Wow, I launched this 10 minutes ago and somebody already put it on Hacker News. Spectacular!
I'm the author of this and would be happy to answer any questions you have.
I'm the author of this and would be happy to answer any questions you have.
Does the server get a separate wg interface for every client that connects? Or does it do something like multipoint GRE interfaces with next hop addresses in the arp table?
Does this do a DH key agreement to guarantee forward secrecy or does it literally encrypt the packet with the peers public key?
Also is it in the scope of this project for peers to discover each other for direct communication, like a Phase3 DMVPN?
No. Each wg interface has a public/private key. It then has a list of peers' public keys and associated allowed IPs. By tying each public key to the allowed IPs of that public key, you can be sure that if a packet comes from wg0 and comes from a particular src IP, it comes from who you want. So no need for a new wg0 for each peer.
> Does this do a DH key agreement to guarantee forward secrecy or does it literally encrypt the packet with the peers public key?
It uses a 1-RTT ECDH key agreement based on the Noise Protocol Framework, with identity hiding, perfect forward secrecy, and so forth. So, it does what you hoped it does. :)
> Phase3 DMVPN
I'm not familiar with this, but I'll read up on it. Just found a large cisco document describing it. I suspect that "automatic discovery" wouldn't be very much to my taste, but I'll read up on it before dismissing it wholesale.
If I understand wireguard correctly it seems NHRP could be run using wiregard for transport, but it would cool if a separate NHRP daemon wasn't required, especially since wiregard is already tracking the mapping of internal to public IPs.
> No. Each wg interface has a public/private key. It then has a list of peers' public keys and associated allowed IPs. By tying each public key to the allowed IPs of that public key, you can be sure that if a packet comes from wg0 and comes from a particular src IP, it comes from who you want. So no need for a new wg0 for each peer.
Does this mean that it is impossible for two clients to connect to the same VPN server from behind router doing NAT? Or does each client choose a random source port for their traffic and then the combination of source port and source IP identifies the client?
I'm curious what will be your strategy with regard to working or not with upstream Linux ?
I wrote an email on LKML and netdev today to David Miller, the network subsystem maintainer. It's not ready for a [PATCH] set now, but it is ready to get initial feedback from them, so that I can start to get things ready for upstreaming. So: that's on the roadmap and a primary objective!
If your work is in the public domain, then at least the corporations would have much harder time hijacking and wall-garden it, and the chances of them simply giving up are higher. Or so I hope.
I've read a good chunk of your website. GREAT WORK! Do not give up, you're doing next-level work. =)
I do hope I am very naively wrong. But history hasn't given us much comfort in this area so far.
If I learned anything from those last 15 years is that they'll sue you if you don't agree the Moon is made of cheese if it suits their agenda.
So I remain cynical towards them. If they can hijack a good technology for their own profit, they will do it. I think we all knew that much at this point?
Also, one of easiest, formal methods is Design by Contract which can be emulated with asserts for pre- and post-conditions plus main invariants. Quite useful to encode operating assumptions in there. Such can also be used for automating test-case generation, fuzzing, dynamic analysis, and covert channel analysis. Oh yeah, definitely do a covert channel analysis on anything that gets near the keys to plug any leaks.
Yes this absolutely is the goal. I'm trying to keep the codebase as small and clear as possible.
> Design by Contract
Working out the precise pre and post conditions of every state would indeed be worthwhile. For all state transitions of the protocol, I've worked out by hand every possible combination and accounted it for it. I should publicize this work (i.e. type up my handwritten notes), and then let others join building on top of it.
That's actually... great. It's exactly what high-assurance security did in kernels and VPN's. I'm impressed. You should definitely write that up and share it for peer review. Also, since you've done it, the next step is to review each one to make sure security properties are maintained or it fails fast, safe, and loud. :)
This looks interesting and I will be sure to check it out when I get the chance. I see from the examples on the site that it's IPv4 everywhre. Is there IPv6 support ? If not, is it on the roadmap ?
Thanks for the documentation suggestion.
One disadvantage off the bat is that every operating system from OSX to Windows 7 to Linux to *BSD already has support for IKEv2 and MOBIKE caked in.
Blake2s is essentially their reference code.
Curve25519 is based on Adam Langley's donna.
For example, there are a myriad of products based on BSD; everything from pfSense at the low-end, the Juniper routers at the high-end.
If the goal is to make money by licensing the code for non-GPLv2 use, then the GPL might make sense, if you're unconcerned about limiting market adoption by precluding integration by non-GPL products.
Couldn't it still be fast and written in a safer than C language considering the security context? (Or we'll still need to get grsec in there... :)
Cheers!
On a microkernel system, the standard way of connecting to the network stack might be through direct shared memory; and on such a system you could manage to run the VPN in userspace at essentially no cost.
However, on Linux, most of the network stack is in the kernel; the ABI for interacting with network hardware is stable. So while in theory you could write an efficient userspace VPN, it would require you to modify or at very least recompile your applications.