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nickpsecurity

Yeah, the stuff was probably extremely hard:

http://www.amazon.com/Cable-Matters-113051-Monitor-Splitter/...

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=X4dCIZAXceQ

Really, difficult. ;)

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The concern is a plausible cover for action. Your suggested solution would be a little difficult to explain away - especially considering the kind of coworkers you'd have at the NSA. Instead of explaining why you're archiving all your mail, you'd have to explain the cabling, capture card, massive video files...

He connected on monitored systems to all kinds of servers under several credentials to steal their files. You think a hidden camera on his chest aimed at his monitor or phone just angled in its direction is too much risk, though?

Yes. There are a lot of rational explanations for why you'd break security protocols, there is no good reason to come into work wearing a wire. Would you rather have to explain a login to IT security, or explain the pinhole camera taped to your chest - after a newly instituted random wanding takes place?

There is not a single, rationale reason why one guy would be mass downloading files under several people's names on his personal machine. Whereas, wearing a wire long enough to look at a few emails entails almost no risk in comparison. There will be nobody noticing it unless you're very careless. You will also leave no records.

There's about no comparison between screenshoting some emails and conning employees out of passwords then mass downloading TS files. My suggestion is WAY lower risk. Worked for CIA and KGB whole Cold War, goo. ;)

I know that you have a good grasp on security, not only is it in your name - but we've discussed the issue before... so the position you're taking on this is surprising. You've never seen an employee blatantly violate security policies in order to meet a deadline, or just because they're way out of their depth? He was writing a unit test that ran in a production environment, there - stupid reason that gets you fired but doesn't result in the FBI landing on you like a ton of bricks. This is kind of a silly discussion though, Snowden was in a very good position to be aware of the risks for his selected course of action.

Cover for action is a tradecraft phrase - the CIA and KGB recognize the importance of running an op on more that wishful thinking and luck. The only reason why miniature cameras are associated with them is because of embarrassing public failures, not because that is their MO.

I just said in another comment he could've done it in many ways that don't involve a camera. It's one among many. Overall point is he was moving massive, unauthorized data from his computer to HD's or something. He could've moved some emails, too. If not due to security, he could sneak photos of a handful of emails. Cover or not given he was about to crash and burn his whole life. He could save them for last.

Do you know how the NSA internal systems operate? Unless you have insider info, I don't see how you can be so sure what risks are involved. It depends entirely on the setup.

E.g. my very, very cursory contact with military computer systems involve visiting offices where access to the classified data and e-mail were physically separated onto different computers and different networks, maintained by different people working in different locations.

It's very possible to have the run of one network and not be able to be sure of how closely he was monitored on the other.

As for taking photos, on one of the contracting gigs I did that involve entirely unclassified jobs at a research institute nothing like the NSA, I was assigned a full time babysitter during the contract. The guy even waited outside the toilets when I had to go, because they were not allowed to let me go anywhere at all alone. These places take security seriously. It is not at all a given that Snowden had reasonable expectation of being in a position where he could take pictures without someone seeing it.

That he was able to do other things is not a good reason for him to take additional risk. On the contrary - it may have been good reason for him to be particularly careful about appearing squeaky clean in other ways to improve his odds if he had to explain away something else.

"Do you know how the NSA internal systems operate? Unless you have insider info, I don't see how you can be so sure what risks are involved. It depends entirely on the setup."

They're normal, boring-ass machines at Booz Allen Hamilton. Snowden knows the setup because he configures and administers them. I can't find article right now but we also know Booz Allen Hamilton had less security than what is typical for commercial sector. I think Snowden was even accessing stuff from home WiFi. It was that ridiculous.

"I was assigned a full time babysitter during the contract. The guy even waited outside the toilets when I had to go, because they were not allowed to let me go anywhere at all alone. "

Snowden's situation was nothing like that. He was instead more likely to be the baby sitter as he was in one of most trusted positions. Nobody was looking over his shoulder except if a supervisor or manager showed up on occasion.

"That he was able to do other things is not a good reason for him to take additional risk."

You could say the same thing about the leaks themselves. He took the risk because it was important. That he tried to handle things internally is also important. He repeats it constantly. A tiny risk doing something I've done and covered for 50+ times in shady organizations is worthwhile for him. We wouldn't even be having this discussion if he had.

Yeah, I'm sure he would've raised no suspicions whatsoever by taking snapshots of his NSA workstation screen with a camera. /s

He wouldn't have if he did it right. Security was very lax if you've followed anything about the situation. Whereas, I've done exactly this in a higher security setting. I'm not speculating.

He can bug his computer. He can hide executables tgat copy it to disks. He can screenshot it to disks. He can photo/video the screen. Examples abound. And remember he's a trained, ex-CIA spy. Not some idiot that cant pull off fieldcraft 101.

He just failed to collect evidence one way or another for a key claim.

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