilities. An exploit widely usable by many authorities would eventually become public knowledge. The fact that such an exploit has not become public knowledge leads me to believe that at least a significant number of the people you refer to as "authorities" don't have the capability to de-anonymize Tor.
So maybe I don't trust Tor to protect me from the NSA, but there are a good many people I do trust it to protect me from. Especially since, like you, my reasons for using Tor are largely ideological rather than practical--I just don't want to be tracked, and Tor significantly decreases the number of actors capable of tracking me.
As I pointed out, IPFS indeed has limitations, but same as Tor, if it doesn't get wider adoption, it won't ever become better. Being a programmer, I believe I can properly time the moment we should stop trying to repair something that looks like it's already working against us, and just start over. As a human being, I recognize I might be wrong and I agree with your counterpoint.
I have no evidence that Tor is compromised, but if we're to believe what we're told via the official news, what another conclusion would you draw? It's an honest question, not an attempt to shift the burden of proof. Objectively speaking, I have no evidence or proof. If I had any, I think there's a reasonable chance I would be in prison because the FBI doesn't like citizens knowing how do they penetrate their cyber targets.
Again, I agree with you. I know many possible malicious actors don't have the tech and/or the talent to deanonymize Tor users. But IMO the whole point is to make every single malicious actor powerless. In that regard, it seems Tor is failing a lot in the last 1 year.
"We can't promise you full anonymity" isn't a legal safety net, it's just the truth. There is not and will never be a system that can let me use the internet but prevent me from posting "My name is David Kerkeslager" on Hacker News. And while that may be a contrived example, note that if I signed into this hacker news account over Tor or sent my address in cleartext to a seller on the Silk Road, that would expose my name as well. And Tor can't prevent programs on your computer, such as your browser, from posting information about you, either, because those programs need all the capabilities that a user has.
Tor anonymizes your IP address and that's pretty much all it does. To fully anonymize yourself on the internet, you need to use a browser that doesn't leak other information about you and to not give out information that can de-anonymize you. That doesn't mean Tor isn't useful; you need to anonymize your IP in order to be anonymous on the internet, and Tor is by far the most thoroughly-tested tool for doing that.
> As I pointed out, IPFS indeed has limitations, but same as Tor, if it doesn't get wider adoption, it won't ever become better. Being a programmer, I believe I can properly time the moment we should stop trying to repair something that looks like it's already working against us, and just start over. As a human being, I recognize I might be wrong and I agree with your counterpoint.
I looked up IPFS and I'm still confused by you proposing it as an alternative to Tor. I don't see anything in my brief look that indicates that IPFS is even trying to provide anonymity--they're solving different problems. There are alternatives to Tor, like I2P or Freenet.
The problem with rewrites, especially rewrites by people who don't understand the previous program, is that they make all the same mistakes that the previous program made. With Tor, thousands of highly-qualified people have tested and sifted through the source code and fixed many (hopefully, all) of those mistakes. If we discard Tor and start writing something from scratch, that's what will happen. And while we might be able to fix those mistakes again,
> I have no evidence that Tor is compromised, but if we're to believe what we're told via the official news, what another conclusion would you draw? It's an honest question, not an attempt to shift the burden of proof. Objectively speaking, I have no evidence or proof. If I had any, I think there's a reasonable chance I would be in prison because the FBI doesn't like citizens knowing how do they penetrate their cyber targets.
I think it's wise to acknowledge that there's some chance actors with extraordinary capabilities can de-anonymize Tor. However, I don't think we can draw any definite conclusion. And as I said earlier, there are still plenty of actors who almost definitely can't compromise Tor.
> Again, I agree with you. I know many possible malicious actors don't have the tech and/or the talent to deanonymize Tor users. But IMO the whole point is to make every single malicious actor powerless. In that regard, it seems Tor is failing a lot in the last 1 year.
I don't agree that the goal is to make every single malicious actor powerless. That's an entirely unrealistic goal. I believe the goal of Tor is something like, "Allow people to connect to computers over the internet without exposing their IP address to the computers they're connecting to." And as far as achieving that goal, I think Tor has a very strong track record.
Tor is continually evolving and being researched and attacked and fixing vulnerabilities and so on goes the cycle.
I2P claims some of its design is more robust security-wise than Tor, but it also has a smaller userbase and fewer eyeballs on its source. It does have enough of a critical mass to be properly functional and have an ecosystem of usage, and is almost as old as Tor (2003 vs 2002).
I also had a lot of trouble getting the it working properly. But the clearnet distinction you noted is interesting.