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Comment by pas | Hacker News Reader

It's not incoherent, just vacuous, because most critics see the difference as nothing. There's nothing they lack.

There's no difference between behaving identically and behaving identically and experiencing it. Because if you ask a p-zombie to describe what it experiences (what you feel, etc..) and they tell you that they experience nothing, then there's indeed a difference, so their behavior is not identical, if they lie, then we can spot that with an fMRI, or eventually they somehow have extra information (so they are magical zombies, so eveything is possible).

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Of course there's no observable difference, that's the definition of a pzombie, and the whole point of the concept. Just because we can't observe a lack of consciousness doesn't mean it's not meaningful difference.

Can you point to another such property, whereby it's not observable but is a meangingful difference? If not, why should qualia qualify?

I'm not sure how absence of other examples refutes one that exists? Experience is meaningful because it's the difference between saying "ow" and actually suffering.

The question is whether we have justification to believe that it actually exists as a legitimate example. Every other property that we granted such special ontological status has been soundly refuted. Why should I expect this to be any different?

> Why should I expect this to be any different?

Because you experience it? If you do..

The difference between the idea of qualia and the other properties that we granted special status to and then later refuted, is that in the latter cases we were trying to explain something external that we thought we were observing, whereas with subjective experience we are discussing a phenomenon that we (or at least some of us) directly, infallibly observe. It is not possible for me to be mistaken about whether there is something it is like to be me; it is not possible for me to be mistaken about whether what I experience is what I experience. It is possible for me to be mistaken about whether there is something it is like to be you, because I cannot directly observe your internal experience.

> in the latter cases we were trying to explain something external that we thought we were observing, whereas with subjective experience we are discussing a phenomenon that we (or at least some of us) directly, infallibly observe.

There's no distinction. When I see what looks like a broken pencil sitting in a glass of water, I am observing exactly what I describe. The reason the pencil looks broken is not because I should grant water some magical powers to break and reconstitute pencils, but turned out to be refracted light.

Analogously, I can observe that I do have subjective experience, but why should I assume that the reason I have subjective experience is different than all other observables? Why would it be some irreducible, unobservable quality?

You seem to be claiming that the existence of subjective experience is reason enough alone, and I don't see how that follows.

>why should I assume that the reason I have subjective experience is different than all other observables?

We're not talking about the reason, we're talking about the experience itself. Maybe that experience occurs as the result of physical processes, but it's still a separate thing.

Arguing that qualia don't exist because you can't observe them externally is like a blind person arguing that I can't possibly see a broken pencil because they can feel the pencil is solid.

> Arguing that qualia don't exist because you can't observe them externally is like a blind person arguing that I can't possibly see a broken pencil because they can feel the pencil is solid.

This is what makes me wonder whether some of us are, in fact, p-zombies: only a blind person, someone who doesn't have visual experiences, could argue that visual experience doesn't exist, and similarly it seems that only someone who doesn't have subjective experience could argue that it doesn't exist. And there do appear to be people arguing that subjective experience doesn't exist. Either I'm misunderstanding them, I'm failing to see the third way, or some of us are indeed p-zombies.

> Maybe that experience occurs as the result of physical processes, but it's still a separate thing.

To say something doesn't really exist is to say that it doesn't have metaphysical status on par with matter. If you say that consciousness really, fundamentally exists, then you're saying that it has the same status in reality as the fundamental particles of physics. We should expect to find some consciousness field and particles upon which it acts; or you would have to posit something like panpsychism which suggests that consciousness is an intrinsic property of all matter.

Consciousness not really existing implies that it's an illusion, in the same way that cars, and jobs and countries are an illusion. Certainly they "exist" in some colloquial sense, but they don't exist in a fundamental metaphysical sense.

> The question is whether we have justification to believe that it actually exists

I understood this to mean that you were doubting whether subjective experience actually exists, and I responded by arguing that it is not possible to doubt that your own subjective experience exists since you (I, at least) experience it directly, which is different than the class of now-refuted inferences that you were comparing it to in. I was not making any argument about where it comes from or what causes it.

To say that consciousness does not "actually exist" is the same kind of statement as saying that a car does not really exist. Certainly I drive something I call a car to work every morning. I have direct experience of this too. And yet, cars don't really exist at fundamental levels of reality, they are merely aggregates of more fundamental types of matter.

And so it is with consciousness. We certainly have consciousness, but to then immediately assign consciousness special ontological status distinct from matter, ie. dualism at worst or panpsychism at best, is a huge leap that requires justification.

Ok, I more or less agree with you here. A car is not a fundamental object, it's composed of many layers of constituent objects which eventually resolve down to fundamental particles and forces. And if physicalism is true, then consciousness also is not fundamental, but ultimately resolves down to fundamental particles and forces also.

I don't know whether physicalism is true. It certainly seems like the best overall account of the universe that we currently have, but if there is a chink in physicalism's armor, consciousness might be it. Might. But, you're right, there's a huge leap between "might" and "is".

Imagine you witness a situation where a young man releases a heavy weight. The weight falls and crushes a child playing below. Your child.

The young man happens to be mute. If he could speak, he would tell you he did it on purpose, and was glad he killed your child. But he's mute. You will never know he meant to do it.

Does his (unobservable) intent make any difference to you?

Bad example: "unobservable" and "we were looking the other way" are not the same thing. Have you scanned the young man's brain activity as you interrogate him? Have you done that with all future technology? By the way, any chances the young man can write?

Here's a tricky one: did I ate spaghetti three years ago? You don't know and very probably you'll never know, but it's an empirical question nonetheless, and who knows, maybe tomorrow you'll think of a way to actually find out, or you'll stumble on some evidence you didn't know was there.

> Does his (unobservable) intent make any difference to you?

Only in so far as one's intent describes one's view of others. Malicious intent of the sort you describe entails danger towards others, which is observable.

Then the debate seems pretty nonsensical. Even though it's touted as somehow having appeal. ( http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/zombies/#7 )

The concept is used as an argument against physicalism, because it might be logically possible (concievable).

Maybe I'm just testifying about how closed my mind is, but to me the answer is a simple no, they are not [not even coherent], end of debate, go think about ethics, at least that seems hard.

Dualists are so full of abstract possibilities since Descartes that they are somehow overlooking the difference between imagination-fueled word-soup of consciousness and real problems of consciousness.

Qualia is the noise in our cognition when our brain tries to make sense of the noise in our feelings when we try to consider what's this feeling consicous thing.

It's real, and it's nothing, and it's pretty personal, because some people don't really care about it, others build entire philo departments on it :)

>The concept is used as an argument against physicalism,

I don't see it as an argument against anything, it's just an interesting philosophical hypothetical made plausible by our inability to observe conciousness.

I could certainly see an argument that they're not that interesting on a more practical level (since by definition, we can never apply any conclusions made about them) but I don't understand the suggestion that they're logically incoherent.

How is this discussion any different if we replace consciousness (meaning "actual" consciousness) with, say, Grace, virtue, soul, etc?

Because we can directly observe our own conciousness, therefore we each know that there is at least one instance of it.

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