Yes, we've neither run out of food nor energy.
Yet.But that requires some modulation.
1. The cornucopian arguments that we'd have no problems with food nor energy, or that these would grow without limits, haven't panned. out.
2. Yes, the specific predictions that we would be facing major global starvation by now (or at equivalent populations -- ~8 billion), haven't panned out. But those have been mitigated by a few circumstances.
a). The Green Revolution. Largely unanticipated, but through mechanisation, new plant breeds, fertilisers, and pesticides, per-acre and per-farmer productivity has been increased. This represents, though, another potentially one-time-only transfer, as we've basically amped up the nutrient cycle for plants (using copious amounts of natural gas to produce nitrogen fertiliser), taken over for plant functions in pest and disease resistance (through pesticides), and replaced human and animal power through fossil-fuel powered tractors and other equipment (so long the fuel holds out). Withdraw fertiliser and pesticides, and many of those benefits disappear (or must be replaced with far more labour input). Moreover, topsoil depletion itself is now a major concern.
b). Population growth, accellerating at unprecedented rates in the 1950s and 1960s, levelled off somewhat. This has been fortunate. However rather than growing at a constant percentage (exponential growth), it's been growing at a constant rate (linear growth). Trends such as the demographic transition may be helpful, but they're not assured.
c). The 1970s oil shocks. Prior to the OPEC oil embargo (1973) and Iranian oil embargo (1979), growth in global oil consumption was increasing at an increasing rate. The so-called oil shocks had global economic impacts, and sharply slowed growth in energy consumption. This delayed global peak oil (occurring in 2005 rather than 2000), but also put to lie cornucopian estimates of future energy consumption.
One argument might be that "the market responded" to higher oil prices. I read the response somewhat differently: the system responded to higher energy costs and greater energy volatility. The long period of exceptionally steady growth from 1945 - 1972 was, well, exceptional. Trends since 1973 have been highly erratic, though "better" (in terms of growth) at times, worse at others.
What's increasingly clear to me is that explanations of conventional economics are substantively incorrect. That energy and inputs do matter, hugely. And that "technology" almost certainly lags rather than leads energy availability, though the relationship is complex.