Tor Browser and Tails Version Fingerprint
github.com
github.com
Not that it wasn't supposed to, just letting anyone know because its a waste of time for someone else to boot up their VMs just to see it, like I did.
I have also installed uBlock Origin; maybe it is what makes the difference?
Client runs guacamole client, one of the intermediate TOR nodes runs guacamole host. Fingerprinting takes place on intermediate node which is randomly chosen every time client starts up service. End result: Client remains anonymous to these sort of fingerprinting efforts
The downside is TOR, which is not terribly performant because of extra intermediate hops, will be degraded further by guacamole service.
chrome://torbutton/locale/aboutTor.properties
[0]: https://github.com/jonaslejon/tor-fingerprint/blob/master/to...
Detecting Tor should be easier though, since exit nodes are published. So just check the IP?
I imagine all the variables have to be exposed because sites will break otherwise.
"chrome" in this context refers to the control elements of the browser
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Graphical_user_interface#User_...
I'm sure they have their reasons for letting pages make Xhr calls to add-ons like that but seems complicated.
[1] https://tails.boum.org/support/known_issues/index.en.html#fi...
Tor provides anonymity by giving all its users the same fingerprint. The fact that you're using Tor isn't a secret.
About the Tor version number in window.navigator, I guess they can't easily block it since the browser itself leaks some information via the features added in each release (e.g. a new JS API introduced in Firefox XX).