Slaughter House Rules - Passing the health-care bill
online.wsj.com
online.wsj.com
I recently found out that it was in the last 50 years that the Senate implemented dual-tracking, which lets the senate just move on when there is a filibuster threat, drastically reducing the consequences of doing so for the minority party. Some details are here:
http://voices.washingtonpost.com/ezra-klein/2010/03/how_dual...
I suspect the democrats would have fared better if they forced the republicans to filibuster 24/7 until public opinion turned against them for delaying work on other bills. It's important to remember that you only need 50 votes to pass the bill; 60 people only have to agree to let a vote happen. However, the democrats seem to have a much less effective political machine, so I can't imagine them making a move like this.
The House could just pass the Senate bill and then pass a separate bill (through the budget reconciliation process, which may not be filibustered) that incorporates the compromise, but House Democrats seem to be afraid that once the Senate Democrats get their bill passed, they won’t cooperate with the second bill. (“The Republicans are the opposition. The Senate is the enemy.”)
Also, the Republicans had no aversion to using self-executing rules back when they were in power. (http://mediamatters.org/research/201003150041)
Everyone else is focusing on the prospect of the House "deeming" the Senate bill as being passed without actually voting on it. If you look at the actual "Right Wing Media" words that are quoted by Media Matters, you'll see that none of them include "self-executing".
This is an attempt at misdirection that doesn't hold up to even minimal examination.
This means that when the House adopts a rule it also simultaneously agrees to dispose of a separate matter, which is specified in the rule itself. For instance, self-executing rules may stipulate that a discrete policy proposal IS DEEMED TO HAVE PASSED THE HOUSE and been incorporated in the bill to be taken up. The effect: neither in the House nor in the Committee of the Whole will lawmakers have an opportunity to amend or to vote separately on the "self-executed" provision. It was automatically agreed to when the House passed the rule.
That report is from 2006.
ADDED: if the Republicans had "deemed" the final language of a bill as being passed without actually holding a vote on it don't you think the Democrats would still be screaming about how they had "shredded the Constitution!" etc. etc.?
Newt and Hastert have also made extensive use of this provision as well. It's tough to dig up news items on it as it wasn't controversial back in the day. Hastert was particularly keen on using it and the zenith of Bush's unpopularity as it allowed him to shield the president's massively unpopular legislation from house votes.
Nothing is being “passed without actually being voted on”. There will be one vote, which will simultaneously have two effects: one described by the procedural rule, and one described in the text of the bill itself. Every Representative who votes on the bill will be perfectly aware of those two effects and can choose to vote yea or nay accordingly. And then the majority will rule, which is more than we get from the Senate.
Especially in the current context where everyone has had a chance to analyze the 2,700 pages of the Senate bill that was passed ~ 2.5 months ago.
I vote we leave this stuff to the Huffington Post, and get back to what HN does best: ^Top (3|5|7|10) (ways to|most annoying|tips for|coolest) (dropout|VC|programmer|hacker) (under 25|in just one year|teen) (founder|failure)
In the history of the Republic I can't remember anything even close to this.
As I noted in my reply, "self-executing" is a red herring.
But heck if I'll make a comment about the politics. While the overall story is historically important, bickering over the individual case here doesn't seem like a good use of time for anybody.
Changing the rules of the game will result in unknowable consequences, and as long as limited government is a distant memory our part of Main Street has to pay attention.
E.g. look at the Dodd bill that will decrease the number of angel investors by raising the net worth threshold and by either adding bureaucratic friction and delay or devolving regulation to the states. For all we know, angel financing in California could cease to exist in a few months or years.
(That's a different sort of "changing the rules of the game", but one of particular interest to all of us.)
I wonder just how much the House is allowed to set it's own rules of conduct? Could, for instance, the Congress decide that whatever bills the president proposes would have the full effect of law without a follow-up vote?
I think the answer is no, but I'm not completely sure. Congress has ceded a heckuva lot of authority already to the executive branch in terms of regulatory authority. If the answer is no, then where is the line and who the heck would adjudicate? The Supreme Court? The Court has been extremely hesitant to go anywhere near the legislature, and for good reason, but if a majority party were to cede all voting rights for the body, I'm thinking somebody somewhere would have to call them on it. I guess that means the Supremes do have something of a role in the legislature.
It's also interesting that something has to go wrong, or there has to be a big political firestorm, and then suddenly everybody is a constitutional scholar. Kind of civics class by crisis. What a country.
And one should be cogent of the maxim that "Hard cases make bad law." That from the judicial side of things, but apropos here.
On the other hand, I think we're fortunate to have a meta-process that the public is involved in, that seems to work better than a lot of the alternatives.
As for your question and uncertainty, I've seen quite a bit of good discussion at The Volokh Conspiracy in the comments to various postings (http://volokh.com/, it's a high quality group law blog by various law professors and the like). (In fact, if you haven't visited it before, check it out, all sorts of tasty stuff right now, e.g. the 11th Circuit has just made what is possibly a bad ruling on email and 4th Amendment search and seizure. I wish I had time to follow it...).
In the discussions you'll find some comments on at least one prior ruling by the Supremes in this area; they are very reluctant but not entirely so.
According to Article I, Section 7, in order for a "Bill" to "become a Law," it "shall have passed the House of Representatives and the Senate" and be "presented to the President of the United States" for signature or veto. Unless a bill actually has "passed" both Houses, it cannot be presented to the president and cannot become a law.
In striking down the line item veto, the Court (in the case of Clinton v. City of New York (1998)) rested its decision squarely on the requirements of Article 1, Section 7, stating as follows:
"[O]ur decision rests on the narrow ground that the procedures authorized by the Line Item Veto Act are not authorized by the Constitution. The Balanced Budget Act of 1997 is a 500-page document that became 'Public Law 105-33' after three procedural steps were taken: (1) a bill containing its exact text was approved by a majority of the Members of the House of Representatives; (2) the Senate approved precisely the same text; and (3) that text was signed into law by the President. The Constitution explicitly requires that each of those three steps be taken before a bill may 'become a law.' Art. I, sec. 7. If one paragraph of that text had been omitted at any one of those three stages, Public Law 105-33 would not have been validly enacted. If the Line Item Veto Act were valid, it would authorize the President to create a different law, one whose text was not voted on by either House of Congress or presented to the President for signature. Something that might be known as 'Public Law 105-33 as modified by the President' may or may not be desirable, but it is surely not a document that may 'become a law' pursuant to the procedures designed by the Framers of Article I, sec. 7, of the Constitution."
Michael McConnell, a Stanford constitutional law scholar, explained the problem with the Slaughter rule ("deemed enacted") as it would apply to this case:
"The Slaughter solution attempts to allow the House to pass the Senate bill, plus a bill amending it, with a single vote. The senators would then vote only on the amendatory bill. But this means that no single bill will have passed both houses in the same form."
Ergo, a clear violation of Article 1, section 7, as recently interpreted by the U.S. Supreme Court. This is not so much a political issue as a legal one - if this rather desperate approach is used to attempt to pass this bill, it will very likely be struck down as unconstitutional, notwithstanding the House's otherwise broad discretion in regulating its own affairs.