If they're going to use random numbers to enhance security, they should make sure that at worst, if the numbers are predictable and controlled by an attacker, it's no worse than the current security.
Does anyone know if their protocol does that?
Does anyone know if their protocol does that?
In the context of using the distributed randomness protocol to randomize the DHT layout, if the protocol were somehow broken then the worst case outcome would be that the DHT layout would again be predictable, which is no worse than the status quo today.
Disclaimer: IIRC there are some proposals to use the distributed randomness protocol for other things besides randomizing the DHT; I cannot speak to how those proposals might be affected if the distributed randomness protocol is flawed.
[0]: https://conference.hitb.org/hitbsecconf2015ams/wp-content/up...
Tor was designed for strong anonymity guarantees in nations that aren't 5 Eyes Alliance ie: China, Russia, ect.
Yes there is. There are currently 857 exit nodes. The Tor Project only has to personally know who runs 86 of them to ensure that 90% of the exits are not run by the NSA.
In fact, since ~90% of traffic exits through the top ~260 relays, they'd only need to know 27 of the people who run those.
This guarantee doesn't scale very well considering the combined 5 Eyes intel budget is ~60 billion USD and throwing just 0.1% of their budget at negating Tor would completely overwhelm the network with hundreds of thousands of stooge relays, plus they have the added benefit of global backbone cable traps. Tor can't give any kind of guarantee against a global passive adversary (5 Eyes) which is why they specifically warn against believing otherwise.