Comment by akavel | Hacker News Reader

Comment by akavel | Hacker News Reader

ArsTechnica seems to have the most detailed and best linked (PDF + DoJ press release) article as of now:

http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2016/07/kickasstorrents-a...

Somewhat more/complementary details seem to be available on: https://torrentfreak.com/feds-seize-kickasstorrents-domains-... — e.g. regarding methods:

[...] The complaint further reveals that the feds posed as an advertiser, which revealed a bank account associated with the site.

It also shows that Apple handed over personal details of Vaulin after the investigator cross-referenced an IP-address used for an iTunes transaction with an IP-address that was used to login to KAT’s Facebook account. [...]

Some aspects which seem interesting to me, from what is reported:

• that apparently KAT owner tried to shield off DMCA takedown requests (which I'd see as trying to affirm being legal);

• that according to the articles he seems to not have used Tor (or fumbled in it).

(Assuming no parallel construction and that he's actually the guy, etc. etc.)

EDIT: I couldn't really find any Polish sources — suppose because it's middle of the night here... (the single article — http://www.dobreprogramy.pl/Zalozyciel-Kickass-Torrents-zatr... — seems to be written based on the above English-language ones)

> investigator cross-referenced an IP-address used for an iTunes transaction with an IP-address that was used to login to KAT’s Facebook account

The article implies that the investigator had a FB and iTunes IP address and THEN Apple gave the rest of the user's details but that doesn't really make sense.

I'm guessing that they gag-ordered and subpoenaed FB for account info, but how did the investigator get the iTunes transaction IP address prior to getting user details from Apple?

Edit:

I think the more likely scenario is that FB was forced to give up user details and the only valid info was the IP Address, and then Apple (and probably google etc.) was forced to search through their databases and produce any records related to the IP address in question.

Or maybe the USG has a database filled with iTunes transaction information -- I really wouldn't doubt this at all. I'm sure music is a partial indicator of "dissident" level in whatever algorithm is used to assist investigators.

The FBI found out his bank account information from buying ads. He probably bought something on iTunes and that would be sufficient for Apple to be given a search warrant for any data related to x IP address, billing info, email address, or name. Any identifying details they collected at that point.

Not hard to connect the pieces once you have a money trail. That's an investigative gold mine.

> The FBI found out his bank account information from buying ads. He probably bought something on iTunes

This actually sounds the most believable to me, excellent point.

My guess would be they got the IP address from Facebook and looked that up in a database that shows all connections made by an IP address, then noticed one of the connections was to Apple and based on that got Apple to reveal the user behind it. I doubt Apple would cooperate willingly with dragnet-style inquiries.

Ok, we changed the URL to that from http://bnonews.com/news/index.php/news/id4926. If there's a more substantive source, we can change it again.

Should have used bitcoin :(

Wouldn't help much once the bitcoin is exchanged for another currency, thus linking the bitcoin address to his personal information if the authorities compel the exchange to provide the info.

Bitcoin can be laundered through mixers pretty easily making it very difficult to track it into a currency conversion.

There are ways to "launder" the payments. Could use JoinMarket to tumble the funds to a decent extent.

Could also send the BTC to shapeshift.io and convert it to Monero and then convert it back to Bitcoin at xmr.to.

I am really shocked they had an advertiser pay to a bank account, especially one in the owners name. It's a huge OpSec mistake.

While this comment and its siblings do mention methods that can, in theory, be used to launder bitcoin, it's still really difficult to do it correctly. People vastly overestimate the privacy benefits of bitcoin. In many practical cases, bitcoin is probably one of the least private ways to get payment; every transaction is publicly recorded and can easily be traced through the blockchain without subpoena, warrant, social engineering, or any justification whatsoever. This is a treasure trove for law enforcement and will likely allow them to find criminals that never would've otherwise appeared on their radar.

Some tumblers are honeypots and many are scams that will skim the top off your btc while barely doing anything to your coins' "taint" rating.

Even if one's understanding of bitcoin and practice of opsec is impeccable, there is still the need to worry about trading partners out to the nth degree; one weak link somewhere in the chain may very well lead back to an otherwise-meticulous user. One also must worry about getting discovered through some other means, like getting a computer booked into evidence and having the bitcoin wallet found and a legal order entered compelling its decryption.

If law enforcement finds out someone unsuccessfully engaged in an attempt to conceal their possession of bitcoin, that person is adding years to a potential prison sentence with conspiracy charges, money laundering, tax evasion, etc.

Bitcoin is awesome for everyday use. Anyone who wants to use it for "underground" endeavors needs to do some serious homework, and not just plunge in believing "it's anonymous currency" or "it's anonymous as long as I send my coin to a tumbler after getting it".

> This is a treasure trove for law enforcement and will likely allow them to find criminals that never would've otherwise appeared on their radar.

If this was the case then why has it never been used as a means to catch someone so far? There have been hundreds of darknet related arrests and none have been related to bitcoin.

Pretty much every other investigative means is easier than tracking down bitcoin like that.

Give it time. Bitcoin's still pretty new. I don't think law enforcement is quite on top of it yet, if I had to guess.

I have a professional acquaintance ( my profession, not his) in the anti-moneylaundering division of a large national, non-US bank. He mentioned that their default assumption is that if an account or a transaction involves bitcoin, it is connected to criminals. They log the details and pass it on to the appropriate law enforcement agency.

The same thing happens where I work (a restaurant). One of my professional acquaintances assumes that if meal preparation involves a knife, it is connected to a murder. He writes down the wielder, date, and time, and sends the information to the police each day.

:D if I could upvote twice I would

Was it a very niche brand of knife that is the nearly exclusive choice of criminals?

Yes, it was.

And don't confuse "nearly exclusive choice of criminals" with "only criminals choose it".

After all, cars are the nearly exclusive choice of bank robbers for getaways. But I don't think you are suggesting that every person driving in a car away from a bank should be documented and reported to the authorities.

No I'm not meaning to imply that anyone should assume someone using BTC is a criminal. However it's not irrational to pay closer attention to them.

I do think reporting every single BTC user to a three letter agency is pushing it though. I would understand doing that for accounts that raise red flags beyond simply using BTC, but doing that for every single one seems a bit paranoid and ineffective anyways.

Many banks will give you a generic error when you make a transaction using an account number that is associated with a business models around bitcoin (e.g. companies that exchange bitcoins for cash after you make a wire-transfer to them are all tracked by the banks and the transaction fails with an unknown error. This is a fact in Unicredit, HVB, (possibly others?) The issue is usually "logged" ;-)).

I'd be interested to find out more about how banks implement possible black/white lists on their users. How far does it affect risk mgmt? Will users get negative points when applying for a loan? And how are customers punished who dare to bet on alternative banking like BTC or god forbid send cash to a bitcoin wallet.

Who knows more? (asking for a friend :))

Isn't that what bitcoin tumblers are for?

Not only can bitcoin be tumbled, but think about the scenario where it is exchanged for another crypto-currency like litecoin then exchanged for bitcoin at another site, then exchanged for cash. Good luck tracing that.

But that's just more data, you just JOIN another table - the exchanges have a list of transactions, left column BTC adress, right column litecoin adress.

The difficult one-time work will be done when chasing terrorists. Everyone can be compelled to hand over data.

Crime is impossible.

If you sell btc for ltc on one site, split up the balances, then sell the ltc for btc on different sites, how exactly would someone piece that back together? The crypto currency exchanges would be transferring to and from their internal addresses. There would be no direct connection without knowing all the addresses the exchanges use, and they can (and should) use a different address for each transaction.

> Crime is impossible.

Lets not get carried away

The "sites" keep track of the transactions. This information could leak or law enforcement could successfully request this information.

High level analysis could find btc-altcoin transactions that "fit" together, maybe with later transaction when the person will eventually cash out, and use other data thats not obvious to us right now. A difficult problem, but one that is straightforward, fashionable (big data), profitable (lots of money at stake), and potentially something that law enforcement/intelligence agencies work on.

We tend to underestimate future capabilities ;)

> Good luck tracing that

Subpoena the trading sites? An active adversary would be running the trading sites, though I doubt they'd waste that info on a low-level case. LocalBitcoins says they retain all messages for 180 days, up from their previous 90. Is that purely for internal disputes?

Sure, if you're not doing anything illegal enough, you can get away with simply using sites in multiple jurisdictions and hoping it's too much of a pain. But let's not pretend it's not traceable. I'd only be happy with zero knowledge proofs (if they're real; I haven't understood the maths at all.)

The crypto currency exchanges could be in any country, I don't think it is any solace to be able to send out subpoenas to sites completely outside the banking system.

>"LocalBitcoins says they retain all messages for 180 days" //

Can't you just wait longer than 180 days then? The investigators then subpoena for the transaction records to link it all back together and the records longer exist (in theory).

Thanks for posting this, OP's link is broken for people with adblockers.

I use uBlock Origin and it works just fine for me.

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