Does More Security at Airports Make Us Safer or Just Move the Targets?
nytimes.com
nytimes.com
If a new indignity -- like making people take their shoes off or wait in a 20% longer line -- pushes even a small percentage of travelers to drive instead of fly (and it does) the increased human risk from the added driving easily outweighs the tiny risk mitigation gained by the new airport rule.
Edit: for at least last year, I'm seeing ~5% air travel growth compared to <1% population growth. So I don't know if your premise has taken effect yet...
<Insert appropriate discussion of how people are very bad at estimating risk, especially when those risks involve death>
<Also insert something about (risk of occurring) * (consequence of occurrence)>
I would say the GP's point is true to first order.
That's irrelevant. For all we know, if we still had pre-2001 TSA rules, air travel would be growing 6% or 7%.
Someone correct me if I'm wrong.
Or ten people could do it. It's probably a lot easier to find ten recruits willing to load bombs onto buses and escape than to find one recruit willing to die by bringing a bomb onto a plane.
Attack on the airport also targets people who aren't native, often westerners which is both what these organizations often want and it ensures that it would much more widely reported than "a bus blew up in north eastern turkey" which maybe will get a headline for 2 hours.
Attack on an airport tells people see you aren't safe anywhere your "most secure" location with all that security isn't safe, we can get you anywhere any time, this helps to spread the fear both within the country and world wide.
Attack on an airport immediately triggers security lockdowns world wide which amplifies the financial cost of the attack globally.
Terrorism is often considerably more calculated than what people think, especially when it comes to high profile attacks.
However, box cutters where the weapon of choice for 9/11 you could make spears on board the aircraft and manually kill everyone except the pilots with a few burley and well trained people. Which is the real problem, defensive safety measures cost a lot and switching targets is really cheap for terrorists.
Security that works by simply creating a juicier target is obviously not security at all.
The real limitation seems to be a limited number of terrorists not a limited number of targets.
That there are other targets is obviously correct, but I do not feel it really addresses the point.
Security has different dimensions. The point of TSA security is to avoid situations where a hostile party can breach the cockpit or disable the plane in the air. All of the security theatre, random searches, etc are all there to make airliners a less attractive target and try to keep terrorism scoped.
Protecting your life as a passenger is a secondary priority, which is accomplished by the random placement of air marshals. Someone planning to fashion ad-hoc spears out of plastic utensils or whatever must account for the presence of a guy with a gun as well as passengers fighting back.
So, are you saying a vigilant public and "a good guy with a gun" are the actual solutions? (And before the reader jumps to a conclusion about my relevant political positions, I'd estimate there's an 80% chance that you'd be wrong!)
Now, it's true sometimes passengers can be... "too vigilant..." There are plenty of stories of Muslims being kicked off of planes for no particular reason, but in the end, yes, I vote public education.
For the "stop a hijacker from flying into a building" scenario, the locked door is the control.
Don't forget, we already lost an aircraft because the door locks and a pilot had a death wish. So, even if you pay someone with a gun to be on board he could be a terrorist, so now you need two guys with guns...
The society freaks out N^2(3) number of deaths involved.
Oklahoma were 168 people. 9/11 were 3000. The response to 9/11 was way greater than Oklahoma*20. It was event that defined US politics for 2 decades lead to 2-4 wars (depending on definition).
And the news cycle have already forgotten San Bernadino, Charlie Hebdo and Paris is on the brink of falling out.
Even then, it was not the number of deaths so much as the loss of a monument that really stuck with people.
Imagine someone ploughing shortly after the start into the Super Bowl. Thats what REAL security nightmares are made of.
Even though, even that cant be fully prevented. Best example would be someone like Andreas Lubitz.
That could be the basis of the worst reality TV show ever! Or one of President Trump's economic programs. Or both.
The most important safety measure against this became mandatory procedure after 9/11: locking the cockpit doors. If the terrorists can't control the plane, they can't use it as a projectile weapon. No amount of killing passengers will give them this kind of access.
The reason why 9/11 was possible was because it had never happened. They could have added zero security measures, not even locking the cockpit door, and 9/11 still would probably not happen again. The reason is because before 9/11 the common wisdom was to let the hijackers do what they want. After 9/11 the common wisdom is the plane is going to be used to fly into a building.
But, locking the door is still a good common sense extra security measure.
Being in a closed cabin at 30,000 feet means that the size of the explosion has to be a lot smaller than on the ground to have the same impact. Additionally, guns can lead to lead to 9/11 situations.
More importantly, TSA probably won't defend against a state level threat, but it keeps crazy people from doing ridiculous stuff. Take a look at this pre-security list of incidents: (remember, a lot less people flew back then)
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_aircraft_hijackings
There is no way not to have security on flights. The next step is making it much faster and more predictable to reduce overall travel time.
All he has to do is show it to everyone and he can direct the pilots to fly anywhere he wants. They may not do a 9/11, but they will all do what he says.
Some type of security will always be required at airports and probably eventually on high speed trains as well. Now we just need to figure out how to make it way faster and less invasive.
A 20 person commuter jet or a 900 seat Emirates Air flight from London to NYC?
http://www.therichest.com/rich-list/the-biggest/the-10-bigge...
Machines and locations of queues are not to blame. The real problem is (multi)cultural -- hate in people's hearts and evil plus incompatibility of cultures & religions. That is the root of the problem and moving a queue to a new location on the sidewalk won't solve it.
We are distracted and quibbling about irrelevant details. I refuse to accept the premise. Cutting to the root of the issue as best I can, civilizations must determine whether to abandon multiculturalism and insist on a homogeneous culture or continue down the current path.
The original Afghan-West battle wasn't about multiculturalist conflict, it was about imperialism.
It's easy to fix by establishing metrics, and any budget could easily be covered by adding fees to tickets. Then you start firing TSA managers that allow the lines to get long.
EDIT: Budget can be solved with ticket fees, I'm happy to pay more to get a predictable wait at security. in Japan I never, ever had to wait in line for security so it's definitely possible.
It's actually a really hard problem. You have to balance dollars, demand and shifts. Demand varies based on flights departing from different terminals. You can't schedule people to come in for two hours, and reassigning staff introduces wastage as they redeploy from one place to another.
That said, TSA manages it poorly, but the root issue is not enough money for the task at hand.
Don't forget events.
Austin airport is usually pretty nice, with short lines. During SXSW however, it gets insanely crowded, with security checkpoints containing hundreds of people in close proximity. It's just not a good situation.
1. Paris 2. Brussels 3. Russian plane back from Egypt 4. Plane en route to Egypt 5. Couple of attacks in Turkey - assorted 6. Turkey airport 7. Orlando 8. Pakistani attack in the kids playing area 9. I am sure I forget a lot more.
Any gathering of people is valid terror target. More security won't help. Terrorism is here to stay.
We must accept that we won't be safe and we can only do damage control.
[1] http://www.pri.org/stories/2014-10-23/world-actually-safer-e...
>“Perhaps the most cost-effective measure is policing and intelligence — to stop them before they reach the target,” Mr. Stewart said.
Perhaps true, but I see this argument a lot by engineering folks, and I think it misses a major point of human nature. Large, violent, deadly events, in places where you completely don't expect them, are always going to be a lot scarier than the random low-lying "background" events, like car accidents.
The fact that the world is so safe only magnifies how unexpected and terrifying it would be to walk around enjoying the mundane events of modern life - going to a concert, taking a trip somewhere, dancing in a club - and suddenly meet a violent death.
“Think of the press as a great keyboard on which the government can play.” - Joseph Goebbels
“The most brilliant propagandist technique will yield no success unless one fundamental principle is borne in mind constantly - it must confine itself to a few points and repeat them over and over” - Joseph Goebbels
But we are safe, at least from terrorism. The probability that you'll be killed by a terrorist on any given day is far lower than the probability that you'll be killed by something mundane.
[1] http://web.archive.org/web/20071214144443/http://www.airbus....
You're also ignoring the fact that emissions at altitude have an increased impact. "For perspective, per passenger a typical economy-class New York to Los Angeles round trip produces about 715 kg (1574 lb) of CO₂ (but is equivalent to 1,917 kg (4,230 lb) of CO₂ when the high altitude "climatic forcing" effect is taken into account)." [2] Even the most fuel-efficient car isn't dumping tons of NOx at cruising altitude, inducing excess ozone formation.
[1] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Seat_configurations_of_Airbus_...
[2] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Environmental_impact_of_aviati...
You could make it more complex where they are identified by cameras and biometrics and have the system channel them a secure location/blast proof holding area if they are flagged as high risk.
I think having passengers in a large mass at the beginning of security at the airport or at a stadium is a huge target and risk since what happens when a screener finds a passenger with a suicide vest. I think there should be some type of screening container that is blast resistant checking someone face to face for weapons isn't effective. No one gets paid enough for that job.
Roll Matrix Security Check Point Scene https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=cF-WeswkqXc
Not saying that the rules make sense, but that seems to be the reasoning behind them. Dealing with a bit of fire is easier than a hole in the fuselage.
First of all the security at the Istanbul Ataturk Airport did partially stop the attackers. At least one of them was shot by security before detonating his suicide vest.
When you have 3 suicide bombers that attack a fixed target like an Airport for the most part you can only minimize casualties and while it's hard to admit it 41 deaths is low compared to what can happen in these kinds of situations (Israel in the early 2000's shows you just how many casualties a single suicide bomber can incur).
The whole idea of layered security (often modeled after the Ben Gurion Airport) is to reduce lines you have finer and finer security checkpoints at each layer this increases the attackers being caught while reduces the population density at the external checkpoints.
Ben Gurion goes further than that and it has incorporated security to how it was built, there is a hairpinned roads ~5min drive from the external security checkpoint to the terminal building (preventing anyone from just rushing pass the checkpoint).
The check in counters and the initial security screening is done over a very wide area in order to not to create choke points.
Passengers are pre-screened before they enter the security checkpoint which really doesn't care about liquids, shoes, or nail scissors.
From the passport control to the main lounge you have quite a long walk through a corridor which has no shops or any thing to gather around just some photographs this again is an anti-rushing measure if some one passes security and decides to rush the gates they are pretty much funneled through a tunnel.
The main terminal lounge is fairly small compared to other airports (even of the size of TLV or smaller) it's round with a large fountain in the middle and with fairly low density seating.
The gates are clustered over several branches and are separated from the main terminal lounge again by another fairly long defacto tunnel without any shops which again gives security the ability to close off any of them and prevents basically a leap frog rush.
There will always be choke points and clusters in an airport or any other public area, the airline counters, the check in desks, the information counter, restaurants, restrooms, the duty free liquor/tobacco store etc and of course the boarding gates. And of course even the most lax security check that is intended to do nothing but to ensure you don't have an RPG in your bags would create them as well.
Good security is built around performing as much checks as possible before the people are centralized in one place and cluster, good security is about building the airports in such a manner that would enable security to react promptly while reducing the effectiveness of both armed assaults and suicide attacks.
So no security doesn't make you less safe sure intelligence and enforcement is still better than securing an airport but that's a given you don't need to analyze anything to come to that conclusion simply because even the most ideal attack on a target like an airport would have some casualties even if it's the assailants only.
Claiming that somehow security makes you less safe is moronic, this to some extent even includes the TSA which isn't an effective security measure but it doesn't makes you less safe. The lines and clusters would still be there regardless of security or not they'll just be at different places.
What happens to security when a bomb goes off ? Well, apparently it is abandoned, and fails open. So you can walk straight through, unopposed. The 2 remaining terrorists (and hundreds of civilians) did just that, and while a police officer shot one of them before he could run into a crowd and that bomb went off in the middle of an open space, apparently without victims [1]. The other one, however did succeed.
According to this article the solution to this is what Baghdad airport does ... which is to have vehicle screening before the vehicles get near the airport building. One can only imagine what a nightmare it would be to do this at a high traffic airport but ...
How about we do the other alternative ? Obviously static defenses with long queues effectively make it easier, not harder, for terrorists to strike (talk about obvious). Let's use this opportunity to make sure people don't ever have to wait in security screening, avoiding creating a vulnerable point, and making air travel far more attractive for everybody concerned while we're at it.
[1] (note: VERY graphic violence https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_QKYBK04AmA )