Supposedly, Chris Wright did his ridiculous laptop dance with Gavin Andresen because he didn't want Gavin to leak the signature early.
What a load of crap. These are supposedly real cryptographers we're talking about here. If you ask a cryptographer (including, presumably, Satoshi) how they would prove their identity to someone else such that the other person couldn't leak the proof, the answer doesn't involve airplanes and fishy laptops running dubiously authentic Windows programs. The answer is deniable authentication.
In the bitcoin case, it's trivial. Satoshi's public key is g^p for some p that only Satoshi knows (using multiplicative notation) on a well-known and hopefully secure elliptic curve. You can use this key for ECDSA, but you can also use it for, drumroll please, Diffie-Hellman. Gavin picks a random scalar b and tells Craig Wright g^b. Chris replies with (g^b)^p [1]. Gavin checks that the result is the same as (g^p)^b.
This is deniable: Gavin can trivially make up the transcript of the protocol, so Gavin can't use it to prematurely convince anyone of anything. No airplanes needed.
There are plenty of other ways to do this. Pretty much any zero-knowledge proof of knowledge would work.
[1] In practice, this should be blinded to avoid cross-protocol attacks and relay attacks. Craig could send something like H("Hi Gavin, I am Craig Wright, aka Satoshi Nakamoto" || (g^b)^p). A real cryptographer could double-check me here.