Pilot-Wave Theory Gains Experimental Support
quantamagazine.org
quantamagazine.org
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pilot_wave
So how can, even in theory, any experiment support one interpretation any more or less than all the others?
This is not quite correct.
It is mathematically equivalent to Copenhagen only at times of 'quantum equilibrium', which is when ρ = φ² (probability density is the square of the wavefunction). Copenhagenists call this the Born rule and treat it as axiomatic. Bohmians don't since they don't need to, since in Bohmian mechanics a system which is not in quantum equilibrium will evolve to be in quantum equilibrium in a very very short time.
Which gives a way to empirically distinguish pilot-wave theory if the universe began in quantum non-equilibrium. (We have no reason to think it did, but we have no reason to think it didn't, so, shrug). If it did, the early universe would have evolved differently in the first femtosecond after the big bang, which should theoretically be detectable to us by analysis of CMB anisotropies.
This has been worked on: a friend of mine did a masters project which among other things involved porting some simulation code on very-early-universe numeric simulations under quantum non-equilibrium (IIRC from fortran 77 to fortran 95, because physicists), under Mike Towler.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bell%27s_theorem
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/EPR_paradox
[Video: The pilot-wave dynamics of walking droplets]
This is about the reality of trajectories built-into the pilot wave theory (such a concept which doesn't even exist in "text-book" interpretation of quantum mechanics, which says particles don't have positions or trajectories until you measure them, upon which they "decide" their position through an "artificial" process called wavefunction collapse; notably, as of now, wavefunction collapse and the reality of wavefunction is still a subject of debate).
There was a paper "Surrealistic Bohm Trajectories" which argued that trajectories predicted by pilot wave theory don't make any sense as real trajectories in general, hence these "trajectories" cannot correspond to real trajectories. A careful analysis which properly takes the nonlocality into account shows the flaw in their argument (arXiv:quant-ph/0010020, omitted in the text linked), and this is the corresponding experiment which confirms their analysis (using weak measurements on a pair of entangled photons to sketch "average" trajectories in a WWM setup).
If you like, this is about the interpretation of a concept within an interpretation.
While I agree that the title is a little bit flashy, experimental confirmation for the reality of Bohmian trajectories is an important topic.
Here is what the experiments actually showed. Quantum mechanics continues to predict things correctly in an experiment that has a fun interpretation within pilot-wave theory.
We also received the standard lecture on why pilot-wave theory makes more sense than the standard Copenhagen interpretation. And a passing acknowledgement of the many-worlds interpretation.
There is no explanation of the fact that many-worlds also explains the result, also is mathematically simple, and lacks the explicit non-locality that is troubling in pilot-wave theory. There is also no note of the fact that all interpretations of quantum mechanics can explain all possible experiments that fit the predictions of quantum mechanics. Therefore no experiment can support one interpretation over another UNLESS the result is in contradiction to quantum mechanics. (In this case the result was emphatically not in contradiction to prediction.)
1. Conservation of energy. 2. Relativistic observers seeing multiple decoherence events in different orders. 3. Experiments that affect whether a particule pair did decohere inthe past. (i.e. quantum state recombination.)
Basically, MW assumes that the probability wave exists and that all outcomes exist, which is a very big assumption, which that FAQ gloss over rapidly. (And then explictly call other interpretations' assumptions as a negative...)
This is not a problem for MWI.
> 2. Relativistic observers seeing multiple decoherence events in different orders
There is no decoherence in MWI.
Yes there is. Decoherence provides the theoretical framework to explain why the superposition of parallel observers can never meaningfully interact with themselves again, even though a superposition of simple particles can.
See https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Quantum_decoherence#In_interpr... for more.
That said, the order in which an observer notices decoherence events has no particular physical importance.
Everyone claims their version is the most simple and logical, but then others disagree.
Many-words is pleasant because it requires (arguably) less "mental gymnastics", but again, it is just an interpretation of what the equation means. It is still the same equation, the same mathematical object.
The claim is that Quantum Mechanics (or QFT more generally) is not a complete theory (and we do know that to be a fact, it does not work when space-time curvature is important). The only reason I personally find Many-words interesting is because it might be easier to generalize to a complete theory. But again, if we are constraining ourselves to flat space-time, all those interpretations are completely equivalent.
The problem is to work out which questions to ask next. The different interpretations should eventually diverge into edge cases - of curvature, of observable other universe, or of some other difference - where they no longer predict identical results.
An incomplete theory suggests at least some further distinctions are possible. They may or may not be possible with current interpretations. They may need a completely fresh interpretation. But the distinctions matter, and it's important to consider the different directions they point in.
Special relativity says that when things begin moving fast, they weigh more. Gold's properties are due in part to the fact that the electrons move so fast that relativistic effects alter the shape and energy of the orbitals that they stay in. That's special relativity.
In order to get significant curvature you would need the amount of gravity to be created to be significant. But electromagnetism is about 10^39 times as powerful as gravity. We only notice gravity on a macro scale because positive and negative charges almost perfectly balance. However on an atomic scale, the theoretical effects of Newtonian gravity are many orders of magnitude smaller than any possible measurement error. Let alone the size of general relativistic corrections to that theory!
But to explain the electron transitions that make gold yellow, you need to use the Schrödinger equation in a relativistic space-time. (But just special relativity suffices here, no need to go to general relativity.)
You're right that postulates such as the projection postulate complicate the theory. But it's not clear how to explain experimental results, like the stochastic nature of measurements or the Born rule, without it. I can make a theory as simple as you like if you don't require it to explain experimental results.
Again, I might be wrong, but I think the problem most people have with QM is that they think something must either exist or not exist. From that perspective it's easier to imagine that something exists in all possible states and that we are just observing one of them. However, even logically things can be in an indeterminate state.
For example, if I draw a box and then I draw another one that is twice as tall, the first box is short and the second box is tall. If I draw a third box that is 3 times as tall as the second one, then the first 2 boxes are short and the third one is tall. However, if I never drew the second or third box, then the first box is neither tall nor short. The concept doesn't actually make sense without the other boxes.
Similarly, imagine a universe with a single particle. What is its position? What is its momentum? Obviously these concepts have no meaning. As soon as I add another particle to the universe, then suddenly position and momentum have meaning. Now imagine that space is not a discrete map of particles with positions, but rather a set of particles which each have a probability of interacting with each other. This probability indicates their position.
In such a universe, if a particle does not interact with another particle, then it does not have a position. There is no meaning for position with respect to that particle. As soon as it interacts with another particle, then suddenly position has meaning. It is "created" in the same way that we "created" tall and short by drawing different sized boxes.
That is my, very possibly naive, way of thinking about it. Yes... I've read too much Taoist literature... ;-)
I would argue they did exist, and that the time travel event actually murdered them. I think of the universe as a computer, and any computation it does actually happens, actually exists in some sense. If the universe does a computation of my entire life, then deletes it, that life still happened. It "exists".
I think the same is true of the famous cat experiment. The computation of both possible states of the cat has to be done by the universe. It needs to compute how the cat reacts to the poison gas, it needs to compute the pain it experiences, etc. That's a lot different than a single particle like your example.
When you open the box, the universe may "collapse" to the second possibility, where the cat is still alive. But the first possibility still happened, and it may still be out there somewhere in an unobservable branch. In fact that model seems a lot more mathematically elegant, being completely deterministic and not having to deal with the weirdness of "collapse" events.
It may take exponential time to simulate the distribution of measured results given only the measurable inputs (which is what we do when we model experiments), but the universe itself knows the hidden variables and so can calculate the next state quite efficiently. So ontologically, a non-local hidden variables theory is much simpler than many worlds.
Copenhagen is unworkable ontollogically; it assumes some distinction between normal interactions and "measurements" which are poorly defined.
Do the others really assume that? Don't they still account for quantum erasure?
Additionally, the article's aim was to demonstrate that the ESSW does not contradict pilot-wave theory, not to show that pilot-wave theory explains the results better than alternative theories, and it demonstrated this by showing that there is no contradiction if you take in account nonlocality.
The title is not misleading because the experiment described in the article does provide experimental support to the theory, support which ESSW aimed to take away. Importantly, it is not an experiment designed to show pilot-wave theory describes the results better than other theories.
ESSW demonstrated that pilot-wave theory requires a weird form of non-locality. These experiments confirm that experiment requires the exact form of non-locality that ESSW required. Whether non-locality bothers you depends on your philosophical position, and is not affected by this experiment.
Until we know everything, is anything in theoretical physics really a zero-sum game?
I think the problem is in the thinking quantum physicists must possess in order to believe in such a theory in the first place. I mean, the idea of, "if we don't know where it came from, it couldn't possibly be hidden information; it must therefor be 'random'" is absurdly egotistic in the first place.
What I said is that if the outcome of an experiment is predicted by two different theories, getting the expected result does nothing to help you decide between them. It happens to be the case that ANY experiment that is in accord with quantum mechanics is equally well explained by EVERY interpretation of quantum mechanics. The result is that most working physicists so not consider wondering about the right interpretation to be a useful scientific endeavor. Indeed most will gladly affirm that they belong to the "shut up and calculate" school of physics in practice.
There are plenty of detailed questions within quantum mechanics which can be asked and answered by experiment. That is what scientists tend to do instead of debating interpretations.
Non-contradiction of existing theories can be seen as a prerequisite for support. As a restricted affirmation of non-wrongness perhaps.
I think this is a really good way to put it, and an important criteria given the timescale over which these theories develop.
It's a question to the philosophers, not the scientists. There is no objective measurement for what "troubling" is.
And if we don't start with any preconceived notions of how things _should_ work, then discovering that they work differently is not particularly troubling.
As discussed upthread, this is all philosophy. The popular interpretations of quantum mechanics are all experimentally equivalent, so we need to use elegance, intuitiveness, troubling-ness, etc to choose between them (and these can be highly personal).
EDIT: After re-reading your comment I think I'm agreeing with you here.
(That's pretty close to the spirit of the Copenhagen interpretation, though.)
The nature of the multiple universes is deply misunderstood. If you just think of the universe as a very large N-bit quantum computer, then the "multiple universes" are simply the superpositioned state of the computer itself. Nothing magical or non-physical about it.
And since we are almost certainly living in a simulation [1]... ;-)
There are simply just too many possible states to meaningfully describe something like a distribution over them, which is what a superposition would be. Mathematics simply gives up when you try to integrate over an infinite number of dimensions.
The article suggests pilot-wave theory "apparently" contradicts special relativity. We know the other interpretations "only" have a problem uniting with general relativity.
Perhaps the core issue is Steinberg's quote in the last paragraph: “The universe seems to like talking to itself faster than the speed of light. I could understand a universe where nothing can go faster than light, but a universe where the internal workings operate faster than light, and yet we’re forbidden from ever making use of that at the macroscopic level — it’s very hard to understand.”
These days theorists are trying to create theories out of which both QM and GR could arise in the limit. An unbelievable amount of energy has gone into things like string theory and loop quantum gravity. True believers believe that a theory will be found..but they haven't succeeded yet.
Back to pilot-wave theory. In special relativity, no inertial reference frame is privileged over the others. In pilot-wave theory one must be..but no experiment can reveal which one is. This is aesthetically ugly, but not actually a contradiction.
Interestingly has this in common with tangherlini relativity... which, iirc, also has nonlocal effects (haven't done the math; am not sure)
No one has combined bohm + tangherlini
Would this be the reference frame of the center of gravity of the universe? If so, and if some parts of the universe are unreachable due to inflation, would that be the center of gravity of everything within the light cone of a system? Sorry if I'm being imprecise, I only dabble in this stuff.
This is a little confused, I'm afraid. The centre of gravity of any system doesn't define a reference frame, it defines a location. For the universe, it doesn't even do that, since 'the observable universe' is a function of the observer: anyone anywhere can look around and observe some universe for 50 odd light years in each direction. Assuming homogeneity, the 'centre of gravity of the observable universe' is just a clumsy way of saying 'my current position'.
The universe does sortof define a reference frame, and it's the frame in which the CMB (cosmic microwave background) is isotropic. In other words: if the CMB looks warmer to your left than your right, that means you're travelling left relative to the CMB frame.
But it would be very surprising if the laws of physics depended on that. (Indeed, special relativity assumes the laws of physics are the same in every frame, and so far we have no evidence to contradict that).
Them: "PilotWave implies E. E was observed. Therefore PilotWave!"
Everyone: "AAAAAaaaaaaaaaaargh! That is not how science or logic works! You're missing the 'not-PilotWave implies not-E' part!"
When I said "You're missing the 'not-PilotWave implies not-E' part!", I was making a simplified reference to the fact that the probabilities predicted by not-PilotWave (e.g. Copenhagen) need to be different from the probabilities predicted by PilotWave in order for evidence/inference to pry them apart.
See [1] if that all sounded confusing.
Both of them predict correctly because they both actually use quantization of particle position. The issue with both of them is that both interpret that solution to equations as a real object - QM takes it for particle itself while pilot-wave theory assigns some real world existence to that "Pilot Wave". It would be like in case of shooting a bullet from a rifle QM would say that the trajectory is the bullet, where is pilot-wave would say that there is real trajectory object guiding the bullet.
The "multiple universes" theory is an explanation that if quantum mechanics describes both the quantum mechanical system under study and the observer, then after the interaction of "observation", the system looks like a superposition of independent systems that each look like the observer observed something different. The amplitude of each system corresponds directly to the likelihood that we will think we observed one thing versus another, and quantum mechanics + thermodynamics shows that these copies will never be able to have any meaningful interaction.
In short, in this interpretation reality, is quantum mechanics. There is never a "collapse" as there is in the Copenhagen interpretation. "Multiple universes" is merely a description of what quantum mechanics predicts the outcome will act like.
If you fire a particle at two slits with a screen on the other side you get an interference pattern on the screen implying the particle in a sense went through both slits and the results interfered. This happens even if you use quite complex particles such as C60 buckyballs. So the universe in some sense runs multiple versions some with the molecules going one way and some going the other. All the "multiple universe" explanation implies really is that this is a general phenomena and the universe runs all possible versions even when we can't observe the results.
http://arxiv.org/abs/quant-ph/0103079
Interpreting quantum mechanics is often like this: you can preserve locality or convenience, but usually not both. This is why I prefer the minimalist relational interpretation:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Relational_quantum_mechanics
However, I don't recommend this as a preferred interpretation because it does not motivate discoveries (the other interpretations all fail here too). So far, none of the interpretations has led to a new physical theory, and in particular none has really helped the study of quantum gravity, which if anything is the whole point of metaphysics: to aid in learning.
Indeed, John Bell of Bell's theorem said that non-locality was THE big problem of quantum mechanics. He was a fan of Bohmian mechanics/pilot waves because it places what he considered the central problem front-and-center.
They do mention many worlds albeit not in too many words ;-) it just says it is rather a convoluted explanation just like the other ones. Infinitely many universes being generated during every particle interaction is just as silly as a funny path or Copenhagen.
> There is also no note of the fact that all interpretations of quantum mechanics can explain all possible experiments that fit the predictions of quantum mechanics.
So what did you mean by "many worlds" being "mathematically simple" isn't it the same mathematics, just different interpretation of it?
Not sure what you man
Many worlds says that quantum mechanics is all that there is, and all observed consequences can be predicted from the assumption that we, ourselves, are complex quantum mechanical systems. The prediction is that we coexist with superpositions of ourselves doing different things and cannot meaningfully interact with them. This seems weird to us, but is exactly what the theory predicts.
Consider Schroedinger's cat. We ask whether the cat is both alive and dead before we open the box. This puzzles us because that is what quantum mechanics predicts and that seems weird. Multiple worlds says that quantum mechanics holds, it remains both alive and dead AFTER we open the box, and while it seems weird, there is no actual contradiction anywhere.
So mathematically simple. Weird consequences. In perfect accord with our best theories and best experiments.
By contrast the Copenhagen interpretation says that there is a collapse somewhere even though there is no experimental evidence for it, and we have no theory about how it might happen. And the pilot-wave interpretation says that our best theories notwithstanding, the universe is something different and weird in a different way.
Copenhagen: Why did the wave collapse into state A and not B,C,...
MSI: Why am "I" in multiverse branch A, and not B,C,...? (and who am "I" anyway?)
Pilot wave: Why is the pseudo-random seed = A', which I can only see indirectly by observing experiment result state A?
At the root, we're always asking why some random variable ended up in a certain state. Our "interpretation" just changes where we ram that annoying random variable into our theory, which largely depends on where we're most philosophically comfortable with uncertainty showing up.
That sounds strange coming from a defender of orthodoxy. By my (layman's) understanding the rallying cry of the Copenhagen school could be paraphrased as "Just do the maths. Everything else is just metaphysics" or to put it another way - questions about what the equations 'mean' are unscientific and Occam's Razor supports Copenhagen because it is the simplest interpretation that doesn't contradict observation.
http://bayes.wustl.edu/etj/articles/cmystery.pdf
>While it is easy to understand and agree with this on the epistemological level, the answer that I and many others would give is that we expect a physical theory to do more than merely predict experimental results in the manner of an empirical equation; we want to come down to Einstein's ontological level and understand what is happening when an atom emits light, when a spin enters a Stern-Gerlach magnet, etc. The Copenhagen theory, having no answer to any question of the form: What is really happening when - - - ?", forbids us to ask such questions and tries to persuade us that it is philosophically naive to want to know what is happening. But I do want to know, and I do not think this is naive; and so for me QM is not a physical theory at all, only an empty mathematical shell in which a future theory may, perhaps, be built.
We shouldn't simply naively accept what our experiment seem to be telling us, we should always seek alternative avenues to explain the evidence. It can yield compelling insights.
But if all your experiments say that it is non-deterministic, again and again and again, Occam's razor approach is to say "yes, it is non-deterministic". Creating an elaborate framework which basically lets you say "it's ACTUALLY deterministic, except for all these other things that make it LOOK non-deterministic for all practical purposes" is not really science, it's just placating a preconceived (and possibly hardwired) notion.
"Biologists have a mechanistic picture of the world because, being trained to believe in causes, they continue to search for them and find them. Quantum physicists have only probability laws because for two generations we have been indoctrinated not to believe in causes - and so we have stopped looking for them. Indeed, any attempt to search for the causes of microphenomena is met with scorn and a charge of professional incompetence and "obsolete mechanistic materialism." Therefore, to explain the indeterminacy in current quantum theory we need not suppose there is any indeterminacy in Nature; the mental attitude of quantum physicists is already sufficient to guarantee it."
It is difficult to formally define, but it is not necessary to have such a definition to meaningfully talk about it. This is quite general - many concepts do not have formal definition and certainly not all can have one - formal definition only works well when its expanded form has root in concepts that require no formal definition. "really happening", like "matter" are intuitive concepts that refer to experience, do not have formal definition and so cannot be further reduced.
There is always a yearning for "what is really happening when", and a desire for results that feel real but that is metaphysics and psychology, not physics. It isn't so different from wanting to "feel God's presence", which has been discovered to be a neurologically mechanism.
See: http://www.smbc-comics.com/index.php?db=comics&id=1914#comic
I mean, it does it's job, it gives correct observable results. And everyone knows when and where to apply the "and then it just collapses" rule to get the results. But the rule is defined in English, not mathematically.
Maybe I am just misunderstanding what people mean when they say "Copenhagen Interpretation", but it seem unproductive to argue about it if we do not first include system-environment interactions (e.g. with a Master equation).
Alternatives to the Copenhagen Interpretation include the many-worlds interpretation, the De Broglie-Bohm (pilot-wave) interpretation, and quantum decoherence theories.
Yes, but neither of those solved the problem of how to describe macroscopic measurements that result in definite outcome (eigenvalue of some operator). The collapse is still needed to continue the description after the measurement, only instead of psi function that should collapse, it is the density matrix that should collapse.
The actually difficult task, the one protected by mathematical theorems that should apply to oil droplets bouncing on water, is passing Bell tests.
http://arxiv.org/abs/1406.0901
No-Go Theorems Face Background-based Theories for Quantum Mechanics
"Recent experiments have shown that certain fluid-mechanical systems, namely oil droplets bouncing on oil films, can mimic a wide range of quantum phenomena, including double-slit interference, quantization of angular momentum and Zeeman splitting. Here I investigate what can be learned from these systems concerning no-go theorems as those of Bell and Kochen-Specker. In particular, a model for the Bell experiment is proposed that includes variables describing a 'background' field or medium. This field mimics the surface wave that accompanies the droplets in the fluid-mechanical experiments. It appears that quite generally such a model can violate the Bell inequality and reproduce the quantum statistics, even if it is based on local dynamics only. The reason is that measurement independence is not valid in such models. This opens the door for local 'background-based' theories, describing the interaction of particles and analyzers with a background field, to complete quantum mechanics. Experiments to test these ideas are also proposed."
(For anyone interested, an example of a theory that derives Schroedinger from a classical particle interacting with a fluctuating background field can be found here: https://web.math.princeton.edu/~nelson/books/qf.pdf .)
edit: and some double-slit https://youtu.be/nsaUX48t0w8?t=4
And it seems the experimental result described isn't a proof or disproof but a "demonstration how this could make sense" - a sort of "this analogy is still valid here" claim of the type that isn't a proof or a disproof.
This phrasing is so unfortunate - a much better understanding of MWI comes from looking at its original name, the "theory of the universal wave function": there is only one universe, it just happens to be described by a single wave function that describes the superposition of many different possible states that the universe could be in.
The nice aspect of this theory is that it is mostly identical to the Copenhagen interpretation, but resolves the problem of wave function collapse in a perfectly clean way: there is no collapse, it's just that the act of observation causes the observer to become entangled with whatever it is that they're observing.
If you really want to talk about multiple universes, you should at least clarify that it is the act of observation that causes the split between universes. So it's not like there are multiple pre-existing universes, and in some of them the electron goes left while in others it goes right. Rather, you as the observer start it one pre-existing universe, and by the observation the universe splits into a "left version" and a "right version". It's a subtle but important difference.
Isn't observation just a particle interaction? Or do you mean a human brain should be present in the loop to register the value.
> the act of observation causes the observer to become entangled with whatever it is that they're observing.
AKA particles interacting => particles get entangled. So they do not factor out cleanly as independent from each other anymore.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Transactional_interpretation
Though at a much earlier stage in the development of such things.
:)
"In Bohmian mechanics, every electron always has a definite position, even if observers are ignorant of what it is. An electron is pushed around by a guiding "pilot wave" that influences the electron's location. While each electron travels through one slit or the other, the pilot wave passes through both slits simultaneously. Interference in the pilot wave leads to the observed interference pattern."
In the unlikely event that I understand this correctly, isn't what Bohmian mechanics calls "the pilot wave" just what the Copenhagen interpretation calls "the electron"? (Or perhaps "the electron's probability distribution"?)
And thus you get nonlocality. Where distant events generate a "bohmian wave" that impact local experiments even if they carry no particles.
I guess you may see it as a case of unobserved butterfly on Pluto cause avalanche on earth, simply because the wing flap set a pilot wave in just the right motion.
In Copenhagen theory, \psi is understood to be mere calculational device the main purpose of which is to get probabilities of results of measurements. There is no idea that particles actually are there moving along trajectories; the subject of the theory are results of measurements and \psi is only a theoretician's tool to get their possible values and probabilities.
> Until a particle is observed, an act that causes the wave function to “collapse,”
The "collapse" is a overly-simplistic way to interpret QM experiments. It's not well-defined because no one's ever been able to define the "observer".
> Quantum mechanics, in contrast, is inherently nonlocal.
This is false, and a common misinterpretation of QM. We do not have any evidence of information travelling faster than the speed of light.
As for nonlocality, entanglement is a fundamentally nonlocal feature of quantum mechanics. There's no way to excise that from the theory, even if you can't exploit it to transmit information faster than light. I'd say calling it inherently nonlocal is entirely fair, that's a very different claim than that we can transmit information faster than light.
...which, as an aside, would not even in and of itself necessarily be problematic, closed timelike loops (for instance) are perfectly fine and good as long as you account for the fact that quantum interference will have very strong effects even at a macro scale in such geometries (the grandfather paradox gets interfered away, more or less, even if macroscopically unlikely things need to happen to end up with a reinforced consistent timeline).
It's actually not false as stated. The author didn't say information travels FTL. Copenhagen gives up realism to satisfy Bell's theorem, but is still non-local.
especially when those things are shown in diagrams with a little image of an eye like in this article
observation of quantum events is very intrusive, and i would argue has an obvious affect on the event's original outcome
it is different from having someone throw a ball in a well lit room, and either having your eyes open or closed
No. The Copenhagen interpretation is not the "standard view."
We don't do things in physics with polls, really. We tend to prefer maths. And, much of the in-your-face weirdness of QM simply goes away with MW. You only have to accept that all paths are taken, but only one is observable to you. Not surprising, since you're an entity that obeys quantum mechanical laws.
Since the actual predictions and experimental evidence for Copenhagen and MW are identical, it doesn't matter which you prefer. If you're not careful you run into philosophy pretty fast here - fun, but not useful.
Copenhagen (kinda, sorta, not really when you do the maths) leads people to think (and I have been guilty of this) that there could be some sort of magical non-quantum 'observer' that causes the wave function to collapse. Which is bollocks.
Many worlds forces you to consider the environment of the system (including the mythical 'observer') as fully quantum systems. Which is much closer to what the maths actually says.
Copenhagen and MW give the same answers, but Copenhagen gives sloppy thinkers a silly avenue to get lost in. "I am a privileged, magical Observer, who is not at any point affected by the measurement I make."
And, hidden variables are so strongly constrained by experimental results that you are out there in the wilds if you propose it. Not actually a crank, but carrying the burden of evidence.
We are an epiphenomenon of quantum objects interacting under the laws of quantum mechanics. And the Many Worlds interpretation allows us to move past the philosophy and make actual, real, testable prediction.
AKA India's Net.