Twilio opens trading at $23.99 per share
techcrunch.com
techcrunch.com
They IPO'd at 15 dollars with a valuation of 1.23 billion dollars, which means they're now about 1.97 billion dollars.
https://techcrunch.com/2016/06/22/twilio-prices-its-ipo-at-1...
hopefully this will encourage more VC's to fund.
Quick edit: not saying there isn't a lot of funding already happening but there's fear that VC might dry up. Hope it doesn't happen.
tl;dr sentiment is very important for IPOs
Who cares. Compare Twitter ("popping" IPO) vs. Facebook ("sagging" IPO).
Probably, GS and JPM got a lot it instead.
Currently the bid of ~1000 shares are available at 24.97 (these number will vary second to second)
That doesn't mean that all of the shares IPOed could have been sold for that price.
Was there likely money left on the table? Yes. But its pretty difficult to put a dollar amount to it.
Change in market cap is a very awkward way to look at a recent public company because it's a very volatile measure and also is harder to mentally extrapolate other metrics from.
They are currently at a ~2B valuation.
45M / 2B = 2.25%
Twilio is (in theory) a high growth tech company. Say they want to grow at 15% a year. 2.25% / 15% = .15 or about 2 months worth of growth.
2 months is certainly something, but in the grand scheme of things isn't the hugest deal in the world.
Even with the auction, Google IPO'd at $85, and the stock opened at $100. If you think that the investment banks gave away $90M of Twilio's money to their friends, do you believe that Google did the same thing with $300M of their own money?
http://www.reuters.com/article/us-nasdaq-omx-facebook-litiga...
This exposed a race condition within the IPO process that bungled it up. The post mortem talks about "order modifications" which are actually order cancels right up to the point of the cross was supposed to take place.
http://www.nasdaqtrader.com/TraderNews.aspx?id=ETA2012-20
Pricing the IPO lower would have had people not feeling that the IPO was overpriced. The overpriced feeling people got caused them to want to tap out and brought out the particular race condition that Nasdaq hit. Normally, IPOs get lots of buying interest. The all-in, then folding behavior was unprecedented as people who didn't believe in the company IPO would never have put in bids in the first place.
This deal was upsized very close to the IPO date and completely oversubscribed with huge retail interest. Everyone wanted this deal to succeed and news behind it was extremely positive. Don't see how random chatter about advertising causes a stock exchange to blow up.
To piggyback on the weird comparisons, why didn't Square encounter any issues on their IPO? News was extremely negative and it was said that they were forced to IPO to cash out investors.
Nothing indicates that this went poorly for Facebook. It seems to indicate the opposite.
Share price is a function of quantity supplied. You reduce quantity supplied, and for any market with a downward-sloping demand curve, the price will go up.
Perhaps a better way to look at this is that (1) market participants have differing views of the fair value of the securities, and (2) given the current market price, only market participants who think the shares are worth >= $24 (last trade) will buy. There is no "true price", just a lot of opinions resulting in individual buy/sell decisions.
Yes, market cap should be independent of number of shares, and the market cap = # of shares * $ per share formula still holds, which is why many prefer to think about market caps rather than accounting units.
But it's also the case that a firm issuing a share for the price of $15, increases book value of the firm by $15, and this directly offsets the resulting shareholder dilution. Arguing it was impossible to find buyers at 24 dollars a share is a bit silly, given that the market immediately did just that.
Goldman Sachs would like to buy 50 shares for $14 each. Morgan Stanley would like to buy 50 shares for $15 each. Barclays would like to buy 50 shares for $16 each.
Citizen Bob would like to buy 5 shares for $24 each.
So what happens? HarryCo IPOs at $15 (the maximum I can get to cover all 100 shares) and then immediately pops to $24 when Bob buys 5 shares from Morgan Stanley.
I did not leave $900 "on the table" in my IPO because there wasn't enough demand to sell 100 shares at $24.
> And then immediately crashes back to $16 because there are no other buyers willing to buy at $24.
Which obviously didn't happen.
If we assume that GS and MS have a reserve price of 24, as evidenced by the market open, then their strategic 15 and 16 bids do represent money left on the table.
But I think that's not always a great assumption, because sometimes things happen that don't affect firm fundamentals (profit, revenues, margins) but do affect valuation, like changes in interest rates, shifting investor sentiment on the sector, a lighthouse investor publicly stating their intention to buy/sell, etc -- all of these things change market cap without altering the business per se.
All this to say, I think the simple CAP=SHARES*PRICE formula is too simplistic. I think it's more accurate to think in terms of ranges of what the firm's equity might be worth, and realize that it's a highly subjective assessment based more on aggregate opinion, than some hard objective law of physics.
I think you're wrong. My reasoning is simple. If the IPO investors thought that the company was worth less than $24 (e.g. $16), they would have sold already, and the price would have dropped. If they thought the company is worth $24 (or more), they would have bought the IPO at any price between $16 and $24 (minus spread) as well.
Really, the only argument for under-pricing the IPO is as a favor to the banks/hedge funds. But the question is, did the banks ever return the favor?
I'm not a lawyer but I think this is part of what's behind the trend toward convertible notes in company financing in SV, compared to the traditional priced equity round -- too hard to give a different deal to different investors, for what amounts to the same shares?
Would love to hear more from someone who knows more about this.
It's troubling to think of the conflicts of interest that go into the pricing of an IPO. The company would like it to be as high as possble, holding the number of shares sold constant. Investment bankers would like to preserve their good relationship with the hoardes of potential IPO investors, and therefore would like the IPO price to be below the "true value" of the stock, to provide their clients with a nice short term return. Another interesting bit, is that most of the employees of the company going public actually care about the price of the stock six months from now when their lockup ends, so their incentives are not exactly aligned either.
In short, the whole "big price pop on day 1 == good" idea needs to go away.
Do you have a source for this? It was my understanding that the investment bankers want the IPO to be priced as high as possible because that's how they make their commission. See the potential windfall for JP Morgan on the Saudi Aramco IPO
Investment banks often have to make guarantees about selling all of the shares, and the worst thing that can happen for them is to have a broken IPO (shares close below the open price). The investment bank that led Facebook's IPO had to buy back shares immediately to prevent that from happening.
Also, many of the initial shares are bought from the investment bank's book of contacts that they reached out to on their roadshow. If you lose money for your fund manager buddies, they won't invest in your next IPO.
For what I know during the normal stock exchange you sell to the highest price and buy to the lowest.
Suppose there a stock EXMPL, and some people want to buy and other want to sell.
Now put all those people in a line with the seller facing the buyer sorted by price.
So in front of seller line there is the one that want to sell at 100, followed by the one who want to sell at 101, then 103 and so on.
In front of the buyer line there is the one who want to buy for 99, followed by 98, and then 97 and so on.
In this situation no exchange is been made because they cannot agree on the price.
Now suppose that someone is betting heavily on EXMPL and decide to buy 100 shares at 102$. It goes in the first position of the line and ask to the one who is selling at 100: 1> "how many share can you sell me at 100?"
2> "75 share for a total of 7500$"
1> "Deal, here the money!"
Now our buyer goes talking with the second of the line...
1> "how many share can you sell me at 101?"
3> "100 share for a total of 10100$"
1> "I only need 25 for a total of 2525$, here are the money"
2> "Deal, here are the share!"
And the 102$/share guy left.
At this point the last tick sign 101$ which is the "price" of the stock, note that nobody is buying anymore at more than 99$.
During an IPO I wouldn't expect much difference...
In my understanding the money "left on the table" are just the one needed to rise the price...
Am I missing something?
company -> banks
The first actual public trade was $23.99 so
banks/clients of banks -> public markets.
People sometimes refer to the first day of trading as an "IPO", but that's not quite right.
A more serious question: how many secondary offerings are there?
In this case the underwriter who controlled this IPO likely has what is known as a "green shoe". The green shoe is an agreement to sell more shares (up to 15%) after the IPO and they acquire them from the company at the IPO price. This means the bank could sell 15% more stock that wasn't part of the original IPO at current market prices and only have to pay the company the original IPO price. The company raises more money and the underwriter makes more profit. This happens when there is a successful IPO where the market prices the stock higher than the IPO price.
I'm with you that huge first day bumps don't help the company much. A little PR is nice, but if the price stays that high, they underpriced.
The investment banks have huge incentives to have these first day pops, as it's free cash for some of their high-volume customers.
Personally I'm glad to see a "Unicorn" step out of the corral and survive in the wild. If it is still above a $B valuation after the employee lockup period ends that will definitely classified as a success.
[Now Over]
I think this is actually pretty incredible. They got trader who's been there for 35 years writing his first Twilio app (and first app ever) live and it works. It feels like an awesome message that we can empower people to code with the right tools and they can feel incredible doing it.
Well done, Twilio!
Edit: And we just finished a conference call with Kenny that he created and we all chanted his name. This is amazing.
> May be I am old school when I think we should all be rolling like Wozniak's (apple co-founder) not flashy brogrammers who would do anything for marketing.
Woz would be a no one without marketing. And similarly Jobs would be a no one with Woz's product development. I'm not sure why you feel the need to address "has marketing gone too far" when you can simply chose to ignore it?
I think people get caught up in the product, and forget that sales is just as important to the core business.
Another way it could have happened: some engineer nerded out, and said at a team meeting "can I live code from the NYSE trade floor? It's silly but would be super fun!". To which marketing replies "yeah, and that'd be great for the company image too- do it!".
You seem to interpret it as the first version, but for all we know it could be the second. Something that would not be out of line with the personality of someone like Woz either.
Investor sentiment around developer tools in Silicon Valley is still broadly negative. I worked for 3yrs at a company funded by prominent valley VCs and, unequivocally, they were trying to get us out of the "developer tools" business and "sell more to the enterprise market". The subtext being, "developers don't control budget in real companies".
And I think there's a grain of truth to that sentiment. You have to realize how much Twilio is a company built against the prevailing Silicon Valley wisdom of "how companies are built". These guys have a bit of a counterculture narrative, of "we're a developer tools company, we're growing, we're having a successful IPO, see, it can be done".
I, for one, think it's a great, harmless PR stunt. :)
Sell NYSE:TWLO!
I love Twilio and wish the best for them with their IPO but having lived through the 1999 dotcom crash, publicity stunts and stock price hubris rub me the wrong way.
First, by being developers. The first word in our title was "developer" and each of us had 10+ years of serious ship-it experience on projects large and small from all over various industries. Even if we didn't know that specific problem, we had shared experiences and mindsets.
Next, by treating everyone with respect. It didn't matter if you were in a "boring" job behind the scenes or the most amazing job with accolades and attention or the person making the purchasing decision, you are someone to be treated with dignity and respect.
Finally, by being hero makers. That was our internal code name at the time. Our job was not to promote ourselves and get our names out there. It was to help make that developer, that hacker, that entrepreneur be admired and a hero in their organization. That meant helping them design, build, and ship useful tools quickly that would work today, tomorrow, and a year from now.
My 0.02.
Apple wouldn't be Apple if it rolled like Woz.
In fact the whole purpose of having a stock exchange floor is 100% marketing. The real action happens in a colo in New Jersey; the trading floor only exists for the cameras and the NYSE would carry on perfectly fine without one.
This is because of how IPOs work:
In an IPO, the company (eg. Twilio) sells the issued shares to an underwriter (eg. JP Morgan) at an agreed amount (eg. $15) and then the underwriter turns around and sells those on the market for whatever people will pay for them (eg. $24).
If those first shares get bought for less than the offering price ($15) the company got a good deal on their shares and the underwriter loses money. If the shares get bought for more than the offering price, the company loses money and the underwriter profits.
This is one way underwriters make money, by being able to turn around and sell those shares to the public market for more than they bought them for.
Twilio issued $10m shares at $15 and the market opened up 60%, so they raised $150M and left $90M on the table.
10m shares * (24 - 15) $/share = $90M
Too many investors losing money on IPOs --> less demand for IPO shares --> less capital available to (generally) smaller companies.
On the other hand, if investors are constantly making money from IPOs, there will be much more demand in the future, and capital will be much easier for these companies to access.
Which makes me wonder... are there any safeguards in place to make sure that companies don't get ripped off? In would seem like it would be in the underwriters best interest to value the stocks at a very low price so they can make a lot of money from an IPO.
This is how an IPO works:
1. The underwriters talk to potential buyers to gauge how much interest there is and how much they're willing to pay.
2. The underwriters set the IPO price in consultation with the company. Then they buy X shares from the company at the IPO price minus a fixed-percentage underwriter's fee, and sell Y shares at the IPO price to investors. Since the percent fee is negotiated ahead of time, the underwriters have an incentive to price the IPO as high as possible so that their fee is higher.
3. In step 2, Y is typically greater than X, by up to 15%. The underwriters sell more stock than they bought, so they make money if the price falls after the IPO. The reason that the company allows (or encourages) this is so the underwriters can buy back the stock after it opens, at or slightly below the IPO price, and prevent the stock price from falling.
So: the underwriters make larger fees if the IPO prices higher, and they make larger trading profits if the price drops following the IPO.
Investors need to understand that internet application service providers aren't software companies, and that it isn't reasonable to expect software-company margins (selling CDs for hundreds of dollars) from services providers.
Companies like New Relic, Twilio, etc. have real costs to operate their infrastructure, especially so in Twilio's case where they likely have to make payments to the downstream network operators (not sure on that last point, I assume, but would love to be corrected if I'm wrong)
But not many that have such a ridiculously high PE ratio. One of the main reasons tech businesses (specifically SaaS) can command such a high valuation is because their gross margins are amazingly high (some up to 90%, on average around 70-80%), which means 90% of their revenue can be reinvested back into growth (S&M and R&D). I think it's certainly fine to discredit Twilio when looking through the lens of publicly traded SaaS businesses (they're on the low side of gross margins), but if you compare to other industries, you're right, it's a very healthy business.
Good read on this:
http://tomtunguz.com/not-all-revenue-dollars-are-created-equ...
In no particular order, a few thoughts:
- I'm not sure how defensible this is against AWS or another infrastructure provider cross-selling to existing customers. AWS/Azure already has lots of relationships with buyers and both have the engineering muscle to build a competitive product. Maybe the existing knowledge of the API and general head start will cause people not to switch?
- How large is the addressable market? Can Twilio grow it? Are they planning to do anything beyond their existing "bringing telephony to the Internet" product line?
- Dual-class share structure a concern for any? Interesting that it ceases to exist after a few years.
I'm thinking about buying a few hundred shares as a long-term hold (3+ years at least) but the first-day pop is making me rethink, maybe it'll cool after a few days, who knows?
It's hard to imagine anyone switching. Presumably if Amazon started trying to compete on price then Twilio could lower their prices enough to not make it worthwhile for anyone to switch. Especially given that they're going to be integrated pretty tightly, it shouldn't be too hard for them to not make it worth the cost to switch.
The real question would be if they were able to continue growing if GC, AWS and Azure introduced the functionality. Lots of companies are willing to pay a little more to keep everything in one ecosystem.
The only difference is that integrating with all the mobile carriers is a totally different problem than anything else AWS, GCE and Azure do. It's not just an infrastructure/technology challenge, there is also the relationship building and negotiating which isn't something you have to deal with when you're building out, say, media transcoding as a service.
Twilio's biggest worry is every incumbent IM provider trying to court businesses with replacing telephony.
Their future competitors are therefore Facebook Messenger, WhatsApp (hey, also Facebook!), and anyone else who wants to push their messaging/call platform to replace more and more of what people used to use business-to-consumer and consumer-to-business phone calls and texts.
Uh, AWS already has a competing web services product, it's functionality is just severely lacking when you compare to Twilio: https://aws.amazon.com/sns/
> Their future competitors are therefore Facebook Messenger, WhatsApp (hey, also Facebook!)
Funny enough, Twilio's largest customer is actually WhatsApp. If Facebook wants to increase some margin and can do it more cost effectively than using Twilio as a provider (I don't see why not) then this is a huge threat to Twilio commercially speaking.
With regard to Facebook, I'm talking about initiatives like these [1] [2] [3] which leverage Facebook's ubiquity and better discoverability tools than PTSN to de-emphasize it for B2C and C2B communication.
[1] https://www.facebook.com/business/news/find-and-contact-busi...
[2] https://www.facebook.com/business/news/new-tools-for-managin...
Matt Yglesias wrote that amazon is a "charitable institution being run by elements of the investment community for the benefit of consumers."
I feel that applies more to Whatsapp than amazon. When you install Whatsapp, you are still presented (with a package in the UI that links to a blog post from 2012(!) about how companies "know literally everything about you, your friends, your interests, and they use it all to sell ads."
https://blog.whatsapp.com/245/Why-we-dont-sell-ads?
If they pivot to sell services after their lofty position, I would expect significant user anger.
If this were in the grocery store, WhatsApp is the organic, GMO-free product and Facebook Messenger is the mainstream product, but they're both made by Facebook -- a product for every need.
2013: -$26.9m
2014: -$26.8m
2015: -$35.5m
1/1-3/31/2016: -$6.5m
[1] https://twitter.com/jammasternate/status/737314901572616193
Edit: removed note against HN policies.
The HN guidelines specifically ask you not to do this. Please reread them: https://news.ycombinator.com/newsguidelines.html.
One big issue is that customer acquisition cost tends to be upfront whereas the life time value lags behind. E.g. you have to hire sales people now, it takes X months for them to become productive, and another Y months for those new customers to fully onboard.
So to put those numbers in to context, you would have to look at revenue growth, margins, customer churn, cac, ltv, etc.
I am not saying they do but they help to discuss the IPO.
Even SalesForce and Amazon sort of go by this model. They make no profits. I'm not sure if I agree with this whole thing, esp. given the coliseum of a city they're building while being not-profitable, but I do understand some of the context of why the companies are valued so high.
[1] https://www.google.com/finance?q=NYSE%3ATWLO&ei=WRRsV5j0KtD9...
There EBITDA appears to be negative. 40% margin is "Gross margin" and is certainly not a valid EBITDA figure.
This is almost entirely false.
> 40% is a valid EBITDA margin for telcos
Uh what? I didn't state that 40% wasn't valid. I simply stated that gross margin != EBITDA.
Are we in the 2000 again?
Is it that Apple and Google introduce their own messaging infrastructure for developers?
[0] (paywall warning: "display:none;" the interstitial modal window) http://stackshare.io/stackups/twilio-vs-nexmo-vs-plivo
At one point when I was building a SAAS sms app, I emailed 579 SMS providers to find quotes on better pricing.
https://medium.com/@datarade/twilio-ipo-thoughts-997c36c9440...
One thing that I find incredibly surprising is that they often white-label and sell on top of other providers like infobip/nexmo. They don't have tier 1 connections and as well they don't scale very well internationally.